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Abstract 
Health management information systems (HMIS) are implemented in less developed 
countries (LDCs) with the expectation that they will contribute to improving primary 
health care (PHC) delivery. Information generated through these systems is conceived 
as an imperative for better decision making processes and strengthening 
accountability arrangements that underpin the delivery of PHC. Despite strong 
rhetoric and significant investments to support these systems, most HMIS 
implementation in LDCs face challenges of poor data quality and weak accountability 
arrangements that limit their impact on health status. This constitutes a divergence 
from the instrumentality of predetermined indicators measuring health status 
performance that do not necessarily reflect the complex reality underlying how poor 
communities define their health priorities. We therefore highlight that accountability 
for performance management may indeed detract from the objective of improving the 
health of the poor and needs to be understood more broadly.  
 
This study illuminates the challenges and potential of HMIS implementation through 
accountability arrangements that are socially embedded in institutions, interactions 
and interpretations of global and local actors. As such, our primary research question 
is, “To what extent can HMIS improve accountability arrangements of PHC 
delivery?” Employing an interpretivist research methodology, we provide perceptions 
of how interactions between citizens, service providers, bureaucratic and political 
agents dynamically construct, contest and navigate accountability arrangements 
underpinning the provision of health care. This understanding has hitherto been 
limited in the HMIS literature. As a central theme in ICT for Development literature, 
illuminating these interactions furthers our understanding regarding the potential of 
HMIS in improving the lives of the poor. National governments, donors and HMIS 
practitioners will benefit from the practical insights derived from this study especially 
in relation to reconceptualising HMIS analysis to incorporate contextual and 
developmental notions of PHC. With relatively limited HMIS research, Northern 
Nigeria as the empirical context of this study also constitutes a useful contribution to 
the body of knowledge. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This thesis explores the intricacies of how health management information systems 
(HMIS) are implicated in the accountability arrangements underpinning the delivery 
of primary health care (PHC) in less developed countries (LDCs). Accordingly, we 
unpack the interrelated influences between divergent ideologies regarding healthcare 
and development, the role of information in health care delivery and accountability 
arrangements that reflect particular notions of information and specific developmental 
views of health. The empirical context of this study is located within the Nigerian 
PHC system. Nigeria has one of the weakest health systems in the world, reporting 
correspondingly high mortality and morbidity rates and poor human development 
index. For instance, the Mo Ibrahim index on governance ranked the country 51 out 
of 53 African countries on health delivery (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2011).  
 
We design this study as a multilevel interpretive case study analysing national 
PHC/HMIS policy agenda, localised implementation at sub national levels and 
developmental experiences from the perspective of poor citizens. For this purpose, we 
identify a series of HMIS implementation efforts and health systems strengthening 
activities underway in Northern Nigeria (a region mostly with the poorest health 
status and developmental indices in the country). HMIS are often defined as decision-
making tools for healthcare managers. From this conception, emphasis is placed on 
technological (digital and non-digital) artefacts implemented to aid the systematic 
process of collecting, storing, analysing, disseminating and using data for the 
improvement of health service delivery (AbouZahr and Boerma 2005; Stansfield 
2005). In this study, we broaden this conception to include both formal and informal 
HMIS (Mutemwa 2006), reaching beyond the technological to incorporate the social, 
institutional, organisational and cognitive realities. This broader HMIS definition 
reflects a tradition of information system research that adopts a critical socio-technical 
perspective (for example see Avgerou 2002). 
 
The urgency for poor countries to implement HMIS is fuelled by a number of 
expected returns that: quality information improves health care management decisions 
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and policy formulation; empowers citizens by increasing their understanding of issues 
that affect their health; and is a critical governance tool for enhancing accountability 
for donor resources (Carlson 2007). These benefits have largely remained unrealised 
(Heeks 2006, Littlejohns et al. 2003). This study explores the extent to which HMIS 
can improve PHC accountability arrangements necessary for improving the health and 
wellbeing of poor communities.  
 
Background to research domain  
Dire Health Status 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is regarded as one of the most poverty-stricken regions in 
the world (Chen and Ravallion 2004). In contrast to global trends, poverty has been 
on the rise in sub-Saharan Africa over the last twenty-five years (Collier 2007). For 
the last three decades, over half of the population have lived below $1.25 a day and 
almost seventy-five percent live below $2 a day (Chen and Ravallion 2008). Basic 
public and social amenities for the most vulnerable are either absent or inadequate. 
There is a mutually influencing relationship between the state of poverty in SSA and 
health status of the population (Handley, Higgins et al. 2009). Failing public health 
systems are particularly alarming, resulting in high mortality and morbidity levels 
especially in rural communities and among women and children. For instance, 
African countries account for 90% of the ten worst under-5 mortality rankings 
(UNICEF 2009). Maternal mortality on average is 900 per 100,000 compared to 27 
per 100,000 live births in Europe (WHO 2009). Only 14% of children less than five 
years old sleep under insecticide-treated nets (ITN) in a region where an average of 
104 per 100,000 of these under-fives die of malaria every year (WHO 2009).  
 
Health status is particularly dire in Nigeria. Since independence over half a century 
ago, health indicators have remained poor and in some cases even worse (HERFON 
2006; HERFON 2008). Thus, Nigeria is judged to have one of the lowest living 
conditions in the world (allWestAfrica 2010). The WHO, in 2000, ranked the 
country’s health system performance within the bottom five of its member states 
(WHO 2000). Not much has changed over the last decade (Enogholase 2010) with 
government expenditure on health less than 5% of general government expenditure 
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instead of the 15% pledged at the Abuja declaration in 2001 (Africa Public Health 
2009-2010). In Nigeria, only 6% (less than half the average for the African region) of 
under-fives sleep under ITNs (UNICEF 2009) and maternal mortality rate could be as 
high as 1500 per 100,000 (WHO Not Dated). Between 1990 and 2011, maternal 
deaths in Nigeria have almost doubled from just over 16,000 to over 31,000 and the 
country has one of the slowest rates of decline in child mortality (Lozano, Wang et al. 
2011). There are significant regional variation is health status within Nigeria. For 
instance, maternal mortality ratio in the North East is almost ten times higher than in 
the South West (HERFON 2006) as only 12% of women in North East Nigeria give 
birth in a health facility compared to 70% in the South West (National Population 
Commission and ICF Macro 2009). There have been efforts by the international 
community to reverse the tide of the poverty and ill health. A significant initiative in 
this direction has been the introduction of PHCs as the primary means of health care 
delivery.   
 
Failing PHC Systems 
In the late 1970s, the primary health care system was decided at Alma Ata to be the 
model for health service delivery. This involved the decentralisation of the health 
sector in such a way that communities will have a greater input in the provision of 
their health services. More importantly, the ideological underpinning of this model 
was universal access to basic healthcare with a central focus on the socio-economic 
and political determinants of health (WHO 1978; Cueto 2004). By the late 1980s, 
what were essentially social-welfare principles had been replaced by the efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness approach of selective primary health care (Cueto 2004). There 
was also a corresponding shift by the international development community to 
provide assistance on the condition that aid recipients adhere to trade and economic 
liberalisation policies articulated both in the Washington (Williamson 1990) and post-
Washington Consensus (Stiglitz 1998). These policies favoured an economic growth 
approach, which relies on a ‘trickle-down’ effect. Healthcare management have since 
been dominated by policies promoting technological interventions and efficiency 
gains.  
In the late 1980s, the WHO and UNICEF sponsored the Bamako Initiative which was 
adopted by African health ministers. The objective of the initiative was to strengthen 
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the already waning PHC services by introducing a minimum service package (MSP) 
for all primary health centres. By doing this, the initiative sought to improve cost-
effectiveness, efficiency and equity of health service provision (Soucat 1997).  At the 
time health budgets in many African countries were already significantly reduced. 
This was part of the broader structural adjustment programme demanding austerity 
measures through fiscal discipline. A major component of this approach was for 
communities to finance and manage medical supplies through a drug revolving fund. 
The required introduction of user fees nevertheless had a negative impact on poor 
people in the community (UNICEF Not dated).  
 
Weak HMIS 
There is widespread support for the adoption of HMIS as a mechanism for improving 
healthcare service delivery (Idowu, Cornford et al. 2008) by facilitating the process of 
collecting, storing, analysing and disseminating data (AbouZahr and Boerma 2005), 
for better policies and decision-making processes. A particular objective is making 
health care providers accountable to funders (government and donors) in terms of 
efficient use of resources (Stansfield 2005). Despite the investments in these systems, 
their implementation in developing countries has been shrouded in partial or complete 
“failure” (Heeks 2006, Littlejohns et al. 2003). In Nigeria, problems encountered in 
the implementation of HMIS include the lack of an information culture, problem of 
scaling up (Shaw, Mengiste et al. 2007), inappropriate infrastructure, low 
management capacity and lack of trained workforce especially at the primary care 
level. The country’s National Health Management Information System (NHMIS) is 
noted to be weak (especially in terms of data reliability) in supporting the PHC 
system (Sambo, Lewis et al. 2005; Adindu and Babatunde 2006) with this leading to  
“serious limitations in the value of the health information that “data-led” 
national information system could provide, particularly regarding its 
availability and usefulness for decision-making processes at local level” 
(HERFON 2008: 304).  
 
HMIS are implemented in LDCs to improve decision-making and accountability 
arrangements. We adopt the term “less developed countries” without intentions to 
address the fierce debates that surround the notion of development (for example 
Escobar 1995; Thomas 2000; Kothari and Minogue 2002; Escobar 2002). Instead, our 
choice is a practical one: relative to more developed countries, LDCs
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rates of morbidity and mortality. It therefore seems logical to avoid the use of the 
term “Third World” because this might conjure imperialist connotations; on the other 
hand employing developing countries seem to suggest a modernisation perspective 
where there is a know trajectory for development. We are inclined to exercise caution 
about attributing a causal design to development. Escobar (2002) articulates a 
convincing argument in this regard: 
“The coherence of effects of the development discourse should not signify 
any sort of intentionality. As the discourses discussed by Foucault, 
development must be seen as a “strategy without strategists,” in the sense 
that nobody is explicitly masterminding it; if is the result of a historical 
problematization and a systematized response to it.” (Pg. 91) 
  
The use of LDCs in this thesis therefore point generally to whole regions and 
countries facing desperate healthcare challenges and weak institutional arrangements 
that can adequately support PHC delivery.  
 
Our research question is presented in the form of a primary question, providing an 
overarching direction, and three interrelated sub questions. These are as follows: 
 
Primary Research Question: “To what extent can HMIS improve the accountability 
arrangements underpinning the delivery of PHC in LDCs?  
Sub-research Questions: 
a) How are HMIS implicated in the accountability arrangements underpinning 
PHC delivery in LDCs? 
b) How can we better understand the challenges of HMIS implementation in 
LDCs through the complexities of PHC accountability mechanisms? 
c) What kind of developmental transformation is implied in the implementation 
of HMIS from an accountability perspective? 
 
Current research in the literature have either conceptualised accountability from a 
narrow technological or instrumental view or not sufficiently engaged in 
problematising the concept in the context of LDCs.  
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Approaches in the literature 
Approaches in the literature have been wide and varied: there are studies that 
concentrate on managerial implications of HMIS (Al-Alawi 2006), designing the 
system (Aqil, Lippeveld et al. 2009), the social infrastructure of HMIS 
implementation (Asangasi and Shaguy 2009); HMIS as supporting decentralised 
organisational structures (Ausse, Omar et al. 1995); HMIS as technology in the health 
sector (Bernardi 2009); others have emphasised the particular institutional context in 
which HMIS is implemented (Bishaw 2008).  
 
We focus on two broad approaches to HMIS studies in LDCs: the first is a technical, 
a-contextual view that emphasises HMIS as tools for achieving an objectified end. 
The second view provides a more nuanced approach to HMIS studies by elucidating 
how these systems embody contestations of particular values deriving from the 
context where they are developed and/or implemented. This thesis follows in the 
tradition of the latter approach and builds on it.  
Techno-economic approaches 
This view somewhat objectifies the technological potential of HMIS to improve 
healthcare delivery (see for example Edejer 2000). A few examples in the literature 
include, the extent of broadband penetration and expansion of internet access in recent 
years enabling health education communication en masse (Gupta and Papagari 2004) 
and serving as a global information gateway for health practitioners to develop their 
knowledge and improve their service to patients (Niessen, Grijseels et al. 2000). The 
implication of these assumptions is that the desired end is undisputedly universal. For 
instance, it is assumed that service providers want to provide better services and 
improve their ability to account for their activities. The literature also states one of the 
benefits of ICT-based HMIS implementation as knowledge diffusion. In the HMIS 
literature this is sometimes presented in terms of bridging the digital divide which 
limits the access of health professionals in LDCs to current knowledge and research in 
best practice (see Edejer 2000; Godlee, Pakenham-Walsh et al. 2004). From a global 
health policy perspective, the WHO’s World report on knowledge for better health 
highlights the importance of health information systems in addressing global health 
inequities (Nolen, Braveman et al. 2005) and meeting the health-component targets of 
the Millennium Development Goals (WHO 2004). The assumptions made are that 
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health practitioners indeed value this knowledge and that this knowledge will be used 
for improving accountability and services to users. The literature is replete with 
notions of health as a commodity contributing to economic productivity. From an 
economic perspective, priority diseases that are calculated to have high economic 
impact, like malaria (Gallup and Sachs 2001) are seen to be obvious candidates. 
HMIS were introduced against the backdrop of this instrumentality as LDCs instituted 
a raft of administrative and health systems reforms according to the imperatives of 
selective PHC (SPHC). The logic of this instrumentality relies on a predefined course 
of action to achieve a predetermined and objectively desirable outcome. Reflecting 
this rationality, HMIS are conceived as managerial and technological tools 
implemented to support evidence-based health care delivery and performance 
evaluation of vertical (disease-focussed) interventions. As most LDCs depend on 
donor aid for implementing their health programmes, measuring performance against 
financial assistance is considered to be of utmost importance. Donors have therefore 
increasingly made recourse to the good governance agenda to set out, amongst other 
criteria, accountability parameters as conditions for aid provided to recipient 
countries. These are often based on measurable indicators for financial and 
managerial accountability. As part of these conditions, recipient countries are 
expected to adopt principles of public sector efficiency and transparency, with HMIS 
playing a key role. In LDCs, the goals of rational decision-making have been marred 
by unintended outcomes, while the predetermined objectives of tackling major 
diseases still prove to be elusive. In Nigeria, HMIS-supported accountability in terms 
of filling forms and reporting data has been reported to be weak because of poor 
capacity (Osa-Eloka, Nwakoby et al. 2009) and a bias towards hierarchical 
information demands rather than local use (Adindu and Babatunde 2006). These 
typify locally situated practices that are tangential to the predefined expectations of 
HMIS supporting a formalised accountability arrangement. Consequently, HMIS 
implementations seldom achieve a predetermined and expected end but rather are 
implicated in unpredictable and fluid outcomes. For instance, an account of Nigeria’s 
PHC initiative express sentiments that suggest that challenges faced are not just 
economic: 
“In some respects, Nigeria’s record in health development has been 
disappointing in that smaller, poorer neighbours have outstripped us in the 
achievements of their health services. This observation is not to deny that 
Nigeria is well able to provide strong leadership within the African region 
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on health development based on the principles of primary health care. Our 
slow start is in part related to the enormous size of our population, the great 
diversity of language and culture and the complex political systems in the 
federal state” (HERFON 2008: xi) 
 
In addition, the weakness of accountability in PHC governance means that, “many 
Nigerians still lack access to formal health care services” (HERFORN 2006: 60). 
Consequently, accountability structures that underlie PHC delivery suggest that while 
there are formal instrumental arrangements defining roles, responsibilities and targets 
for PHC delivery, there are also socio-cultural and political dynamics at play, which 
are implicated in the way these formal demands are interpreted, localised and 
redefined.  
The limitation of instrumental approaches is brought to the fore in the divergence 
between objectified formulations - linking information to decision and actual practice 
- that confound prescriptive analytics (Klecun-Dabrowska 2002). The technical 
instrumental approach does not illuminate the intricate social dynamics that modulate 
and contest the goal of PHC accountability. This has been indicated in critical HMIS 
studies that show the problematic nature in the logic underpinning the assumed 
positive associations between information/knowledge and decisions (Mutemwa 
2006). More broadly, ICTD capability studies have proposed that ICTs (such as 
HMIS) potentials require the converting of resources such as information into 
effective capability sets (Kleine 2010). In HMIS research, this is implied through 
attempts to understand the capacity or agency of communities in defining their health 
priorities and participating in formulating strategies regarding the delivery of primary 
health care. This shifts focus from the binary functions defining those with access to 
technology versus those without and rather focus on the lack of requisite capability 
necessary to convert potential resources into increased opportunities for engaging in 
social, economic and political activities (Zheng 2009) that underpin the delivery of 
primary health care. As such the capabilities approach show that ICTs (or HMIS 
specifically), on their own are not able to generate significant improvement in the 
lives of the poor (and their health care) but requires a holistic strategy that help poor 
people to effectively take advantage of the potentials of ICTs (Zheng and Walsham 
2008). 
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In summary, the implementation of HMIS has mainly been conceived from a narrow 
techno-economic rationality. Their design is usually based on a top-down approach 
that assumes universal principles apply regardless of contexts. The motivation 
underlying their potential contribution to strengthening health care delivery has 
therefore been predominantly articulated in terms of cost effectiveness, service 
efficiency and rational decision-making. These arguments draw from similar concerns 
raised in the IS and ICTD literature (Avgerou 2002; Avgerou 2010). Experience 
shows in the case of HMIS that there are complexities of variation and divergence in 
how health and health care problems are defined by local communities including local 
interpretations of health and illness (Good 1994 in Miscione 2007). What is often 
missing in a technical instrumental approach is the people-centred view and by 
extension how the social context in which these systems are implemented bear upon 
the analysis of the outcome of their implementation. This is critical within the primary 
health care system that requires responsiveness to the health priorities of the 
community. The articulation of health priorities and the intricacies surrounding how 
they are met (or not) requires analytical approaches with tools for understanding the 
nature social interactions in the provision of public services. The approach of this 
study is therefore context sensitive. 
Context-sensitive approaches 
Avgerou argues that a context sensitive view of ICT implementation goes beyond 
analysing technological artefacts but spans a wider analytical space including socio-
cultural and political arrangements (Avgerou 2010). She notes that IS implementation 
studies following the social embeddedness tradition  
 
“see the purpose of ICT innovation as arising from local problematizations, 
and its course as being shaped by the way local actors make sense of it and 
accommodate it in their lives” (Avgerou, 2002 in Avgerou 2010: 4). 
 
 
This has implications for the developmental role of HMIS as a form of ICTD. In 
terms of healthcare delivery, this developmental ideology resonates with general 
PHC, where priority is given to the role of communities in defining their health 
priorities and participating in formulating strategies regarding the delivery of primary 
health care (Cueto 2004). The important point to note is that these are situated 
approaches to HMIS research seeking to account for the notion of locally defined 
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development parameters including “culture and local context, civil society 
involvement, local participation, decentralisation and transparency” (Soeftestad and 
Sein 2003: 69). This addresses the attitudes, understanding, and behaviour of local 
officials, healthcare providers and communities. Therefore this view provides 
analytical means and insight into the varied and divergent sense-making process that 
typifies PHC delivery and accountability arrangements.  
 
 
While the problems highlighted in the implementation of HMIS are relevant, what is 
still missing is a good understanding of the processes through which these systems 
actually impact the delivery of healthcare services to communities. HMIS 
implementation is often designed to capture disease incidence, service utilisation and 
produce various management reports. Higher-level government officials and funders 
require this output for performance monitoring and resource allocation (Carlson 
2007). It is usually the case that health workers either do not have the capacity to use 
the data or do not find the data locally relevant. Indeed most of the data elements are 
decided at a distance involving a range of high-level public officials and international 
donor organisations (Madon and Krishna 2010). The volume of data required often 
makes it less likely for public officials to monitor these. The experience in most 
developing countries is that the accountability mechanisms and institutional 
arrangements required are often weak or inappropriate and therefore limit the 
reliability of the HMIS (see for example, Heywood 2008).  
 
Aims of Research 
The main differences between the approaches discussed are not just in techniques, 
strategies or means through which HMIS is conceived to support PHC delivery. 
Rather, these go deeper into ideologies regarding PHC from a developmental view, 
the nature of accountability consequent on the particular notion of PHC adopted and 
the role of HMIS in this relationship. A preponderance of literature debate divergent 
economic perspectives promoted in global health policy (see for example,  Paglin 
1974; Szreter 1997; Macfarlane, Racelis et al. 2000; WHO 2000; Gallup and Sachs 
2001; Deaton 2003; Waitzkin 2003; Sachs 2004); Other perspectives such as a special 
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series by the British Medical Journal present studies on the socio-economic causation 
of health status (see Bartley, Blane et al. 1997; Brunner 1997; James, Nelson et al. 
1997; Kawachi and Kennedy 1997; Roberts 1997) and other still on behavioural and 
cultural factors (Anderson, Davies et al. 1989; Conner and Norman 1996; Norman, 
Abraham et al. 2006). These debates are particularly rife in the context of LDCs. We 
therefore need to understand HMIS from a developmental view especially as a form 
of ICTD.   
 
The nature and mechanisms through which information and communication 
technologies contribute to development (ICTD) has been an important discourse in 
both academic and policy debates. ICTD conceptualisations are useful in discussing 
theoretical approaches to HMIS implementation.  ICTD literature has called for a 
closer and more explicit conceptualisation of development. In this regard there have 
been studies advocating that the contribution of ICTs to development must extend 
beyond economic growth (for example, Madon 2000; Soeftestad and Sein 2003; 
Kleine 2010). It is therefore critical for studies located in LDC contexts to explore 
ways in which ICTs such as HMIS are implicated in development.  
From this viewpoint, this study positions HMIS in relation to its role in supporting a 
responsive and locally relevant healthcare delivery service. This thesis approaches 
responsiveness through the notion of accountability. Accountability itself is 
problematized in order to fully explore how HMIS may or may not support these 
arrangements in LDCs. In this relationship, some authors have conceptualised HMIS 
as playing a role to support bureaucratic and democratic accountability through 
formal and informal organisational arrangements (Madon, Krishna et al. 2010). The 
aim of this thesis is therefore to address the necessity of a real-world context where 
different forms of accountability are required to analyse the implementation of HMIS 
in terms of their potential roles and challenges. By focussing on a real-world context 
it is implied that HMIS conceptualisations must achieve a balance between 
managerial functions and situated responsiveness. Therefore, while maintaining its 
managerial functions HMIS must also be conceived in a way that is responsive to 
community needs. This approach is in the spirit of what Roberts (1991) proposes in 
the case of informal and formal (hierarchical) forms of accountability when he 
suggests that “there is little hope that the communicative and moral potentials of the 
informal organization will be able to supplant the overarching instrumentalism 
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reproduced through the hierarchy” (Pg. 356) instead “the lateral ties that are produced 
do much to secure the routine interdependence of action upon which effective 
organization depends” (Pg. 364). 
Expected Research Contributions  
Academic 
By placing HMIS studies within an accountability framework, this study attempts to 
provide a conceptualisation of HMIS as developmental interaction between health 
providers, local administration and citizens. This has hitherto been limited in the 
literature. The illumination of this interface helps to further contribute to the literature 
on the developmental dimension of ICTD and the ways in which ICTs can actually 
impact on the lives of the poor.  
The contextual analysis provided by socializing forms accountability might also go 
some way in unpacking HMIS challenges in achieving instrumental accountability. In 
a sense we might begin to see how particular forms of interaction influence the 
outcome of hierarchical information demands and accountability. Furthermore, HMIS 
implementation in the Nigerian context is rarely found in the literature.  
 
Policy 
This study hopes to shed understanding on the interdependent micro-level factors that 
impact the health of poor communities and the governance arrangements 
underpinning healthcare delivery. The implications of this study for HMIS analysis 
and implementation might help policy makers reformulate PHC HMIS development 
and implementation as experimental and contextual. In addition it helps to provide a 
framework to go beyond the instrumental view of HMIS implementation. In a sense 
this allows PHC policy formulations to incorporate a broader understanding of HMIS 
into primary healthcare delivery strategies. This may include developing different 
categories of data relevant to health at a community level (Madon and Krishna 2010).     
 
PHC HMIS implementation is particularly critical because the rationale underpinning 
these systems is based on community level interventions especially for the rural poor. 
This study can therefore provide useful insights on potential transformational avenues 
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and explanatory factors for understanding the challenges currently faced in their 
implementation. 
Thesis Chapter Outline 
The reset of this thesis is structured as follows:  
 
Chapter 2: provides a critical review of the literature. This traces the different 
understandings regarding the link between PHC and development focussing 
especially on the transformational dimensions of ICTD. The role of HMIS is then 
considered in light of accountability arrangements that have far-reaching 
consequences for the delivery of primary healthcare delivery. This chapter ends by 
framing the research questions that will guide the thesis.  
 
Chapter 3: expands on key concepts from the literature review as theoretical 
propositions to sensitise the design of the empirical fieldwork as well as provide a 
guide for data analysis.  
 
Chapter 4: discusses the philosophical and methodological underpinnings of this 
study and their epistemological implications of the nature of contribution made to 
scholarship.  
 
Chapter 5: the case study used for empirical fieldwork is detailed in Chapter 5. This 
broadly describes the Nigerian primary healthcare system and then concentrates on 
Northern Nigeria before centring on Jigawa state and Tsakuwawa community.  
 
Chapter 6: analysis of the case study is presented using theoretical constructs 
developed in Chapter Three.   
 
Chapter 7: discusses further conclusions from the case study analysis, presents 
implications of the findings for HMIS research and provides a critical evaluation of 
the thesis as a research project in terms of its contributions. This chapter also presents 
weaknesses, limitations and recommendations for further study. 
  
  28 
  Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
HMIS and Primary Health Care in LDCs 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the discourse surrounding the implementation of HMIS in 
developing countries to support the delivery of PHC services. Given the divergent 
ideologies regarding PHC delivery, HMIS discourse is debated within the broader 
role of either contributing to health as a developmental commodity i.e. in terms of 
economic or productivity value, or directly to human development as indicated in the 
original ideology underpinning PHC. This latter view evolves from a particular socio-
political, economic and cultural context and is based on a participatory approach 
where health care priorities and delivery are contingent on the democratic engagement 
between state and society. The former view however is reflected in selective PHC 
ideologies, where health care objectives are disease-focussed and priority given to 
biomedical interventions and principles of efficiency and cost effectiveness. Global 
health policy and donor programmes typically favour this technical view and 
consequently implement and conceptualise HMIS as tools for improving PHC 
delivery.  
The implementation of HMIS is therefore often based on an instrumental rationality 
that conceives of an unambiguous relationship that the availability of quality 
information will lead to better health policies and decision-making for the efficient 
and effective delivery of PHC services. To some degree HMIS implementation can be 
analysed from an instrumental perspective as they are introduced in health 
management administration to achieve predetermined objectives according to a set of 
predefined processes and rules. In this respect, HMIS are conceived as improving 
health care delivery by exploiting technological innovations to improve the process of 
data-driven decision-making.  However, the limitations of an instrumental approach 
are evident in the gap between expectations and actual experiences that constitute 
tangential outcomes. To understand these divergence, HMIS implementation are 
conceived as socially embedded in order to account for the unpredictable and complex 
interaction of multiple agents and institutions. In this regard, HMIS are construed as 
socio-technical systems with their implementation outcome highly situated, socially 
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constructed, constantly negotiated and inevitably contested. Consequently, HMIS 
design, implementation and use are necessarily contingent on the socio-cultural, 
political and institutional arrangements of the context in which they are introduced. It 
is noteworthy that an intrinsic component of this context is the hierarchical 
information demands of an instrumental approach. Accentuated by donors’ 
involvement in supporting health care systems in LDCs (Ashraf 2005), one of the key 
demands is for HMIS to support formalised accountability arrangements that are 
measured in terms of predetermined performance indicators (Wild and Domingo 
2010). From a socially embedded understanding the focus is on illuminating how 
these accountability arrangements are interpreted locally and therefore modulated.  
 
Accountability arrangements are especially critical in the delivery of primary 
healthcare due to the heterogeneous interests represented by stakeholders such as 
donors, health ministries/parastatals and communities. Therefore, one of the alleged 
developmental contributions of HMIS is improving PHC accountability mechanisms 
through a decentralised organisational structure. However, in HMIS research, 
accountability is either treated superficially i.e. in a non-critical way (for example 
AbouZahr and Boerma 2005) and/or biased towards instrumental accountability 
which are derived from the expediencies of performance management (Braa and 
Hedberg 2000). This constitutes an important gap in the literature, reflecting limited 
understanding and appreciation of the accountability arrangements through which 
HMIS can improve PHC delivery.  
 
The rest of this chapter is divided into five sections: the first section provides a brief 
review of perspectives of PHC as a route to development; next we present the role of 
information and knowledge in health policy and decision-making; the section 
following explores pertinent issues surrounding the implementation of HMIS in 
LDCs; the penultimate section connects HMIS to accountability; and the last section 
synthesises the main themes in the literature review and identifies gaps in the 
literature. 
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Perspectives of PHC as a route to development  
Development ideologies address the constitution and reconstitution of society (Leys 
1996), therefore not only do they influence the process and means of (PHC 
contributing to) development but also the goal of development (Pieterse 2000). These 
ideologies are underpinned predominantly by two different rationalities: a socially 
embedded view that attempts to understand the contingent nature of health and 
healthcare delivery through the way it evolves from a particular socio-political and 
cultural context, and an instrumental rationality that predefines what health is in a 
manner that allows for measurable and technical interventions.  In this section we 
review these two perspectives of PHC and their underlying developmental goals. 
 
Social development approach 
Before gaining independence, many LDCs like Nigeria, inherited a health system 
based on secondary care, primarily serving the needs of colonial administrators who 
suffered fatalities from tropical diseases (HERFON 2006; HERFON 2008). In the 
newly independent states, this approach to health care delivery continued as mostly 
selective, serving a new privileged social class of indigenes but failing to meet the 
health needs of the general population, especially the rural poor (Roemer 1986). With 
the resulting high rates of mortality and morbidity among the poor, the international 
health community turned its attention to the central concern that majority of the 
population in LDCs lacked access to basic health care services (Orubuloye and 
Yoyeneye 1982). An effort to address these failing systems was articulated in the 
WHO Alma Ata declaration (WHO 1978). This declaration conceived of health as a 
fundamental human right and therefore promoted universal access to basic health 
services. Primary health care (PHC) was proposed as the main approach to achieving 
equitable health service delivery within and between countries (Starfield, Shi et al. 
2005). PHC was introduced based on the implicit assumption that diseases in 
developing countries were contingent on socio-economic arrangements and therefore 
interventions required political will rather than sophisticated biomedical interventions 
(Cueto 2004). The Alma Ata declaration of “health for all” is based on decentralised, 
community-led (Tarimo and Fowkes 1989), preventative programmes (Atkinson, 
Medeiros et al. 2000) that foster local accountability, responsiveness (Cornwall, 
Lucas et al. 2000), and sustainable health systems through a participatory approach 
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(WHO 1978; Starfield, Shi et al. 2005). This approach emphasises the need for 
communities to be able to actively participate in the delivery of their health care 
(Gilson and Schneider 2010). By focussing on the community-level, proponents of 
the PHC systems suggest that health services are more accessible and interventions 
are likely to be more responsive to local needs as there is increased opportunity for 
effective local participation (Tarimo and Fowkes 1989). The rationale is that there is 
increased accountability and improved health care service when policies and 
intervention strategies are formulated with the users to reflect local priorities 
(Cornwall, Lucas et al. 2000). With this system, less emphasis is placed on 
technologically sophisticated and curative bio-medical interventions (Bossert 1979).  
Essentially, PHC delivery from the Alma Ata view is context-sensitive, evolving 
from a particular socioeconomic and cultural context, highlighting organisational 
arrangements for community engagement (Atkinson, Medeiros et al. 2000).  Health is 
seen as constitutive of development with the aim of improving socio-political and 
economic opportunities that expand the freedom of individuals to engage in matters 
that relate to their health (Sen 1999). As such, poverty is not just instrumentally 
undesirable in terms of unaffordable access to health care services, but embodies the 
erosion of individuals’ right and capacity to fully participate in decisions regarding 
their health care delivery (Macfarlane, Racelis et al. 2000). This engagement implies 
that in addition to political freedom, communities must be afforded the requisite 
social and economic opportunities that will enable them to effectively exercise their 
rights within a democratic space.  
Similarly, poor citizens need a formal institution to support “collective voice and 
action” (Mehrotra 2006). In this spirit, Mehrotra (2006) developed a model of 
democratic decentralisation that focuses on how local functionaries can provide 
effective delivery of basic social services to poor communities. It captures a three-
way dynamic relationship between an active central government, well-resourced 
local authority and functioning civil society (Tendler 1997 in Kjær 2004). 
Nevertheless, the mere existence of these three do not lead to effective service 
delivery unless central governments, local governments and civil society are bound in 
a mutually accountable relationship. The essence of this accountability is premised 
on the intrinsic value of health, which is to be provided by states according to 
principles of social justice (WHO 1978; Orubuloye and Yoyeneye 1982; Roemer 
1986). Not long after the Alma Ata declaration, this approach was seen as too 
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idealistic and replaced by an instrumental view of health as economic commodity 
(Hall and Taylor 2003).      
 
 
Economic view 
The end of the Cold War era ushered in the dominating influence of neo-liberal 
ideologies, and brought with it change of priorities in relations between donor and 
recipient countries (Cueto 2004). Upheavals in global politics and the failure of state-
driven economies corresponded to a shift from PHC to selective primary health care 
(SPHC) (Hall and Taylor 2003; Cueto 2004). Cueto describes this new era as a 
change of emphasis in PHC ideology from a people-centred welfare strategy to the 
biomedical technological approach of SPHC (2004). This model assumes that 
diseases in developing countries are a natural phenomenon and therefore renders them 
amenable to economically viable and technical interventions (Cueto 2004). 
Underpinning this approach is an instrumental rationality that defines health to fit the 
logic of a rational biomedical perspective. This is reflected in health systems reform 
initiatives defined as “…“purposeful” in the sense of emerging from a rational, 
planned and evidence-based process...”(Berman 1995). As such, health reforms in 
LDCs prioritise the tackling of major diseases (Unger, Paepe et al. 2003) through 
efficient (Mills 1995) and economically viable means (Sen and Koivusalo 1998). This 
approach essentially represents a new public management (NPM) health model 
(Cueto 2004) conceived from the union between neo-liberal ideology1(Segall 2003) 
and public administration (Dunleavy and Hood 1994; Gray and Jenkins 1995; Hood 
1995; Heeks 1999; Gruening 2001). Health reform policy context parallels a wave of 
changes addressing public sector productivity crises in developed countries (Berman 
and Bossert 2000). Generally, NPM is a term used to illustrate a particular type of 
administrative reform that “adopts private sector management model” (Criado, 
Hughes et al. 2002) with strong emphasis on performance targets (Hood 1991). These 
                                                
1 It must be noted that change initiatives in the public sector are not restricted to a 
specific political ideology and some authors have attempted a more comprehensive 
analysis of the origins of NPM (see Gruening 2001). 
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efforts are underpinned by a managerialist approach to development (see Gulrajani 
2009).   
Against this backdrop, the notion of good governance evolved from international 
donors’ efforts to redefine the modalities and mechanisms for aid provision (Santiso 
and Nitze 2001) while stipulating institutional reforms towards economic 
liberalisation and democratisation (Doornbos 2003). These reforms promote the 
limited role of the state in public service provision like health care (Loewenson 1993) 
and the ascendancy of marketisation ideologies. Thus constructing a depoliticised 
instrument for donor communities to influence health policies and programmes in 
LDCs (Okuonzi and Macrae 1995). For instance, in return for financial aid, LDCs 
committed to structural adjustment policies (Loewenson 1993; Cornia 2001; Olowu 
and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. 2001) as a form of 
fiscal discipline in public sector spending (Doornbos 2003; Waitzkin 2003). These 
policies have been criticised for further weakening PHC delivery (Segall 2003; 
Chatora and Tumusime 2004). Therewith, the decentralisation of public health 
services in LDCs (which is a feature of primary health care) is conflated with the 
means of rolling back the state (Collins and Green 1994). A major implication of this 
techno-economic approach to PHC delivery is the lack of appreciation for the 
informal institutions and situated organisational arrangements that constitute a 
comprehensive view of health care delivery (Atkinson, Medeiros et al. 2000; 
Atkinson 2002). Instead, the principal focus of SPHC reform initiatives have been 
administrative decentralisation in terms of cost-savings, efficiency gains and new 
public management, rather than democratic decentralisation which emphasises the 
need for local participation (Bossert 1998). 
 
SPHC view resonates with influential policy reports (such as the (United Nations 
Development Programme 2001; World Bank 2002), Commission on Macroeconomics 
and Health (WHO 2000; Sachs 2004), Kirkman et al., 2002). It is also from this 
standpoint that health economists advocate for increased investment in health (Sachs 
2001; Sachs 2002; Sachs 2004) and the need for innovative sources of funding 
(Blaauw, Gilson et al. 2003). These approaches however imply universal objectives 
(Tarimo and Fowkes 1989) of development as economic growth without much 
reference to the socio-cultural context within which these objectives are made sense 
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of (Fine 2001; Fine, Lapavitsas et al. 2006). Atkinson (1995: 497) points to a similar 
lack of contextual understanding in PHC research studies:  
“…the managerial aims of health sector reform are only in part to improve 
coverage. They also include improved quality, effectiveness, efficiency, 
and humanity or acceptability with improved equity. Wider social 
development goals of reforms are not even considered in these health 
services research models.”  
 
The ideological preferment of SPHC, sustains the emphasis on a technological, 
disease-focussed model of health care delivery, which has failed to adequately 
address the health needs of LDCs (Magnussen, Ehiri et al. 2004). For instance poor 
regions like sub-Saharan Africa are generally lagging behind especially as rural 
primary health care systems are most backward (Godlee, Pakenham-Walsh et al. 
2004).   
 
There are contentions that these global health policy imperatives are highly influenced 
by the sedimentation of modernisation ethos (Garrett 2007), which is the prevalent 
view of development (Gardner and Lewis 1996; Schech and Haggis 2000). In this 
tradition, one of the hallmarks of modernity is the diffusion of technological artefacts 
(Rostow 1960) - seen in the digitisation of public service delivery (Bellamy and 
Taylor 1994; Atkinson, Medeiros et al. 2000; Ho 2002) - as both the means and 
objective of development (Eggleston, Jensen et al. 2002). The central tenets being that 
the goals of development are rendered technical in order to propose instrumental tools 
to achieve them (Hasselskog 2009). Schön summarises the limitation of this approach 
as follows: 
“Technological rationality depends on agreement about ends. When ends 
are fixed and clear, then the decision to act can present itself as an 
instrumental problem. But when ends are confused and conflicting, there is 
as yet no problem to solve. A conflict of ends cannot be resolved by the use 
of techniques derived from applied research. It is rather through the non-
technical process of framing the problematic situation that we may organize 
and clarify both the ends to achieve and the possible means of achieving 
them” (Schön 1996: 16). 
 
While it is vitally important to address diseases as well as general welfare (Gonzalez 
2005), the instrumental approach of SPHC narrows the developmental objectives of 
these interventions to measurable economic indicators (Atkinson, Cohn et al. 2005), 
requiring efficiency-driven public sector management and biomedical interventions 
(Hall and Taylor 2003). This approach renders the technicalisation of health care 
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objectives possible by conceiving of health primarily as the absence of (major) 
diseases. However, there are complexities of variation and divergence in how health 
care problems are defined and how local communities interpret health and illness 
(Good 1994 in Miscione 2007). It is this need to address incongruent ends that 
development is reconceptualised to accommodate the multidimensional nature of 
human development and welfare as opposed to commodities and economic growth 
indices (Sen 1999). The original conception of PHC is that health is not just the 
absence of disease (WHO 1978) but embedded within socially constructed values of 
general wellbeing; appropriate PHC delivery is thus locally negotiated through 
interactions between communities, services providers and political agents. This 
holistic viewpoint emphasises the need to place health priorities within their broader 
socioeconomic context (Magnussen, Ehiri et al. 2004). In progressing the debate, 
these ideological views of PHC have an influence on conceptualising the means of 
intervention. The literature points to similar contentions regarding the role of 
information and knowledge in improving PHC delivery through policy and decision-
making.   
Role of information and knowledge in health policy and decision-making  
Instrumental view of HMIS 
While not writing directly about HMIS, Schön (1996) describes instrumentality as a 
view where ends are discretely defined and means, deriving from a scientific 
knowledge base, rendered in terms of universal principles. The instrumentality of 
health technologies and information systems such as HMIS is reflected in their 
conception as decision-making tools for healthcare managers and their challenges 
seen as providing quality data, which will help implement effective and efficient 
healthcare delivery (Mutemwa 2006). In this light the desired end is perceived to be 
undisputedly universal: HMIS are implemented to aid the systematic process of 
collecting, storing, analysing, disseminating and using data for the improvement of 
health service delivery (AbouZahr and Boerma 2005; Stansfield 2005). It is proposed 
that poor countries particularly need to invest in these systems for this purpose 
(AbouZahr and Boerma 2005; Stansfield, Walsh et al. 2006; Gething, Noor et al. 
2007). Within a decentralised PHC structure, HMIS are seen as supporting local 
decision-making that is more relevant and responsive (Lippeveld, Sauerborn et al. 
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2000; WHO 2004). Significant numbers of researchers and global health agencies 
focus on the potential of technological advancements to improve health care delivery 
in developing countries (Chetley 2006 in Lucas 2008). Lucas (2008) outlines four 
broad categories of how ICT applications contribute to the improvement of health 
care systems in developing countries. The first category is the improvement of data 
quality and reporting through the digitisation of conventional paper-based HMIS. The 
second category is employing technology for better diagnosis and monitoring of 
treatment. The third category presents telemedicine as enabling geographically 
unbounded support for local health care delivery. The last category expresses how 
ICTs are used for providing health and healthcare information to whole populations.  
 
From a global health policy perspective, the WHO’s World report on knowledge for 
better health highlights the importance of health information systems in addressing 
global health inequities (Nolen, Braveman et al. 2005) and meeting the health-
component targets of the Millennium Development Goals (WHO 2004). The US-
funded Data for Decision Making Project, sought to develop the capacity of public 
health practitioners in data-driven decision making and improve health information 
systems so that they will adequately support data collection and use at all government 
administrative levels (Pappaioanou, Malison et al. 2003). Furthermore, in 2005, the 
WHO set up the Health Metrics Network (HMN) as a way of stimulating international 
support for HMIS in terms of technical capacity input (such as policy, tools, 
indicators etc) and financial support (Carlson 2007). The aim is to achieve consensus 
regarding health data requirement so as to facilitate harmonised data reporting 
nationally and globally.  
 
Technologically based HMIS are increasingly occupying a central role in the design 
and evaluation of healthcare delivery (Odhiambo-Otieno 2005; Maokola, Willey et al. 
2011). This is part of a broader commitment to an evidence-based approach (Niessen, 
Grijseels et al. 2000) where identifying priority diseases, building responsive 
epidemiological surveillance systems, formulating appropriate health policy and 
delivering cost-effective interventions is data-driven (Green 1999; Niessen, Grijseels 
et al. 2000; McMichael, Waters et al. 2005). This approach has also been referred to 
as a “medical rationality” (Heeks 2006). A few examples in the literature include the 
implementation of geographic information systems (GIS) for capturing spatial health 
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data to improve public health systems and tackle epidemics (Clarke, McLafferty et al. 
1996; Johnson and Johnson 2001); the extent of broadband penetration and expansion 
of internet access in recent years to enable health education communication en masse 
(Gupta and Papagari 2004) and serve as a global information gateway for health 
practitioners to develop their knowledge and improve their service to patients 
(Niessen, Grijseels et al. 2000); mobile technologies such as PDAs used in developing 
countries by health workers to improve the delivery of primary health care to rural 
areas (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2001). The benefits of information systems 
implementation are represented as knowledge diffusion and HMIS conceptualised in 
terms of bridging the digital divide which limits the access of health professionals in 
LDCs to current knowledge and research in best practice (see Edejer 2000; Godlee, 
Pakenham-Walsh et al. 2004). This is especially as HMIS implementation 
expenditure and attention is mostly concentrated on tertiary hospitals rather than 
primary health care facilities, leading to a greater divide between rural and urban 
areas (Simba 2004). A developmental argument for HMIS implementation in LDCs is 
to help poor countries leapfrog into the digital age (Edejer 2000; Chandrasekhar and 
Ghosh 2001; Stansfield 2005). In this vein some researchers have proposed that the 
digital divide is possibly more important than "inequity in health or income" and as a 
result, the optimal use of technology is prescribed as an imperative: 
 
“The way forward is to exploit the full interactivity of the internet, which 
allows rapid feedback and change to continuously mould information into 
useful knowledge” (Edejer 2000: 797). 
 
Efforts to exploit the optimum technological potential of HMIS (McGrail and Black 
2005) are justified in terms of cost savings (Stansfield 2005; Krishnan, Nongkynrih et 
al. 2010) and the efficient allocation of resources according to clearly defined health 
priorities (Jamison and Mosley 1991; Niessen, Grijseels et al. 2000). Accordingly, 
this approach towards HMIS implementation is the raison d'être of most donor 
programmes (Ashraf 2005). From this instrumental perspective, one of the main 
challenges of implementing HMIS in LDCs is that the quality of information 
available is usually unreliable (Reerink and Sauerborn 1996). Writing in 2004, Godlee 
and colleagues argue that the drive for better information has not significantly 
improved primary health care delivery in the last 10 years (Godlee, Pakenham-Walsh 
et al. 2004), with a general lack of information being a major barrier (McGrail and 
  38 
Black 2005). In 2011, assessments of progress against Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) (UN Millennium Project 2005) targets show that no country in sub-
Saharan Africa will meet the target for maternal and child health (Jane Dreaper - BBC 
News 2011; Lozano, Wang et al. 2011). Interestingly, one of the major challenges in 
the assessment of these targets is that there is a lack of reliable data (also see  Nolen, 
Braveman et al. 2005). The BBC News article reporting on the Lancet publication 
assessing progress towards maternal and child health MDGs, quoted global health 
experts as saying, "Numerical assessments against the MDGs are inevitably processes 
that are plagued by poor and missing data” (Jane Dreaper - BBC News 2011). The 
significance of this evaluation is that for at least two decades, HMIS implementation 
in developing countries has not been able to provide quality data, which can be used 
to improve health care delivery. To address this problem, there is usually an emphasis 
on instrumental tools or procedures e.g. rigorous methodological procedures, sound 
reasoning for processes followed, open critique of data used (Krieger 2003; Elliott 
and Wartenberg 2004) or statistical solutions to providing reliable information from 
unreliable data (Gething, Noor et al. 2006; Gething, Noor et al. 2007).  
A critical and fundamental problem with the instrumental view of HMIS is the very 
real possibility of misidentifying the problems of ill heath and therefore specifying 
inappropriate instrumental tools through data indicators and processes to address what 
are essentially peripheral health problems. The strive for a scientific knowledge base 
and subsequent drive for quality data may therefore institute a series of evidence-
based criteria for measuring improvements in health but these may still not reflect the 
complex and varied reality of why communities suffer from ill health.  
We acknowledge that there is an expected instrumentality in HMIS implementation. 
However, slightly more nuanced HMIS studies question the feasibility of a one-size-
fits-all approach and instead adopt “a notion of “appropriate,” context-specific 
practice” (Avgerou 2010: 4) (for example, Akubue 2000; Wilson and Heeks 2001; 
Soriyan, Korpela et al. 2009) within the predefined goal of evidence-based decision-
making (Korpela, Soriyan et al. 2000; Korpela, Hanmer et al. 2004; Soriyan, Ajayi et 
al. 2007). 
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Limitations of the instrumental view of HMIS  
Despite the rational approach that conceives of information as a vital resource for 
improving health care delivery, experience shows that most decisions appear to be 
driven by political motives or intuition (Pappaioanou, Malison et al. 2003). Rather 
than view these as irrational actions, the theoretical basis for constructing the 
instrumental role of information in decision-making has been problematised in 
organisational management literature (Mintzberg 1975; March 1988 in Mutemwa 
2006). From a philosophical stance, critical perspectives have questioned the 
neutrality of technology and information (Borgmann 1999). Therefore, the claim that 
PHC delivery is strengthened by an effective HMIS is called into question by 
contradictory practices that either derail, or to some degree, limit the underlying 
objectivity of this relationship (Mutemwa 2006). Contrary to the unambiguously 
defined goals of instrumental rationality, the actual reality of HMIS and information 
use is socially constructed and negotiated and is distinctively characterised by 
uncertainty and unintentional outcomes. The essence of this contingent view of HMIS 
is argued as follows: 
“With divergent trajectories or outcome-projection functions, between 
theory and actual practice, there is an absence of the necessary agreement 
on the measuring of benefits, success or indeed failure” (Mutemwa 2006) 
   
Mutemwa (2006) notes that the literature implies three ways in which information 
diverges from the instrumentality of rational decision-making. Firstly, information 
being manipulated for self-interest is noted as a core feature of organisational 
experience (Feldman and March 1981; Feldman 1988; Dean and Sharfman 1993; 
Mutemwa 2006). The objective function imputed to information is often superseded 
by its symbolic value to justify and legitimise a preferred course of action or decision 
(Mutemwa 2006). Secondly, there is a presumption that information is indeed used 
for decision-making. However, studies show that most decisions are made before 
information is sought to justify them (March 1982; Mutemwa 2006). In other cases, 
decision makers at the local level opt for a more intuitive approach to decision-
making thereby ignoring the formal health information system altogether (Finau 
1994).  Lastly, Mutemwa (2006) observes that there are other forms of information in 
addition to the formal HMIS. He presents the formal HMIS, which incorporates paper 
and electronic media, as “written form of transmission or information” (pg 3) and 
other forms of information including “verbal, observational, experiential and 
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training”. From this study, he concludes that all these forms of information bear upon 
decision-making processes and outcomes. Therefore,  
“it becomes evident that the actual health management information system 
for a decentralized district health system is by far more integrated and 
complex than the formal HMIS” (Pg. 11).  
  
In this vein, there are critical studies that question the narrowness of the instrumental 
analysis of HMIS implementation. To be clear, our critique does not completely reject 
rational approaches to HMIS implementation. Instead, it attempts to broaden its 
analytical scope by addressing situated practices typified by multiple and conflicting 
forms of rationalities (Chilundo and Aanestad 2004). These conflicts represent a 
tension between predetermined expectations of the formal HMIS and the fluidity of 
informal decision-making at local levels (Mutemwa 2006). To analyse the mutually 
influencing relationship between these formal and informal interactions, information 
(or HMIS) is conceived as socially embedded within dynamics that account for the 
attitudes, understanding, and behaviour of local officials, healthcare providers and 
communities (Bossert 1998; Madon, Krishna et al. 2010). Therefore, context-sensitive 
theories are employed to analyse the varied and divergent sense making processes of 
HMIS implementation for PHC delivery. For instance, to understand the consequent 
social complexities that underpin the use of information in decision-making 
processes, Mukama, Kimaro et al. employ structuration theory to highlight the power 
relations that underlie the organisational culture of those involved in HMIS 
implementation and how health workers navigate the social structures within which 
they make decisions (2005). Thompson (2002) employed theories from social 
psychology and anthropology to highlight the behavioural components that are 
brought to the fore in how users make meaning which are useful to them (Thompson 
2002). Thompson argues that this is a practical framework for understanding the 
“interaction between users and technology” (Thompson 2002). Other studies have 
analysed how social communication practices embedded in cultural histories, have 
implications for timeliness of data reporting, extent of data usage and quality (Mosse 
and Sahay 2001). These are a form of indigenous communication practices and 
knowledge, which have been noted to be critical to development (Mundy and 
Compton 1995).  
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Theoretical views of socially embedded HMIS  
Extensive action research conducted under the Health Information System 
Programme (HISP) has gone some way in trying to understand HMIS implementation 
challenges (Braa, Monteiro et al. 2004) from a social embeddedness perspective 
(Avgerou 2010). It is important to state that the point of departure and value of 
socially embedded studies is the richness of social theories deployed to understand the 
HMIS domain and reconceptualise the goal and contribution of these systems within 
their wider social context.  
 
Some of the social theories used in HMIS research include complexity, institutional, 
and actor network theories (Avgerou 2010). Complexity science combines analytical 
concepts from chaos theory and complex adaptive system (Braa, Hanseth et al. 2007). 
It proposes that within complex systems such as health care provision, agents adapt to 
the emergent nature of outcomes as they evolve from a given historical legacy and an 
unpredictable future. This theory has been used in understanding the challenges of 
scaling up HMIS implementation and strategies for developing flexible standards to 
cater for changing healthcare environments and user needs (Braa, Hanseth et al. 2007; 
Shaw 2009). While there are varied definitions of (New) institutional theories, they 
generally conceptualise how, through the process of legitimisation, structures of 
social reality become enduring but over time and space subsequently change, adapt 
and decline (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos 2000; Scott 2001 in Sahay, Sæbø, et al. 
2009; Scott 2004). Noir and Walsham (2007) used this theory to broaden the debate 
of instrumental, technical rational approaches regarding the way HMIS may improve 
public health delivery. On one hand, because HMIS is itself an institution (Avgerou 
2003) the need to achieve legitimacy is sought by adopting these technologies 
ceremoniously (Noir and Walsham 2007). The authors contend that in the context of 
their case study, this tick-box attitude may contribute to inefficiencies and 
ineffectiveness in the Indian public healthcare sector. On the other hand, they noted 
that the implementation of HMIS as an ICTD intervention also provided opportunities 
for social development as poor rural women were given computer training (Noir and 
Walsham 2007). Other HMIS studies have used this theory to analyse how in former 
communist countries like Tajikistan, incompatibilities in “institutional logics” have to 
be resolved through the “deinstitutionalisation” of centralised planning to 
accommodate decentralised HMIS implementation (Sahay, Sæbø et al. 2009). 
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Miscione (2007) further employed this theory to account for the views of 
telemedicine providers as well as perspectives as they are interpreted locally 
(Miscione 2007). Much of HMIS studies have employed actor network theories 
(ANT) because they allow researchers to explore situated action as the outcome of 
interaction between heterogeneous entities without having to distinguish between 
technological and social artefacts or humans and non-humans but instead conceive of 
this interaction within a complex web of network nodes. Chilundo and Sahay (2002) 
explain ANT concepts including translation (presenting an idea in a way that 
resonates with a broader network of similar ideas and therefore garners more support 
(Johansen and Hanseth 2000)), inscription (translation process that leads to the 
materiality of an idea (Callon 1991)), alignment (predefining a legitimate standard to 
be followed), and enrolment (expanding the network). These concepts were employed 
in showing the intricacies of multiple interests and understandings in HMIS 
implementation and how these heterogeneous networks are implicated in challenges 
of developing an effective laboratory information system.  
 
HMIS implementation in LDCs 
The experience of HMIS implementation in LDCs, both in terms of building a 
rational health system and improving the performance of health care delivery, have 
been fraught with challenges and expectations remain elusive and largely unrealised 
(Heeks 2006; Lucas 2008). For instance, an evaluation of HMIS use in Tanzania 
revealed it is on the outer periphery of the health system despite a generally positive 
attitude towards implementing the HMIS (Nyamtema 2010). Some of these 
challenges have been understood from the viewpoint of not fully optimising the 
potential of ICTs (Edejer 2000; Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2001) while others have 
argued that HMIS implementation requires appropriate organisational structure and 
institutional arrangements (Braa, Macome et al. 2001; Odhiambo-Otieno 2005; 
Stansfield 2005; Stansfield, Walsh et al. 2006). These are especially relevant in LDCs 
where the adoption of the PHC approach resulted in decentralised organisational 
structures.  
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HMIS for local action 
Decentralisation leads to significant changes in information requirement and 
restructuring of the organisational design of HMIS (WHO 2004; Kimaro 2006). This 
requires a reorientation from centralised hierarchical models to HMIS emergent 
through local interpretation. For example, following the collapse of apartheid in South 
Africa, the development of HMIS for local action was reconceived radically as a 
bottom-up collaborative initiative as described in a historical account of the Health 
Information Systems Programme (HISP) (Braa and Hedberg 2000). The account 
detailed a series of conflicting rationalities that surfaced in the design of the HMIS. 
These include the pressure towards collecting data for hierarchical needs rather than 
local use and the preference for selective PHC demands rather than data for public 
health promotion and prevention (Braa and Hedberg 2000). Mukama and colleagues 
presented a similar case of Tanzania MOH where they found tensions between the 
bureaucratic demands of managing hierarchical health information and locally 
situated experiences (Mukama, Kimaro et al. 2005). This conflict, they contend, 
revolves around resource constraints and motivation, leading to donor dependence 
and asymmetrical power relations (Kimaro and Sahay 2007).  
 
In a bid to support the orientation towards locally relevant data, the HISP initiative 
identified the development of an essential data set as one of the fundamental criteria 
of the District Health Information System (DHIS) architecture (Braa 2000). Shaw 
(2005) further defined its key features in coordinating local action:  
“essential data set, which may be defined as a set of the most important 
data elements, selected from all primary health care vertical programmes, 
that should be reported by health service providers on a routine basis, with 
the aim of being able to generate indicators that monitor the provision of 
health services in an integrated manner” (Shaw 2005: 632)    
 
From the above definition, the critical advantage presented by establishing an 
essential data set is the relevance of the data for local level use. It is also clear that 
establishing an essential (or minimum) dataset would require addressing some 
questions including how to determine the “most important data elements”, according 
to what criteria, and primarily serving what (or whose) purpose (Bowker and Star 
1999). These are particularly complex in the context of LDCs where health systems 
are typified by a host of uncoordinated donor activities (Mekonnen, Sahay et al. 
2009). Achieving consensus or integration in this situation is difficult because of the 
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multiple stakeholders and interests represented (Madon, Sahay et al. 2007; Smith, 
Madon et al. 2008; Kanjo, Moyo et al. 2009). Acknowledging the complexity of this 
process, Shaw (2005) provides a framework for developing an essential dataset using 
the experience of HISP in South Africa as an illustration. Data collection is stratified 
according to information needs along a hierarchical structure (See Fig. 2.1 below). 
This process is organised such that each level (e.g. national, state and local 
government) collects data relevant to their needs but only return relevant data to the 
upper levels. Data collection progresses as a bottom-up approach but the minimum 
national dataset is negotiated and directed from a top-down process (Shaw, 2005). 
The MDS criteria therefore suggest that HMIS challenges are directly related to the 
need for balancing the emphasis placed on top-down and bottom-up processes. As this 
process is essentially conceived as driven by a bottom-up orientation, understanding 
information dynamics at the local level therefore becomes a matter of great import. 
This means that the sustainability of HMIS requires flexible design for local 
customisation and configuration but must also maintain some standardised features. 
These themes are explored in more detail in the next section under “sustainability”  
 
 
Fig. 2.1: Developing an essential data set (Shaw 2005) 
 
HMIS sustainability 
HMIS sustainability is a key challenge in developing countries and has received 
considerable attention from the HISP research network (Kimaro and Nhampossa 
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2004; Kimaro and Nhampossa 2005; Jacucci, Shaw et al. 2006; Kimaro 2006; Kimaro 
2006). Sustainability constitutes both a conceptual and practical challenge. Given the 
potential of HMIS to improve healthcare delivery and the fact that most 
implementation initiatives are driven (or initiated) externally, these studies try to 
conceptualise how we can understand the transformation process required for short-
term HMIS implementation projects to metamorphose into long-term institutional 
infrastructures especially after direct external support ends. Simply put, how can 
national governments develop ownership of HMIS and pursue its intended objectives 
in the delivery of PHC? In essence, sustainability focuses on the capacity of “user 
organisations to identify and manage risks that threaten the long-term viability of the 
HIS, following the withdrawal of external support” (Kimaro and Nhampossa 2005). 
This definition implies the need for 1) a specific kind of value-system regarding 
information, 2) a need-based HMIS design to support this value system and 3) the 
convergence of multiple (or dominant) interests around this value system. We will 
discuss these respectively under information culture; adaptability and scalability; and 
institutionalisation, integration and participation. 
Information culture 
The implementation of a new HMIS embodies values that would demand the 
“cultivation and institutionalisation of a new kind of culture” (Kimaro and 
Nhampossa 2005: 276). HMIS implementation studies address the process of 
developing an intrinsic institutional culture that values data and uses it to make 
informed decisions (Aqil, Lippeveld et al. 2009).  The evidence of an information 
culture is apparent, as the HMIS becomes a part of the operational day-to-day fabric 
of the “institutions” using them. The dynamic notion of culture has evolved from 
static entities of antiquity and is conceived as “contestable, temporal and emergent … 
constantly interpreted and reinterpreted, and is produced and reproduced in social 
relations” (Avison and Myers 1995: 52). In essence, “through appropriating 
technologies, cultures can be redefined and strengthened and cultural identities 
changed and made more robust” (Westrup, Jaghoub et al. 2003: 21). ICTs, within a 
socio-technical construct, are therefore conceived as outcomes shaped by a 
multiplicity of agents who can then enact various uses (Law, 1987, Avgerou, 2002, 
Ciborra and Lanzara, 1994, Orlikowski, 1996) with unpredictable and unintended 
consequences (Westrup et al, 2003). The implications of this dynamic notion of 
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culture when applied to HMIS institutionalisation is two-fold: first, it suggests that 
HMIS are not just value-free technological artefacts but embody particular values 
which are taken for granted in the culture where they are designed; secondly, the 
outcome of an information culture in itself is constantly being produced and 
reproduced through power negotiations among multiple stakeholders at different 
levels and intersections of the health care delivery system.  
 
Adaptability and scalability 
HMIS designs are often “transferred” from one context to another. Using actor-
network theory (Latour 1988), Nhampossa (2006) reconceptualises HMIS from 
“technology transfer” to “technology translation”. He argues that the problem with the 
transfer and diffuse approach is that the concepts are conflated. He proposes that the 
translation perspective illuminates the practical challenges faced implementing HMIS 
across different contexts i.e. developed to developing countries (Nhampossa 2006). 
Importantly, the installed base of legacy information systems and information 
infrastructure (Lungo and Nhampossa 2004; Nhampossa 2004) are incorporated to 
represent the macro technological context (Braa, Monteiro et al. 2004). Findings from 
these studies emphasise the need for “political brokering” in order to successfully 
introduce and sustain the new HMIS (Sahay, Monteiro et al. 2009). Nevertheless, 
even when HMIS transfers occur between developing countries (i.e. south-south), 
they still face the same problems (Kaasboll and Nhampossa 2002). Some of the 
difficulties highlighted from a translation framework are cultural (e.g. language), 
technical (e.g. differences in length of name strings) and organisational (e.g. 
institutional capacity and knowledge). For instance, the sustainability of HMIS is 
often threatened by a lack of appreciation for the quality of infrastructure and human 
resource capacity available in the target context (Kimaro 2006). These problems 
signal the imperative to consider the local adaptation of these systems (Jacucci, Shaw 
et al. 2006; Soriyan, Korpela et al. 2009). HMIS must be designed and developed in a 
flexible way to accommodate changing user needs and requirements e.g. in terms of 
its scalability (see Bergqvist et al. 2006, Braa et al. 2004, Mengiste and Nielsen 2006, 
Sahay and Walsham 2006). A comparative study of scaling HMIS in Nigeria and 
Ethiopia reveal overlapping complexities related to defining an essential data set, 
building required human capacity and developing appropriate technological 
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infrastructure (Shaw, Mengiste et al. 2007). Essentially, translation and any 
corresponding scaling of HMIS require a balancing-act between standardised 
technological features and infinite malleability for local customisation (Nhampossa 
2004; Sahay and Walsham 2005). First and foremost this refers to the appropriateness 
of the HMIS artefact (mostly technological but can also be paper-based) and then its 
implications for the level of human resource capacity (quality and quantity) 
demanded. The sustainability of HMIS requires a set of standardised functionalities, 
which are easily adaptable to local needs while the essence of the functional design 
retains its relevance (Nielsen and Nhampossa 2005). The challenge of balancing 
standardisation and local adaptability is brought to the fore by the inability of target 
countries to address the fragmentation effect of donor policies (Kimaro and 
Nhampossa 2005: 276-277). This is evident in the dependency of most countries, like 
Nigeria, on external aid to support HMIS implementations (Akinde, Soriyan et al. 
1997; Soriyan, Ajayi et al.).  
 
Institutionalisation, integration and participation  
The institutionalisation of HMIS is contingent on social relational dynamics across 
global and local institutional levels. This is particularly because of the significant role 
played by donors in the process of HMIS institutionalisation and the corresponding 
impact of their activities on the sustainability of these systems (Kimaro and 
Nhampossa 2005). For example, the sustainability of HMIS open source software is 
analysed in terms of the institutional, technological and influence of donor-driven 
projects in Kenya (Bernardi 2009) while the “historicity and heterogeneity” of HMIS 
shows that the alignment of key HMIS stakeholders - in particular donors, MOH and 
software developers (Kimaro and Nhampossa 2004) - are important in the 
sustainability of these systems (Aanestad, Monteiro et al. 2005). In practice, health 
workers collect numerous datasets for different overlapping projects without an 
overarching plan or design for their accessibility and use (McGrail and Black 2005). 
A participatory and collaborative approach is important for integrating the resulting 
fragmentation of the HMIS (Kanjo, Moyo et al. 2009). This fragmentation is however 
not just as a result of technical or managerial challenges but divergent interests, goals 
and objectives making integration socially complex (Chilundo and Aanestad 2003; 
Chilundo and Aanestad 2004; Smith, Madon et al. 2008; Kanjo, Moyo et al. 2009; 
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Mekonnen, Sahay et al. 2009) and inherently political (Sahay, Monteiro et al. 2009). 
The design of participation in HMIS implementation is also found problematic by 
Kimaro and Titlestad (2005) who argue that the notion is imbued with assumptions 
from a Western context regarding basic computer skills, human resource capacity, 
motivation and mature democratic ideals of local empowerment. As these are often 
not applicable in the context of most poor countries, they maintain that it is important 
to rethink participation through the concept of “participatory customization”. This 
approach, they propose, incorporates on-the-job basic computer training as 
participants are allowed to focus on contributing to adapting the software in a locally 
relevant way (Kimaro and Titlestad 2005). As pertaining to HMIS in PHC delivery, 
multi-level interactions between organisations, HMIS research institutions and 
individual users constitute challenges that underlie participation efforts (Nhampossa, 
Kaasboll et al. 2004). Nevertheless some studies (such as one carried out in Nigeria) 
have advocated for the necessity of community participation in PHC HMIS 
implementation (Korpela, Soriyan et al. 1998). The main point however is that there 
are no prescriptive principles of participation that can be applied universally (Puri, 
Byrne et al. 2004). Central or external planning of routine data collection has been 
shown to result in minimal participation and relevance at local levels (Walsham 1992; 
Lippeveld, Sauerborn et al. 2000; Lippeveld 2001). Indeed, participation extends 
beyond the requirements of computer-based HMIS but also incorporates systems such 
as community outreaches that disseminate health information through which 
communities are directly informed and educated about their health choices 
(Pomerantz, Muhammad et al. 2010). Community participation is at the heart of the 
PHC ideology and HMIS conceived as supporting this decentralised organisational 
structure. HMIS once institutionalised, are relied upon to support the generation and 
use of locally relevant information (Kimaro 2006). The institutionalisation of HMIS 
into the day-to-day processes of users has far-reaching sustainability implications, 
which requires the meshing of information cultures and negotiations between global 
and local actors. These negotiations are implied in accountability arrangements that 
reflect divergent objectives and interests. 
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HMIS and accountability 
HMIS implementation in LDCs navigates the tension between hierarchical 
accountability, donor vertical programme priorities and the need for a community-
based focus (Braa and Hedberg 2000). Donors’ priorities and hierarchical demands 
are underpinned by objectives aimed at improving financial accountability, 
transparency and performance. Within the overarching performance-based 
accountability arrangements, there are also attempts to understand accountability 
through the views of communities. In this next section we review the literature on 
these two views. 
 
Performance management 
 
Reflecting an enduring challenge of disease-focused global health initiatives 
(Tangcharoensathien and Patcharanarumol 2010), HMIS are largely developed as 
silos of compartmentalised systems (Braa and Hedberg 2000; Aanestad, Monteiro et 
al. 2005). This approach is justified by the need to monitor short-term donor projects 
in order to satisfy donors’ financial accountability to their stakeholders (Okuonzi and 
Macrae 1995). Collaboration between donors and national governments is 
nevertheless perceived as desirable (Lee 1998; Peters and Chao 1998; Cornwall, 
Lucas et al. 2000; Elzinger 2005) because uncoordinated donor projects lead to 
duplication of efforts and wastage of resources (Buse and Walt 1996). The suggested 
framework for coordinating donor activities rely on pooling donor funds into a 
“health sector basket fund” and integrating vertical programmes through a health 
sector-wide approach (SWAp) (Brown 2000; Brown 2001; Hobbs 2001). The 
expectation is that national governments will allocate these resources based on their 
health policies and defined priorities while donors concentrate on governance and 
accountability (Handley, Higgins et al. 2009). In LDCs, challenges of PHC delivery 
are keenly linked to the proposition that accountability arrangements are weakened by 
the impunity of bad governance in poor countries. This is echoed by critical 
development economists who contend that donor aid is channelled to governments 
with a history of corruption and mismanagement of public funds (Easterly 2006; 
Moyo 2009). The results are apparent in the pronounced weakness of governance and 
accountability structures (Khan 2008) that see health systems riddled with corruption 
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(Olowu 2001; Lindelow, Kushnarova et al. 2006; Savedoff and Hussmann 2006). 
Consequently, good governance (Kaufmann, Kraay et al. 2007; Kaufmann, Kraay et 
al. 2007; Kaufmann, Kraay et al. 2009) in health care delivery is seen as a way of 
improving financial and managerial performance (Mimicopoulos, Kyj et al. 2007) as 
well as reducing the extent of institutional corruption (Lewis and Pettersson 2009). 
Expounding on governance and corruption in West Africa, Olowu (2001) maintains 
that  
“Most countries have initiated democratic decentralization programs in the 
1990s but only a few have actually transferred all three key essentials of 
effective decentralization: responsibilities, resources and accountability 
systems to the localities. The development of effective systems of 
accoutability at community levels, backed up by state leaders and state 
institutions to promote public and not private interests will most likely be a 
prerequisite to the reduction of institutionalised corruption in central 
government” (pg. 116). 
 
The complexity of governance within a decentralised primary health care system 
(Handley, Higgins et al. 2009) is exacerbated by the intricacies of conceptualising 
accountability (Brinkerhoff 2004).  Nevertheless, as decentralisation is a key 
component of governance (Huther and Shah 1998) it has been used in analysing 
accountability structures that impact on health system performance (Bossert 1998; 
Mitchell and Bossert 2010; Bossert and Mitchell 2011). Using theoretical concepts 
such as principal-agent theory and “decision space”, Bossert (1998) notes that 
accountability can be framed according to how principals influence local decisions 
towards achieving the performance goals of the health system. Capacity of agents and 
institutional accountability arrangements are therefore imperative to health systems 
performance (Mitchell and Bossert 2010; Bossert and Mitchell 2011). For instance, a 
study found that the weak capacity of local officials (Olukoga, Bachmann et al. 2010) 
and the national HMIS in Nigeria’s decentralised health system significantly 
compromised planning and budgeting processes (Nnaji, Oguoma et al. 2010). HMIS 
studies have also shown that lack of capacity is a major factor in weak accountability 
in LDCs (Kanjo, Moyo et al. 2009). Therefore, because the capacity and 
accountability mechanisms of many LDCs are weak, donors continue funding vertical 
programmes (Hobbs 2001; Tangcharoensathien and Patcharanarumol 2010) as a 
means of ensuring project accountability. Using Malawi as an example, Kanjo, Moyo 
et al (2009) argue that due to the weakness of the national HMIS, the health system is 
riddled with vertical programmes in spite of stakeholder buy-in to integration and 
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harmonisation. Similarly, decentralisation is often not fully devolved as critical 
functions are still carried out with technical assistance from the centre (Kimaro 2006; 
Kimaro and Sahay 2007; Venugopal and Yilmaz 2010). HMIS are implicated in the 
need to improve human resource capacity and institutional arrangements (Hanmer 
1999) that impact and are impacted by accountability mechanisms. These 
accountability structures are nevertheless biased towards performance management 
targets set by donors and/or superiors (principals) within the PHC administrative 
hierarchy. The influence of the good governance agenda (Williamson 1990; Stiglitz 
1998; Williamson and Kuczynski Godard 2003; Kaufmann, Kraay et al. 2007; 
Kaufmann, Kraay et al. 2007; Kaufmann, Kraay et al. 2009) in terms of the 
conditionality stipulated by most donor programmes (Santiso and Nitze 2001) 
produces ambiguous accountability structures and lacks the necessary creativity for 
designing HMIS as a social system catering for the demands of diverse stakeholders 
(AbouZahr and Boerma 2005). In essence, HMIS are conceptualised as increasing 
transparency, accountability and bureaucratic performance (AbouZahr and Boerma 
2005; Stansfield 2005) to meet hierarchical demands or donors’ conditions. However, 
HMIS are also implicated in local accountability arrangements that are centred on 
community views. 
 
Community monitoring 
Community health monitoring initiatives represent efforts to improve localised 
information use and local accountability. Community monitoring is a key initiative, 
which aims to improve accountability through local participation especially in the 
context of decentralised public services (Cyan, Porter et al. 2004). In primary health 
care delivery, community monitoring gives citizens a greater voice by establishing a 
platform to access health status data and provide feedback regarding their satisfaction 
with the quality of local health care services (Báez and Barron 2006; Madon, Krishna 
et al. 2010). The National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) in India is a significant 
scheme in this direction of local accountability (Husain 2011) and is currently piloted 
in nine states. Community ownership of services and local accountability are the main 
priorities. The NHRM therefore established groups such as Village Health and 
Sanitation Committees (VHSC) and Rogi Kalyan Samiti (RKS) for ensuring 
communities are formally involved in local accountability arrangements (Sri, Sarojini 
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et al. 2011). Evaluation of the impact of these established platforms on community 
participation and accountability however reveals a more complex social process, 
especially at the PHC level. For instance, the constituted membership of these 
associations is not necessarily pro-participation e.g. power-asymmetries (Sri, Sarojini 
et al. 2011), lack of transparency and deviations from the objectives of the association 
(Husain 2011). Challenges are generally amplified at the PHC level first in terms of 
coordination between health facilities and higher district programme management 
units (DPMU) and in terms of adequate authority to address administrative concerns 
like staff underperformance. There have also been corresponding challenges reported 
in developing an effective HMIS in terms of scaling up (Seshadri 2003), coordinating 
vertical programmes, and in monitoring and supervising the performance of the 
NRHM by disadvantaged rural community groups (Mallipeddi, Pernefeldt et al. 
2009). Some of the problems were attributed to high burden of managerial data, lack 
of data tools, weak capacity and disconnection between data reporting and feedback 
(Husain 2011).  
 
The complexity of HMIS implementation is reflected in the need to balance 
hierarchical accountability demands and an orientation towards local accountability 
(Véron, Williams et al. 2006) in the provision of PHC services. As yet, this area has 
not received much attention in HMIS research. This study therefore suggests that it is 
fruitful to unpack how HMIS is implicated in the complexity of local sense-making 
practices within the overarching structure of an instrumental approach to PHC 
delivery. 
  
Synthesising the literature review and addressing research gaps 
The literature reviewed reveals the conceptual and experiential complexity of 
implementing HMIS to support PHC delivery in LDCs. There are opposing ideologies 
regarding the developmental objective of PHC and these are reflected in a dialectic 
relationship between the instrumental and context-sensitive role of HMIS in health 
policy and decision-making. As a key health policy in LDCs, the decentralisation of 
health care delivery marks a radical shift in information requirements and architecture 
to supports this organisational structure. One of the key features of this radical shift is 
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the conception of HMIS as instruments of accountability used by multiple agents to 
diverse ends. The main themes of the literature review are summarised below after 
which we discuss the gap in the literature.  
Summary 
The developmental view of PHC as originally conceived at Alma Ata was based on a 
participatory model where individuals and communities were actively involved in 
decisions that affected their healthcare provision. Consequently, significant emphasis 
was placed on a holistic approach to health that advocated the necessity of human 
development: this included social, political and economic opportunities that expanded 
the capacity of citizens to effectively participate in matters relating to the delivery of 
their health care. In this sense, the design and outcome of PHC delivery evolved from 
local problematisations reflecting contextually defined priorities.  In contrast, the 
influence of neoliberal ideology and the introduction of the good governance agenda 
in health care produced a modulated selective PHC approach as the preferred model 
in LDCs. SPHC resonates from a modernisation ethos of development conceiving of 
health as a commodity instrumental to economic growth and the absence of disease as 
the primary goal of health interventions. Therefore, prioritisation of health care 
delivery focuses on tackling major diseases that represented a high burden on 
economic growth e.g. malaria (Gallup and Sachs 2001). The implications of this 
ideology reveal an instrumentality that predefines the goal and problems of PHC 
delivery and also prescribes technological tools to achieve and address these. We 
however find that the reality of health and health care delivery is often divergent from 
the theoretical expectations of this rationality.  
The gap between theory and practice is pronounced in constructing the role of 
information and knowledge in health policy and decision-making. Here, the literature 
shows that there are limitations in the analytical foundations of an instrumental 
approach. Indeed, empirical findings proffer a more tenuous relationship between 
information and decision-making processes. The implications are that the formal 
HMIS constitutes only a component of the actual HMIS, therefore decisions and 
actions are a product of a far more diverse and complex social process that are based 
on both the formal and informal HMIS. In LDCs, the implementation of HMIS for 
local action is particularly intricate as a result of the multiplicity of global and local 
interests that negotiate and contest objectives and outcomes of PHC delivery and 
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HMIS implementation. These interactions highlight the value-laden character of an 
HMIS implementation. As such, its sustainability is dependent on developing an 
information culture but also in the flexible design of the HMIS to adapt to local 
particularities and changing needs. There is a noted tension in this process that is 
consequent on the influence of donors in the institutionalisation of HMIS in LDCs. 
This tension occurs as a result of the complexity of harmonising objectives and goals 
of multiple donors with the HMIS of the target country. Against the background of 
multiple interests, we find that one of the predominant views of HMIS objectives is to 
improve accountability according to measurable performance indicators such as 
health service coverage, utilisation and cost effectiveness. These accountability 
arrangements are usually tuned towards the interest of donors or hierarchical 
administrative demands. Community monitoring however represent initiatives that 
redirect accountability to reflect the experience of local communities. We therefore 
suggest that this represents the possibility of alternative forms of accountability 
arrangements in addition to the predominant performance-based view. However, this 
has not received much attention in the literature i.e. the nature of PHC accountability 
arrangements that are implicated in HMIS implementation in LDCs. We therefore 
expand on this gap in the next section.    
Gap in the literature  
There are two broad gaps in the HMIS literature: the first is related to a peripheral 
analysis of developmental ideologies in studies that are based in LDCs; the second is 
regarding limited research based on a critical view of accountability and the role of 
HMIS.  
 
HMIS and Development 
Observations are made in the literature that ICTD research do not explicitly and 
sufficiently engage the development dimension of their study (Thompson and 
Walsham 2010). This line of thinking is influential in the recent call for ICTD studies 
to engage more in understanding their transformative potential (Walsham 2010). 
HMIS studies as a type of ICTD lack studies analysing their transformative role in 
LDCs. Due to this shortcoming and with specific reference to the African continent, 
Thompson and Walsham (2010) call for ICTD studies to engage more closely with 
the notion of transformational development or  “developmental ICT” which they 
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define as the “conception, development, implementation, and use of ICT as an explicit 
vehicle for furthering developmental aims – where ICT functions both as enabling 
artefact and enabled set of social behaviours” (pg 113). Given the dire state of 
development in Africa, the authors surmise that it is often not clear how ICTs can 
make a real difference and therefore very little research is directed at illuminating this 
knowledge gap. This dearth of knowledge is equally applied to HMIS studies in 
LDCs. These studies do not often engage with the problematic concept of 
accountability in substantive depths to adequately problematise the accountability 
arrangements underpinning PHC delivery and the implications these have for HMIS 
implementation and their developmental potential. Thompson and Walsham assert 
that the fundamental requirements for this sort of study rely on a zooming-out 
approach to address macro structures such as global actors, “broader institutional and 
political infrastructures, policy-level debate about the transformative potential of ICT 
in building civil society” (pg 113-4). These are conceived as “strategic dimensions” 
where HMIS can potentially play a developmental role in Africa by strengthening 
institutions, governance, accountability and civil society (Thompson and Walsham 
2010).  
 
HMIS, Governance and Accountability 
Therefore if HMIS research is to respond to this challenge it will be critical to study 
the role these systems play in empowering state and citizens (Thompson and 
Walsham 2010; Walsham 2010) within the context of PHC delivery. This is in a sense 
what community monitoring of PHC delivery is all about. For instance, in improving 
public health in Africa, Thompson and Walsham (2010) propose that ICTs can play a 
role in strengthening institutional infrastructures if implemented as part of a multi-
sector developmental strategy such as coordinated investments in health and 
education. HMIS outcomes can therefore be framed in terms of promoting social 
opportunities and strengthening transparency mechanisms (Walsham 2010; 
Thompson and Walsham 2010). These institutional infrastructures are akin to the 
VHSC and RKS in India’s NHRM and the Ward/Village Development Committees in 
Nigeria’s PHC system. Developmental goals are conceived in light of the 
effectiveness of institutional arrangements for providing public services and the 
engagement of poor communities with relevant political and bureaucratic institutions. 
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Essentially, for HMIS implementation studies, strategic ICT dimensions can be 
reconstituted as accountability arrangements, which strengthen state-society relations. 
Propositions of how this is done include, promoting good governance, supporting a 
more open and accountable public administration and “informating” (Zuboff 1988 in 
Walsham 2010) a civil society to demand better governance and accountability 
(Thompson and Walsham 2010). Different approaches to governance lead to different 
conceptions of accountability. For instance, as we alluded to earlier, a good 
governance approach promotes performance-based accountability arrangements. 
Transformative development through governance and accountability arrangements are 
understood as the extent to which they reflect or incorporate the views of poor 
communities. We therefore propose that we can study the developmental role of 
HMIS, by exploring how they are implicated in the governance and accountability 
structures underpinning the delivery of PHC services to poor communities.  
Accountability occupies a prominent conceptual role here because it broadens HMIS 
analysis by providing the means to illuminate the socio-cultural, political and 
institutional dimensions of health care delivery within a PHC system. More 
importantly, it provides a rich and useful context for studying HMIS implementation 
in its wider role of strengthening PHC delivery and by extension improving health 
status (which is an important developmental indicator). The primary research question 
of this study is therefore restated: 
 
“To what extent can HMIS improve accountability arrangements of primary 
healthcare delivery in LDCs?” 
 
By synthesising the main themes from the literature review the next chapter develops 
a concept of governance and accountability to be employed in this study as a 
theoretical framework.   
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework 
 
 Governance, Accountability Arrangements and HMIS 
Introduction 
The primary research question of this study is addressed in this chapter by presenting 
theoretical propositions that unpack accountability from a developmental viewpoint 
and illuminate the challenges and potential contributions of HMIS implementation. 
These concepts will be used to guide the interpretation and analysis of subsequent 
empirical findings. This chapter is divided into two broad sections. In the first section, 
we lay the foundation for our conceptual framework by presenting governance ideas, 
instrumental accountability constructs and socialising forms of accountability that we 
find useful for this study. In the second section, we attempt to tease out the analytical 
interdependencies between the distinctly presented theories of the previous section. 
Therefore, we construct a more nuanced accountability framework that, (1) 
synthesises governance, instrumental and socialising forms of accountability; (2) 
introduces a dual view of accountability through concepts of Representation, 
Visibility and Responsiveness (these unpack the complex process underlying 
accountability objectives, mechanisms and outcomes respectively); and (3) provides a 
way of re-conceptualising accountability in HMIS studies.  
Governance Ideas 
Governance is a conceptually vague and variedly-employed term (Doornbos 2003). In 
the context of LDCs, governance relates to legitimising the institutions of rule and the 
means of holding political agents accountable. Accountability arrangements in public 
administrations are therefore central to conceptualising governance (see for example 
World Bank 1992; UNDP 1997; International Monetary Fund 1998; Grindle 2004; 
Hyden, Court et al. 2004; Grindle 2007). Different views of governance however have 
different implications for how accountability is conceived. For instance, donor 
communities tend to focus on the notion of good governance, which emphasise a 
form of instrumental accountability in government institutions (Doornbos 2003). This 
emphasis is marked by the necessity to measure the effectiveness, transparency and 
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performance of recipient countries in the use of donor aid (World Bank 1998; Nanda 
2006). This understanding of governance highlights a fundamental thinking that 
accountability arrangements play a critical role in evaluating economic and 
democratic development (Sangudi and Epstein 2003).  Others have emphasised the 
dynamics of state-society relations, defining governance as interaction (Kooiman 
2003; Hyden, Court et al. 2004). Following this approach, there have been 
conceptualisations of the importance of governance being interpreted from the 
perspective of those who are being governed (Corbridge, Williams et al. 2005; 
Cornwall, Robins et al. 2011). This view unpacks how diverse and dispersed 
governance instruments are being reconstructed through interpretations that are 
locally situated (Kooiman 1993; Rose 1999; Cornwall, Lucas et al. 2000; Kooiman 
2003; Corbridge, Williams et al. 2005). This type of governance lends itself to 
socialising forms of accountability. As a sensitising construct, it promotes a 
contextual appreciation for how local communities make sense of evolving and 
socially constructed accountability arrangements that underpin the provision of public 
services. It is critical to note that in practice, HMIS implementation is implicated in 
both instrumental and socialising forms of accountability. What we attempt to 
emphasise is that governance as interaction helps us to gain a richer understanding of 
the outcomes of the good governance agenda, by locating it within its institutional, 
socio-political and cultural context. The distinctions that follow are therefore made 
for analytical purposes.  
 
“Good governance”  
Good governance as a concept provides the global economic and political discourse 
through which LDCs structure and define their role as a developmental state. The 
good governance agenda addresses both democratisation and public management, 
including “legitimacy and voice, direction, performance, accountability and fairness” 
(UNDP 1997; Graham, Amos et al. 2003). This ideology is reflected in measuring 
indicators such as transparency and corruption, accountability of public officials and 
inclusiveness of democratic institutions (Bovaird and Löffler 2003). Donors 
increasingly depend on this tehnicalisation of governance as illustrated in the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) which set out to quantitatively measure 
  59 
aspects of governance2 (Kaufmann, Kraay et al. 2009) that constitute the instrumental 
basis of associating economic growth with public sector performance (Mimicopoulos, 
Kyj et al. 2007). As a result, poor governance is conventionally proffered as an 
explanatory factor for why most LDCs’ deregulation and liberalisation policies have 
not yielded growth or better health conditions (Cornia 2001). This translates to a 
critical focus of reducing the extent of institutional corruption (Lewis and Pettersson 
2009) by improving managerial (including financial) performance and accountability 
mechanisms in public institutions. Hasselskog (2009:96) in his thesis analyses this 
discourse by proposing that, “governance reform packages, widely agreed on among 
donors, are legitimised by scientific rationality and presented as instrumental and 
inevitable solutions or tools to address technical problems”. What we find useful in 
this conception is that the instrumental and normative character of good governance 
seeks to objectify, quantify, evaluate and compare the quality of public service 
provision between and within LDCs in terms of their contribution to the quality of life 
of citizens (Bovaird and Löffler 2003; Grindle 2004). Within this governance context, 
HMIS are introduced to improve instrumental accountability where the goals of PHC 
delivery are predetermined with objectives and problems defined within a techno-
managerial policy framework. As discussed in Chapter Two, this instrumentality 
resonates with the ideologies underpinning selective primary health care. The 
challenges and practical experience of implementing these policies (see Jabes 2002; 
Grindle 2004; Grindle 2007) however suggest that the actions of national 
governments, sub-national governments, organisations, international agencies and 
civil society combine to have a complex and unpredictable impact on democratic and 
economic conditions (Sangudi and Epstein 2003). We find that this is closely related 
to the theme of unpredictability in information use, which we presented in the 
previous chapter. To understand these governance contingencies, other approaches 
proposed focus on the social interaction dynamics of governance (examples: Kooiman 
2003; Hyden, Court et al. 2004; Kjær 2004).  
 
 
                                                
2 These indicators are “voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption” 
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Governance as interaction  
 
Bevir (2009) notes that a social science perspective of governance studies the 
interdependencies and interactions between state and non-state organisations. 
Kooiman captures the idea of governance as interaction in the term “social-political 
governance” (Kooiman 1993; Kooiman 1999; Kooiman 2003). Governance from this 
stance includes a network of state and non-state actors, blurring the conventional 
divide between state and society (Easton 1965 in Kjær 2004; Kooiman 1993), leading 
to what is identified as an ongoing debate regarding “democratization, state capacity 
and the nature of state-society relations” (Peters 2000 in Kjær 2004: 17). This notion 
of governance incorporates cultural and socio-political variations, balances the need 
between universal and contextual conceptualisations (Hyden, Court et al. 2004) and 
“provides the context in which policy and administration are carried out” (pg 8). 
Hyden et al surmise that  
 
“Governance is a structurally contingent activity in the sense that agency is 
not completely free but to varying extents shaped by structural and/or 
institutional factors that are specific to time and space (pg. 2).” 
 
This idea of structural contingency is fundamental to our understanding of the 
relationship between governance as interaction and good governance. We see these 
notions as co-constitutional: the hierarchical framework of good governance sets an 
overarching performance agenda, which is socially interpreted at the local level and its 
outcome contingent on particular institutional and contextual dynamics. In essence, 
governance as interaction gives us a way of incorporating a situated understanding of 
diverse local governance practices within the broader discourse of global health 
policy. Kooiman (2003), Corbridge et al. (2005) and Cornwall et al. (2011) approach 
governance as a socially emergent perspective of how citizens and local actors 
experience and interpret governance arrangements (more discussion on this later).   
 
Hyden et al. employ six conceptual schemes to scope the dynamics of governance:  
“1) civil society, 2) political society, 3) bureaucracy 4) government, 5) economic 
society, and 6) judiciary. Civil society relates to the space where people take up 
interest in public matters and how rules at play might influence the way society gives 
voice to its demands and concerns. Political society has an aggregate function where 
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the summation of citizens’ interests is “packaged into specific policy demands and 
proposals” (pg. 77). The bureaucracy includes all state organisations and is 
fundamental in policy formulation and implementation, regulation and the delivery of 
public services. The government arena focuses mainly on national security. Economic 
society conceptualises the relationship between the market and the state. The 
judiciary, addresses conflict-resolution systems and institutions. As the last three 
concepts are not a focus of this study, our attention is mainly on political society, civil 
society and the bureaucracy. This is because these are most useful analytical tools in 
illuminating contextual accountability dynamics in primary health care delivery 
(World Bank 2003). Theoretical concepts in each of these will be discussed next. 
 
The effectiveness of political society evaluates the responsiveness of the system in 
“adopting and processing political demands from civil society” (pg. 90). Therefore, 
the extent to which elected officials live up to the norms associated with 
representative government is critical even though politics is often perceived as the 
preserve of rich, educated elites (Hyden et al. 2004). Political society is key to this 
study because it allows us to delve into the accountability dynamics implicated in 
representing the interests of citizens, the implications of being able to make demands 
on political society and how political society responds to citizens’ demands, 
particularly for PHC delivery. Accountability within political society examines the 
mechanisms at the disposal of voters to punish legislators for non- or poor 
performance. However, as far as developing countries are concerned most incumbents 
have state resources at their disposal and are able to use these to campaign for re-
election usually through giving bribes (Hyden et al. 2004).  
 
Civil society is not without problems in its use; however, at the heart of its evolution 
are different notions about the relationship between state and society (see Hyden, 
Court et al. 2004: 59 for analysis of historical process).   For this study, civil society 
relates to how people engage in public policy formulation and the way society 
articulates its needs and priorities (Hyden, Court et al. 2004). In addition, the 
historical contexts from which civil society evolves, has an impact on their 
functioning in demanding accountability. This in turn is implicated in the nature and 
extent of political rights exercised (Hyden et al. 2004). The authors note that in 
developing countries, the ability of civil society to influence policy varies according 
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to whether the activities of civil society actors are institutionalised within a 
democratic order or whether action has been inevitably “forced” upon civil society 
due to the weakness of the state (Hyden et al. 2004).  
 
Hyden et al (2004) argue that in the provision of public services (like health care), the 
bureaucratic system must be seen to be meritocratic and bureaucrats in their dealings 
with the public, to be transparent. Therefore, “the rules that determine procedures in 
the bureaucracy, formal and informal, are especially important for public perceptions 
of how the state operates” (pg. 121). A number of literature attribute poor 
development in sub-Saharan Africa to a weak bureaucracy and the problem of 
political patronage where governments offer “jobs to family, friends and supporters” 
(Hyden et al 2004 quoting a World Bank report: 125).  
 
What Kooiman describes as first-order governance, i.e. the experiential understanding 
of how individuals navigate governance challenges, is akin to both Corbridge et al’s  
(2005) governance framework of how individuals view the state and Cornwall, 
Robins et al’s (2011) notion of citizenship through interaction. Corbridge accepts that 
perceptions are notoriously slippery concepts given that they are formed “against the 
sightings of other individuals, communities and institutions” (Pg. 45). 
Notwithstanding, propositions of how citizens in LDCs interact with and therefore 
come to view the state go some way in illuminating how governance and 
accountability arrangements are being constructed within the overlapping spaces 
between the bureaucracy, political and civil society (Cornwall, Lucas et al. 2000; 
Hyden, Court et al. 2004; Corbridge, Williams et al. 2005).  
 
We draw on these governance ideas to conceptualise health governance and 
accountability. 
 
Health governance and accountability 
A health governance model (See Fig. 3.1 below) addresses the need to balance 
accountability relationships between the state (including policymakers and 
politicians), health service providers and citizens (World Bank 2003). Brinkerhoff 
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(2007) using this model, proposes that there are two routes to accountability: the short 
route where citizens hold service providers to account through monitoring of services; 
and the long route where citizens participate in the democratic space where politicians 
are held accountable for responding to health priorities by providing adequate 
resources and a bureaucracy (i.e. MOH) capable of formulating and implementing 
appropriate policies. These therefore serve as the basis of mutual accountability 
between actors responsible for the provision of health care services. Service providers 
are held to account to the state in terms of information and reporting and the state is 
held to account in the formulation and implementation of appropriate policies and 
provision of adequate resources; and service providers are accountable to citizens in 
terms of health services (Brinkerhoff 2007). RTI International used this framework to 
observe that accountability to citizens is usually weak in this balance of power (RTI 
International Not Dated). In the context of strong states, Wlodarczyk (2009) uses the 
Polish health system as an example to argue that the state sometimes wields 
considerable influence vis-à-vis service providers. The author contends that 
politicians may use terror and intimidation against service providers and in addition, 
bureaucrats in the health sector are often prone to widespread corrupt practices 
(Savedoff and Hussmann 2006).  
 
 
 
Fig. 3.1: Health Governance model (RTI International Not Dated - adapted from 
World Bank 2003) 
 
Cornwall and colleagues contend that citizens’ (or civil society’s) influence in 
political society extends beyond their voting power and must be understood within the 
  64 
historical context of a community’s political culture and how it evolves over time. 
This constitutes an overlap between political and civil society as this historical 
context gives rise to particular political cultures in which the chaotic world of political 
society is sometimes inhabited by ‘(un) civil society’ (Cornwall, Robins et al. 2011). 
To further show the nuanced interplay between civil and political society, Corbirdge 
et al (2005) note how an authoritarian imposition over a subjugated civil society is not 
only limited to military rule but also extend to democratic regimes that merely pay lip 
service to the electoral process. Therefore, the protection of social and economic 
rights of civil society (Hyden, Court et al. 2004) can also be conceived in light of 
citizenship i.e. how the state is seen to be responding to public priorities (Corbridge, 
Williams et al. 2005; Cornwall, Robins et al. 2011).  
As a way of synthesising the concepts presented from the health and governance 
framework, our approach to analysis is guided by the notion that modern governance 
does not afford the parochialism of ‘either-or’ conceptualisations but requires a robust 
analytical framework (Kooiman 2003). Our analytical framework is therefore 
constructed in the spirit of Kooiman’s (2003) submission that  
“creativity, intuition and experience are just as important as goal-
directedness, criteria of efficiency, and ‘working according to rules’. 
Emotions play a part, as does power, calculation as well as coping with 
uncertainty” (pg. 4). 
 
 
Development view of governance and accountability  
 
We adopt Corbridge et al’s (2005) conceptualisation of the interaction between the 
state, lower level officials (service providers) and citizens. Instead of the state being 
conceived as a discrete entity, they are constituted of “bundles of everyday 
institutions and forms of rule” (pg. 5). In this regard lower level officials socially 
construct, make sense and contextualise hierarchical demands. The state is also 
conceived as a structuring technology of rule that classifies and categorises citizens 
(using tools such as Demographic and Health surveys and National Population 
Census) according to social designations through which they encounter government 
agencies providing public services. We can therefore see how the formal rules of 
meritocracy and transparency in the bureaucracy resonate with Kooiman’s (2003) 
description of interventionist form of governance interaction; these are formalised 
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hierarchical controls, setting the tone of communicative exchange. Within this rule-
based interaction, health governance requires transparency in policy formulation, 
allocation of resources and performance (Brinkerhoff 2007). On the other hand, the 
informal rules of the bureaucracy, understood within their cultural and historical 
political context, like in the case of post-colonial Africa, point to the necessity of 
patrimony and clientelism as a means of holding powerful state actors accountable 
(Cornwall, Robins et al. 2011). This is analogous to Kooiman’s conception of 
“interplay” as another form of governance interaction where there is the relative 
absence of hierarchical or power influences. Corbridge et al. further note that it is 
important to understand how different actors, including state employees, experience 
the state in the mutually influencing interaction between state and society. The 
authors propose that studying how three key actors experience the state can enlighten 
our understanding of the developmental state in context or practice. The actors they 
propose broadly correspond with those introduced in the health governance model. 
We provide an analytical level through which we present our structure for data 
analysis by relating these governance levels to 1) a hierarchical view which 
correspond to the state in health governance, development community and senior 
bureaucrats in governance interaction; and 2) localised interpretation of the 
bureaucracy and citizens (see Table 3.1 below).  
 
As mentioned earlier, accountability arrangements reflect specific governance 
ideologies. The interventionist and interplay perspectives of governance can be 
construed to correspond to instrumental and socialising forms of accountability 
respectively. These accountability structures are defined by roles and responsibilities, 
rules and understandings, and are interpreted along the relational network of diverse 
global and local actors.  These accountability arrangements form the nucleus of 
primary health care systems, which aim to improve PHC hierarchical performance as 
well as responsiveness to communities’ locally defined health priorities.  
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Analytical 
levels 
Health governance Governance 
Interaction 
Developmental 
proposition 
Hierarchical 
View 
State: politicians and 
policy makers 
Practitioners from the 
development 
community and senior 
bureaucrats 
 
Objectified and 
universalist notions of 
health care and 
instrumental role of 
HMIS implementation; 
Service providers Government officials 
and individuals in 
political society 
Influence of political 
patronage on 
bureaucratic rules and 
performance (Hyden et 
al. 2004) 
“…growing importance 
of visuality and 
presentation in the 
promotion of an anti-
poverty agenda. 
Politicians need to be 
seen to be active on 
behalf of the poor” 
(Corbridge et al 2005: 
10) 
Localised 
interpretation: 
bureaucracy 
and citizens 
Clients/citizens Poor as citizens and 
marginalised members 
of the political society 
“…poorer people very 
often see the state 
because the state has 
chosen to see them” 
(Corbridge et al 2005: 
10) 
 
“Communitarian 
citizenship”; 
“…citizenship 
experienced as a deficit” 
(Cornwall et al. 2011) 
Table 3.1: Conceptualising level of analysis 
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Instrumental Accountability 
 
Instrumental accountability helps us to analyse how PHC delivery challenges are 
rendered technical and the ways and means through which HMIS are deployed as 
rational management tools for addressing these technical problems. Global health 
policy goals often emphasise measurable performance and HMIS co-opted - by 
multiple actors including donors, NGOs and national governments - in providing 
evidence for evaluating health care delivery. Global and national polices subscribe to 
decentralised organisational structures as central to improving performance of 
primary health care delivery.  Decentralisation is generally thought of as a more 
depoliticised notion compared with democratisation and as such can be approached as 
a technical concept (Jørgensen 2006 in Hasselskog 2009:110). HMIS are therefore 
implicated in both the organisational and relational dynamics of PHC delivery. The 
former relates to performance target setting and evaluation while the latter is 
concerned with how individuals are held to account through regulatory mechanisms. 
The concepts introduced below are not discrete in practice but for the purpose of 
analysis, they are presented as neatly bounded concepts.      
 
Administrative Decentralisation  
Our presentation of administrative decentralisation is primarily confined to analysing 
the hierarchical context of instrumental accountability. This illuminates the 
expediencies of performance related goals, the accountability of agents to multiple 
principals, and the role of information demands within a hierarchical structure.  
 
Decentralisation is a key component of governance (Hasselskog 2009) mostly 
targeted “to the subdivision of state and allocation of political and administrative 
institutions” (Peckham, Exworthy et al. 2008: 561) and has been used in analysing 
health system performance (Mitchell and Bossert 2010). From a principal-agent 
theory, Bossert (1998) developed the concept of “decision space” to investigate the 
impact of decentralisation on the performance of PHC systems (Bossert 1998; Bossert 
and Beauvais 2002; Bossert and Mitchell 2011). At the heart of this conceptual lens is 
the accountability arrangement that obtains between the principal (this could be a 
state, donor, non-state organisation etc) and agent (local level) (Atkinson, Cohn et al. 
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2008). The decision space construct is two-pronged but only the principals’ 
perspective is relevant in this section (the agent’s perspective is discussed under 
socialising forms of accountability). The principals’ perspective helps to analyse 
instrumental accountability by addressing the hierarchical relationship where agents 
are accountable to fulfilling the objectives of the principal. This construct also 
proposes that there are often multiple principals holding agents accountable. It is 
noteworthy that within the dynamics of this relationship, information plays a crucial 
role in accountability arrangements. In this case, the principal predetermines the 
information requirement and the agent is accountable for capturing and reporting this 
against set targets. 
 
To further explore this informational relationship, it is useful to employ Roberts’ 
(1991) notion of hierarchical distance. This proposes that information demands are 
required to mirror a context of remote subordinates. Hierarchy is comparable to the 
role of principals in determining data requirements. Distance denotes the requirement 
of securing accountability through information without necessarily being in close 
proximity. Roberts notes that this form of information “is usually produced at a 
distance from the contexts which it purports to mirror” (Roberts 1991: 361). 
Hierarchical distance seeks to individualise in order to clearly define responsibilities. 
The primary task of the subordinate is to fulfil the role of collecting and reporting data 
that provides a mirror representation of the health status of their domain. This is often 
one-way reporting from the subordinate to higher levels. Using the principal-agent 
concept we further explore these multilevel accountability relations.  
     
The instrumentality of these concepts is that it has predefined targets, which tend to 
analyse empirical links between decentralisation and performance without much 
consideration for wider social contexts (Peckham, Exworthy et al. 2008). Some 
studies either argue that this relationship is inconclusive (for example Bossert and 
Beauvais 2002), contingent on factoring in the “broader context of institutional 
capacity building and resource management” (for example Regmi, Naidoo et al. 2010: 
361) (pg. 361) or augmenting institutional capacity with appropriate accountability 
arrangements (for example Mitchell and Bossert 2010). Nevertheless, the theme that 
runs through global health policy concerns   performance related goals of PHC 
delivery, which are often skewed towards measurable indicators such as equitable 
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access, managerial efficiency, service quality, cost effectiveness and development 
goals (Atkinson 1995). Through these indicators healthcare workers and local service 
providers are required to account by a multiplicity of powerful stakeholders.  
 
We now examine analytical concepts that shed light on the mechanisms of 
instrumental accountability.    
Regulatory mechanisms 
 
The decision space is the formal authority that is conferred on local officials to make 
choices about health care delivery. It is derived from the constitution or a comparative 
legal process. This legislative act defines the administrative boundaries, directives, 
obligations, discretions and privileges of local government actors in the health sector. 
The legislative environment is crucial to enforcing PHC policies and can be analysed 
in terms of supporting or constraining the accountability mechanisms underpinning 
PHC delivery. This provides a way of better understanding the form and effectiveness 
of enforcement arrangements between principals and agents. According to Bossert 
(1998), the theory can be used to understand how the central government as principal 
can persuade local agents to achieve performance targets through a mechanism of 
incentives and sanctions. It is important to note that the principal-agent theoretical 
structure is dependent on the principal being able to ascertain and assess the 
performance of the agent in order to respond with the appropriate action. As a result,  
 
“Information and monitoring are crucial for the principal to evaluate how 
and whether the agents are achieving the principal’s objectives. But 
information and monitoring have significant costs. However, the agent’s 
control of information is crucial to the negotiating power of the agent vis-à-
vis the principal” (Bossert 1998: 1523).       
 
This necessitates the assessment of “how much information is available to the central 
authorities, the capacity of the central authorities to process this information and the 
quality of the information” (pg. 1523: [emphasis mine]). Analysis focusing on the role 
of the principal denotes instrumental accountability to the extent that they are 
conceived in light of their direct impact on the performance of the local health system.  
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Roberts’ (1991) idea that information is employed to systematically render local 
subordinates subjects of unequivocal responsibility under a sanctions and rewards 
system resonates with Bossert’s conception of the principal-agent accountability 
arrangement. Roberts introduces the concept of disciplinary regime to explain the 
mechanisms through which information is used to secure hierarchical accountability 
(which we refer to as instrumental accountability). While making reference to 
accounting information, we suggest that the same principle applies to health 
information in that “… the subordinate accounts for himself to the superior rather than 
reciprocally…” (Roberts 1991: 361). Employing Roberts (1991) idea of what 
constitutes this regime, we are able to further shed light on the dynamics of 
information generally and HMIS specifically in instrumental accountability 
arrangements. Within the discourse of incentives and sanctions, conferment of (non) 
recognition and (non) acceptance “are not achieved once and for all but are constantly 
at stake in the rituals of hierarchical accountability” (Roberts 1991: 358 [emphasis 
mine]). This system is three-pronged in that it first ascribes clear responsibility to 
individuals or institutions (e.g. targets set for an individual); secondly, it assesses 
performance based on target; lastly it sanctions or rewards based on the outcome of 
this assessment.  
 
“Disciplinary power is exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it 
imposes on those it subjects a compulsory visibility. In discipline, it is the 
subjects who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power 
that is exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen that 
maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection” (Foucault 1979:187 
quoted in Roberts 1991: 359 ) 
 
Health workers and programme managers are routinely being evaluated on the basis 
of the information they report (or not). Processes of collecting and reporting health 
information from primary care centres are used “in the rituals of routine 
accountability” (Roberts 1991: 359) in a bid to provide a mirror image of a health 
worker’s performance in relation to others. This comparison is in itself a form of 
disciplinary regime used to exclude non-performing workers or to reward performers 
with recognition and acceptance. This disciplinary regime when exercised keeps 
others in line through the fear of similar sanctions.  On the other hand, other workers 
are also kept motivated when the same system recognises and praises them, giving 
them the anticipation of career promotions (or other valued rewards).  
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Understanding accountability from a binary distinction of principal-agent theories are 
constraining in light of the plurality of social actors (Roberts 2009) and the cognitive 
limitations to fully account for one’s actions (Messner 2009). Moreover, Bossert 
(1998) observes the informational bargaining power agents exert over the principal 
while Roberts (1991) suggest that the antidote for redressing inherent communicative 
distortion is the provision of a dialogue forum where all participants are seen as 
relative equals. The crucial implication of these observations leads us to present 
accountability as “a vital social practice” (Roberts 2009: 969).  This theme is taken up 
in the next section discussing socialising forms of accountability. 
 
Socialising forms of accountability  
As a contrast to the impersonality of hierarchical accountability that individualises, 
socialising forms of accountability reconstitute accountability arrangements as 
evolving from people-centred, face-to-face interactions (Roberts 1991). These 
interactions are within the bureaucracy but also involve community participation. In 
the case of the former, accountability involves downward accountability from 
superior officials to lower level workers. The other form of socialising accountability 
expounds on understanding the formal and informal participatory mechanisms, from a 
citizens/civil society viewpoint, used to hold public officials to account (Rowe 1999). 
For our study, we consider concepts of democratisation processes to highlight the 
institutional and socially embedded dynamics of accountability, and participatory 
mechanism concepts through which we analyse accountability processes and 
outcomes. 
 
 
Processes of democratisation 
Analytical concepts presented in this section are related to the institutional and 
contextual interactions that characterise socialising forms of accountability. These 
concepts provide tools to empirically study the perceptions of citizens regarding their 
influence and engagement of political society for their healthcare needs; analyse how 
the characteristics of service providers influence accountability outcomes (Bossert 
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1998); and examine the institutional context from which civil society and 
intermediaries operate, including the role of donors in these institutional structures 
(Cornwall, Robins et al. 2011).  
 
Democratisation presupposes a form of state-society dialogue where an active and 
capable community/civil society holds public officials responsible for the provision of 
public services (Mehrotra 2006). This construct captures a dynamic three-way 
interaction between the central government, local authority and civil society (Tendler 
1997 in Kjær 2004 ). In terms of PHC delivery, local governments require adequate 
resources while individuals and civil society need a centrally established forum to 
engage local functionaries and political agents for the delivery of health care services. 
The platform or institutional structure through which civil society and individuals 
engage political representatives is central to socialising forms of accountability. This 
includes formal mediation organisations as well as informal community groups in the 
interaction between citizens, state, and donors/NGOs in the provision of public 
services. Mehrotra (2006) proposes that formally established institutional platforms 
are required for citizens to package their needs, vocalise their priorities and hold 
public officials accountable for the provision of public services. He further asserts that 
community voice is made possible through the institutionalisation of a formalised 
platform that gives citizens the opportunity to engage with powerful state actors in 
responding to their public service needs. Hyden et al. (2004) contend that civil society 
is able to influence policy more significantly if they are formally institutionalised 
rather than informally constituted to make up for state weakness. Notwithstanding, 
Madon and Krishna (2010) propose that both formal and informal arrangements are 
essential in conceptualising the link between the local bureaucracy, political officials, 
service providers and civil society. The authors go on to emphasise the importance of 
informal organisations in how civil society engages with bureaucratic and political 
agents for much needed resources. Cornwall writes that community groups created by 
donor agencies are able to foster interaction from a partnership perspective: 
 
“Focussing on co-management institutions, community groups created by 
donor driven health sector reform […], shows how in principle these 
institutions are to provide the basis for new partnerships between service 
providers, users and local government. In practice, however, deliberative 
processes fail as poor people experience their own agency as limited by the 
local relations of dependency within which they remain locked. Yet, it 
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would be important to know whether the poor themselves always 
experience relations of dependency as debilitating and disempowering, and 
whether or not it is possible that dependency might allow the client to make 
demands on the patron (Cornwall, Robins et al. 2011: 21).    
 
This partnership perspective is reminiscent of Kooiman’s (2003) description of 
modern governance where a variety of actors are required. Community groups are 
implicated in the interaction between poor communities and local government. In the 
ICTD literature this is also a key proposition in terms of the role of information in 
enhancing agency capabilities (Zheng 2009; Thompson and Walsham 2010; Walsham 
2010). The tenor of these propositions is the role played by intermediaries in the 
interaction between service providers, the bureaucracy and citizens (Madon & 
Krishna 2010, Walsham 2010) in the provision of health services.  
 
The motivations, capacity and goals of agents (Bossert 1998) open up the analytical 
space where we can study how agents use their discretion in either better serving their 
communities, being accountable to principals or otherwise for self-interest. They 
come to bear on the analysis of HMIS for PHC delivery. Bossert and Mitchell (2011) 
note that local officers who use more of their discretion tend to have more capacity 
and are often more accountable to elected officials for the choices they make. The 
usefulness of this construct is that it helps to explore factors that underpin the exercise 
of agents’ discretion as it relates to the provision of PHC services to communities, and 
reporting of health information.  
 
These concepts help in studying how social accountability arrangements are emergent 
through dynamic interactions that underpin the provision of primary health care 
services. We therefore turn to the participatory mechanisms that illuminate the 
processes implied in socialising forms of accountability.  
 
Participatory mechanism 
Roberts’ (1991) socialising forms of accountability is characterised as dialogue within 
a forum where asymmetries of power are relatively absent (Roberts 1991). This 
dialogue is a means through which the bureaucracy becomes more accountable to its 
workers as well as improving civic engagement. This form of accountability is 
opposed to the objectified impersonality of instrumental accountability by 
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“humanising the experience of work” through personal social interactions. Roberts 
(1991) note that: 
“At the heart of accountability is a social acknowledgement and an 
insistence that one’s actions make a difference both to self and others” (Pg. 
365) 
 
The interaction between citizens/civil society, service providers and political officials 
is based around mutual understanding and consensus even though it might be 
temporary. Roberts (1991) submits that even though dialogue can sometimes achieve 
some sense of stability this is often ephemeral. We interpret the temperamental nature 
of this interaction in light of a political society that is often always messy and chaotic 
(Cornwall et al. 2011). Consequently, a critical component of dialogue is the political 
environment through which citizens make demands for accountability. In this regard 
desperately poor citizens in communities though shy away from open confrontation, 
depend on organising “weapons of the weak” for covert political scheming (Scott 
1985 in Corbridge 2005: 45).  Although Scott developed a comprehensive framework 
of how peasants resist forms of oppression and repression from the ruling class (Scott 
1985), what we find useful for our framework is the idea and sensitivity to how poor 
people in practice make a stand in non-compliance.   
Cornwall et al. (2011) explain that the historical context from which political cultures 
are formed suggest that in post-colonial Africa, “communitarian forms of citizenship” 
are mostly preferred because they are evoked in order “to hold powerful state actors, 
traditional leaders and patrons accountable…” (pg. 12). They note that citizens 
identify more with tribes and communities rather than with a national identity. Our 
understanding of communitarian citizenship is that it presupposes a highly contextual 
and situated accountability arrangement. This highlights Roberts’ concerns that the 
multiplicity of local priorities is often impossible to reconcile in the absence of an 
overarching structure. Hyden et al. (2004) also refer to the necessity of structural 
contingency when conceiving of governance arrangements and local accountability.  
Participatory mechanism constructs provide a way of understanding the challenges of 
instrumental accountability. Both Roberts and Bossert highlight the social complexity 
of instrumental accountability. Roberts note that the nature of hierarchical interaction 
is prone to distortion due to social contingencies that impact on the dynamics of the 
exchange. He states that the presence of asymmetrical power relations make it 
unlikely for subordinates to be completely free, open and honest where this might 
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result in sanctions. The implication being that, information exchange between 
subordinates and their superiors are often doctored, producing a misrepresentation of 
health status and PHC delivery services.  
Bossert similarly point to the presence of an informal decision space, which results 
from weak enforcement mechanisms. The weak application of sanctions and/or 
incentives between principals and agents and the lack of an effective accountability 
framework leads to the exercise of local agents’ discretion outside formal rules. 
Within this space, public officials often do not discharge their responsibilities 
according to the terms of their engagement.  
 
These analytical concepts provide insight into the interplay between social and 
instrumental accountability. The central proposition of this thesis that both 
instrumental and socialising forms of accountability are required to analyse PHC 
delivery finds resonance in Madon, Krishna et al’s (2010) work where the authors 
conceptualise the role of HMIS within bureaucratic and political decentralisation.  
This is presented briefly as an introduction to the synthesised analytical framework 
developed for this study. 
 
Conceptualising HMIS and Accountability 
De facto and Democratic accountability 
The analytical framework for this study builds on research conducted by Madon, 
Krishna et al’s (2010). They note that the provision of healthcare, as a public service 
to communities, is contingent on relational dynamics between communities, political 
and bureaucratic institutions (Madon, Krishna et al. 2010). In this relationship, HMIS 
is conceived as potentially playing a role to support either de facto or political 
decentralisation (See Fig. 3.2 below). The former is concerned with data reporting for 
managerial or performance-related accountability mainly in terms of resource 
allocation and efficiency. The latter centres on democratic accountability 
conceptualised through the enlisting of intermediaries to strengthen responsiveness to 
community-defined health priorities (Madon, Krishna et al. 2010).  
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Fig. 3.2: Linking HIS, decentralisation and democratic accountability (Madon, 
Krishna et al. 2010) 
 
De facto accountability in essence is responsiveness to superiors or principals who 
wield the authority to reward or sanction performance. The authors submit that HMIS 
performance targets are determined at a distance through deconcentration and 
deregulation of health care services, which is typified in administrative 
decentralisation. Under a democratic accountability arrangement, the authors propose 
that HMIS can be expanded to include qualitative contextual data, serving as a 
repository for a better understanding of the health profile and needs of a community 
and also used to facilitate a better accountability structure and linkage between local 
health facilities and the community they serve. Although broadly overlapping, this 
study refers to instrumental and socialising forms of accountability rather than de 
facto and democratic accountability.  
 
To conclude this first half section, we provide a theorisation of the relationship 
between instrumental and socialising forms of accountability. 
 
Instrumental and socialising accountability 
 
A major commitment of this study is that both instrumental and socialising forms of 
accountability are required to make sense of the complex field of accountability 
especially in LDCs. Our understanding of this relationship is based on similar 
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theoretical approaches that seek to provide capacious analytical frameworks to study 
dynamic social phenomena (for instance, fusing of economic, human and social 
parameters as constitutive of development (Sen 1999)); accountability studies echoing 
the need for both hierarchical and socialising forms of accountability in a ‘real-world’ 
context (Roberts 1991); HMIS studies advocating the need to address both top-down 
and bottom-up requirements of establishing a minimum data set (Shaw 2005). Our 
observation in developing this relationship is that concepts so far introduced, are 
implicated in the duality of accountability, which are a feature of the complex, 
paradoxical nature of a social order. In essence, these concepts can be thought of as 
mutually influencing and co-constitutive. We suggest that socialising forms of 
accountability can help provide useful understandings of the challenges of defining 
objectives, activating mechanisms and interpreting outcomes of instrumental 
accountability. In addition, socialising forms of accountability also help to broaden 
the conceptual landscape of studies in this domain as it yields richer insights and 
provides robust means of capturing nuances and subtleties otherwise missing from a 
purely instrumental view. In a nutshell, socialising accountability sheds light on the 
challenges and limitations of instrumental accountability and provides broader 
analytical capacity to incorporate contextual influences.   
We propose that for HMIS studies, instrumental and socialising forms of 
accountability can be synthesised around concepts that similarly have dual 
associations: representation, visibility and responsiveness. In the next section, we will 
show how we relate these terms to concepts previously discussed and then develop a 
framework for how they will be used in this study.  
 
Towards a synthesised accountability framework  
Introducing Representation, Visibility and Responsiveness 
Representation is conceived as the objective of accountability. These objectives have 
both an instrumental and socialising angle. With respect to the former, representation 
attempts to mirror the status of PHC service delivery, in order to take decisions and 
actions to strengthen the system. In understanding the challenges of this mirroring 
process we turn to the socialising theme of representation, which is about the 
mediation of diverse interests from global to local concerns. We therefore broaden our 
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understanding of the objective of mirroring by placing it within its institutional, 
political and socio-cultural context and introducing relational dynamics that modulate 
these objectives. Understanding the process through which PHC - and consequently 
HMIS - objectives are defined, provides potentially valuable analysis regarding the 
implementation of these objectives. We therefore frame HMIS implementation 
challenges and potentials through the duality of representation.  
The mechanism of representation is visibility. Once accountability objectives are 
determined (or more accurately, constantly negotiated), visibility focuses on strategies 
for achieving these objectives? Visibility mechanism is also related to instrumental 
and socialising forms of accountability. Visibility in the case of the former is for the 
purpose of discipline. That is, unambiguous identification of accountable agents for a 
clearly defined deliverable in order to legitimise the reward or sanction of 
performance. Visibility also has connotations of direction, where it is necessary to 
“see” from the perspective of those who account (and those to be accounted to), in 
order to understand locally defined priorities and challenges. Visibility therefore 
sustains the mirroring process through disciplinary mechanisms, where the emphasis 
is the accountability of subordinates to superiors. Mediation on the contrary requires 
directional visibility for gaining situated understanding of how accountability is 
socially evoked at the points of service delivery.  
The outcome of these accountability arrangements is responsiveness. Instrumental 
accountability prioritises performance-driven targets while socialising accountability 
is people-centred. We conceptualise HMIS in terms of the former through emphases 
on developing an information culture. In terms of the latter we examine how we can 
broaden the conceptualisation of HMIS to improve responsiveness of PHC delivery to 
community health priorities by supporting a dialogue culture.  
 
It is useful to reiterate that the primary research question of this thesis is, “To what 
extent can HMIS improve accountability arrangements of primary healthcare delivery 
in LDCs?” To answer this question, we formulate three sub-questions to be 
individually addressed through the theoretical concepts introduced. Accordingly, we 
will now present how these individual concepts relate to the theories presented in the 
previous section and what component of the primary research question they address.  
 
  79 
Representation as mirroring and mediation 
 
The sub-research question, which our representation construct attempts to address is, 
“How are HMIS implicated in the accountability arrangements underpinning PHC 
delivery in LDCs?” We approach this question by proposing that mediation sheds 
light on the distorted communication challenges of mirror representation and provides 
broader analytical capacity to incorporate contextual influences of health providers’ 
(informal) decision space, a chaotic political society and an (un) civil society. To 
capture the development component of this question, we structure our framework 
around experiences at three different analytical levels (see Fig. 3.3 below), drawing 
on the schema introduced earlier in Table 3.1 (pg 65). Analysing experiences at these 
levels improve our understanding of the developmental state in context or practice.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3.3: Synthesising Representation as Accountability Objective 
 
For ease of the analytical narrative, we provide a mapping of these overlapping levels 
to our representation concepts. For instance, the focus of our analysis in 
administrative decentralisation is from the hierarchical view of senior bureaucrats and 
the wider development community; we discuss bureaucratic performance and decision 
space from the perspective of localised interpretations of government officials and 
politicians. The perspective of poor citizens becomes central under political and civil 
society. We however note that mediating representation concepts will be used 
extensively to analyse findings from mirror representation.  These concepts will be 
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employed to understand how HMIS is conceived within the dynamic of defining 
accountability objectives. Next, we summarise the theoretical concepts that are 
combined to constitute our representation construct. 
 
Hierarchical View 
 
Administrative decentralisation  
From an instrumental accountability perspective, administrative decentralisation is 
framed as being supported by HMIS as a management tool employed in evaluating 
the performance of subordinates according to hierarchical information criteria 
determined at a distance (Madon, Krishna et al. 2010). This resonates with Robert’s 
hierarchical distance and conceptions of decentralisation as deregulation and de-
concentration. Mirror representation from this viewpoint constitutes accountability 
objectives biased towards a global health approach to PHC delivery. These global 
health policies reflect SPHC management ideology towards disease prioritisation. The 
important point is that what is to be represented is determined centrally by 
hierarchical superiors and principals. As such, we introduce the idea of multiple 
principals negotiating diverse and divergent demands for representation (i.e. deciding 
the data that is to be collected).  
 
Distorted communication 
We use the notion of distorted communication to explain misrepresentation or poor 
quality data reporting. Theoretically, this is an intrinsic challenge of mirror 
representation, consequent on hierarchical relations within an instrumental 
accountability structure. In relation to HMIS for PHC delivery, this is reflected in 
accountability arrangements that misrepresent local health priorities and the status of 
PHC delivery. Through a socialising view of accountability, we analyse distorted 
communication as a consequence of interest mediation.  
  
Localised interpretation 
Bureaucratic performance rules 
Performance of the bureaucracy in implementing PHC policies, translates into the 
adequacy of PHC services provided and the quality of mirror representation (i.e. 
accuracy of HMIS data in reflecting services provided). For this, instrumental 
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accountability requires transparency and a meritocratic system of recruitment and 
promotion of health workers and government at state and district levels. Bureaucratic 
performance therefore lies at the interface between mirror and mediating 
representation. The focus on rules and performance derives from a hierarchical view. 
However, the actual experience of the bureaucracy shows that these rules are flexibly 
interpreted locally. This is to be expected in the context of LDCs where the literature 
notes the strong influence of political society on bureaucratic rules. We therefore 
consider how bureaucratic performance is mediated through political society 
(discussed below).  
Decision Space 
As a decentralisation concept, decision space helps us to explore how local agents 
interpret and exercise their discretion in relation to demands made by principals. 
While principals determine the data to be collected what data is actually collected and 
reported is within the domain of an agent’s discretion. Agents exercise their discretion 
either within the formal decision space or through an informal decision space, in view 
of varying levels of resources provided by different principals. Through the mediation 
of agents’ characteristics, motivation and capacity, the objectives of accountability 
i.e. mirror representation, are navigated, contested and constructed.  
 
Political and civil society 
Political society illuminates the mediation of demands made by citizens for public 
services. These demands are made as citizens and civil society engage local 
functionaries and political agents through formal and informal institutions and 
intermediaries. The extent through which civil society influences political society is 
related to the degree to which they were constituted as a consequence of state 
weakness. This proposition sensitises our analysis to interpret the extent to which 
citizens perceive that their interests are represented and how the historical context 
from which political culture evolves, expand or restrict the landscape of this 
representation. Patrimony and clientelism are political cultures in Africa that conflict 
with the rationality underpinning the formal rules of bureaucratic performance. This 
conflict impacts on the capacity and motivation of agents, reflecting negatively on the 
adequacy of PHC services provided and the quality of HMIS mirror representation. 
Citizens / (un) civil society activate “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985 in Corbridge 
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2005: 45) as a means of mediating their interests within this (chaotic) political 
society.  
 
Expected insights 
The combined use of these theories provides tools to conduct a robust analysis of 
HMIS implementation challenges in terms of data quality, reliability and use. By 
framing instrumental and socialising accountability as co-constitutive, we are able to 
unpack how contextual understandings can contribute to formalised HMIS and vice 
versa. These also have policy implications for the role of multiple principals in HMIS 
PHC delivery, especially highlighting the involvement of international partners and 
the wider donor community. These policy implications provide guidance on 
strengthening institutional structures and intermediaries that advocate local 
developmental priorities with a view to balancing the bias of global health 
expediencies on formal hierarchical systems. 
 
Visibility for discipline and direction 
The sub-component of the primary research question addressed by our visibility 
concept is:  “How can we better understand the challenges of HMIS implementation 
in LDCs through the complexities of accountability mechanisms?” The dual nature of 
visibility is closely related to representation. Visibility can be thought of as the 
mechanism of representation. From the instrumental perspective of mirroring, 
visibility is primarily for the purpose of discipline. These mechanisms, through 
formalised legal instruments, render agents unambiguously accountable for the 
delivery of PHC services and the reporting of data that is used to evaluate 
performance. The practical experience of instrumental accountability is conceived 
within the rituals of routine accountability as performance is evaluated against set 
targets so that sanctions or rewards can be meted out accordingly.  
From a socialising sense, visibility is driven by the need for direction through mutual 
recognition and respect i.e. “to be seen”. These entail mechanisms employed by 
health workers’ to humanise work and make them feel that their input counts and 
evoking communitarian citizenship in order for political society to acknowledge and 
respond to health priorities. Visibility mechanisms for direction operate through 
dialogue processes that increase understanding. We propose that these accountability 
  83 
mechanisms can be conceptualised through the duality of visibility for discipline and 
direction.   
 
Hierarchical view 
Integrity of regulation 
At this level, our theory proposes that a legal framework is required for accountability 
between the hierarchical levels i.e. federal to states and states to hold LGAs 
accountable for the provision of PHC services including the reporting of such data as 
requested up the hierarchical ranks. Bossert’s concept of a legislative framework is a 
useful tool for analysing the foundation upon which information (HMIS) is employed 
for hierarchical disciplinary purposes. We note that within decentralised PHC 
structures, formal rules that define multilevel accountability arrangements require 
appropriate legal frameworks. HMIS implementation within the PHC system 
therefore relies on enforceable legal authority in order for lower level administrators 
and political agents to be held accountable. Within this legal framework, Roberts 
proposes that through the rituals of routine accountability information is employed to 
systematically render local subordinates subjects of unequivocal responsibility under 
a sanctions and rewards system, which could be financial or non financial (e.g. a 
system of recognition and exclusion). This resonates with Bossert’s conception of 
principals holding agents accountable through the demand for information. Roberts 
and Bossert both highlight socialising factors that impact on the integrity of 
regulation.  
 
Localised interpretation 
Dialogue 
 
At this level we explore forums where diverse agents engage to discuss problems of 
mirror representation and how they navigate formal accountability structures. The 
concept of dialogue is helpful in analysing how informal and socialising forums are 
implicated in locally situated accountability that attempt to improve mutual 
understanding. Through this understanding we can identify how health workers 
counter the impersonal nature of bureaucratic demands and construct interpretations 
of accountability to citizens.  
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Understanding distortion 
Roberts (1991) notes that the nature of hierarchical interaction is prone to distortion 
due to social contingencies and power relations that impact on the dynamics of the 
exchange while Bossert (1998) similarly point to the presence of an informal decision 
space, which results from weak enforcement mechanisms. These concepts also shed 
light on the complexity of maintaining the integrity of regulation and are useful for 
analysing the challenges of HMIS implementation. The theoretical proposition 
regarding hierarchical information is that it usually results in distorted 
communication, which is produced as a result of asymmetrical power relations 
between superiors and their subordinates. From an HMIS perspective this can be 
expressed as data reporting often being one-way, poor data quality and reporting 
practices. In cases where enforcement mechanisms are weak, this leads to a 
pronounced informal decision space through which we can analyse the actions of 
health workers. 
 
Communitarian citizenship 
An important component of our concept of direction is how health workers and 
citizens engage within political society to achieve visibility and therefore steer the 
course of PHC delivery towards locally defined priorities. We approach this theme 
through the construct of communitarian citizenship. Visibility underpins goals of civil 
society to be seen and heard (Báez and Barron 2006; Mehrotra 2006) by the state. 
Cornwall et al (2011) and Corbridge et al (2005) conceptualise community voice and 
engagement with state actors in terms of citizenship. Citizenship, they argue, is 
constructed from how poor people experience the state. Visibility is particularly 
critical in most LDC context where there is general neglect and pervasive 
disconnection of local communities from state provision (Corbridge, Williams et al. 
2005; Cornwall, Robins et al. 2011). Cornwall et al. coined the term, “citizenship 
experienced as deficit” to explain this situation. Placing this construct within the 
context of historical political culture, the authors propose the notion of 
communitarian citizenship to describe how citizens evoke communal alliances in their 
engagement with political society for resources. Visibility that leads to the provision 
of public services therefore becomes a matter of political patronage and knowing 
influential state actors who are from the same community or tribe.  
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Expected insight 
Employing our concept of visibility, we attempt to enrich our understanding of how 
the formal regulatory context of PHC accountability mechanisms is implicated in the 
challenges of HMIS implementation. We also hope to illuminate the socially 
constructed, contested and negotiated nature of locally situated accountability 
mechanisms and their implications for implementing HMIS to support a disciplinary 
regime. 
Responsiveness: Performance and people-centred 
Conceived as the outcome dimension of accountability, the sub question to be 
answered through this construct is: “What kind of developmental transformation is 
implied in the implementation of HMIS from an accountability perspective?” We use 
the concept of responsiveness to critically analyse the (potential) developmental 
impact of HMIS implementation. An instrumental accountability perspective 
emphasises efficient performance through the development of an information culture, 
while socialising forms of accountability focus on responsiveness to community 
priorities by strengthening a dialogue culture. We propose that the developmental 
transformation potential of HMIS can be reconceptualised as supporting responsive 
performance. In essence, the developmental contribution of HMIS is not limited by 
the need to develop an information culture but implicated in the imperative to 
practically and actively strengthen a dialogue culture. 
 
Responsive performance 
The approach we put forward is to gain a better appreciation of the complexity of 
implementing HMIS by balancing performance oriented goals against strengthening 
the institutional fabric of dialogue (which is central to democratisation ideals). From a 
performance perspective, information culture is a useful notion for understanding the 
challenges of HMIS implementation in terms of data management processes 
(affecting quality and reliability) and the institutionalisation of information use 
(affecting sustainability). However, including a dialogue culture highlights the power 
relations that are implicated in what, how and for whom information is used but also 
incorporates the socio-political dynamics underpinning HMIS implementation in PHC 
delivery.  
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Mirroring 
From this perspective, responsiveness is to an extent driven by the imperatives of 
SPHC based on an instrumental rationality of predetermined objectives of global 
health. This is underpinned by a performance-based accountability arrangement with 
a predominantly economic view of development. The influence of social actors with 
divergent motives lead to tangential outcomes from those expected. We conceive of 
this intentionality as mediation of self-interest within the hierarchy level. The 
weakness of an information culture reflects accountability arrangements that are 
defined by the mediated interests of well-placed and influential actors. 
 
Mediation 
We can analyse the developmental perspective of PHC delivery through the experience 
of citizens, intermediaries and civil society. In the humanisation of work, social 
interaction between health workers and community members yield an understanding 
of how health must be seen within a wider developmental context. Additionally, 
political culture helps us in understanding how citizens perceive their agency within 
accountability practices for the delivery of PHC services.  
 
 
In the next chapter we discuss how these theories are implicated in the design of the 
data collection methods and interviews and our understanding of their role in data 
analysis.   
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
(Pre) Conception to Analysis 
Introduction 
This chapter describes and justifies the methodological approach adopted for this 
study. A number of factors come to bear on the particular path chosen and are 
informed by the researcher’s philosophical leanings, appropriateness of methods for 
addressing the research problem and personal motivations. The study adopts a realist 
constructionist view where knowledge is produced as a result of subject (i.e. 
researcher)/object (domain of study) interaction where the subject engages the object 
in the process of “making” meaning (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Therefore, what 
we produce in this research as knowledge is not definitive of what is knowable or 
what can be known (Sayer 2000). In place of the problematic notion of truth 
(Goodman 1978), critical realist research expresses this notion in terms of “practical 
adequacy” (Sayer 2000) or understanding.  
This study employs an embedded single-case research which brings different 
phenomena within the Nigerian PHC delivery system to the fore from the National 
level to the northern region, to a single state, ward and lastly a community. PHC 
research have shown how national structures are implicated in local PHC delivery 
(Atkinson, Cohn et al. 2005; Atkinson, Cohn et al. 2008) while HMIS studies have 
also argued for the necessity of a aligning macro level data demands and policy with 
micro level practice (Shaw 2005). While the logic of the case study chosen is not for 
statistical generalisation, the realist research design allows the theoretical abstraction 
of findings such that analytical generalisations can be made successfully and with 
relevance across similar contexts (Klein and Meyers 1999; Sayer 2000; Yin 2003). 
We locate this research within an interpretivist tradition (Geertz 1973; Walsham 
1993; Walsham 2006) 
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Philosophical leanings: Ontology and Epistemology 
To place this HMIS research within its philosophical tradition, this section elaborates 
on different positions regarding the constituent character of reality and how we obtain 
knowledge of this reality. Although agreed that the distinction made between one’s 
position on reality (i.e. ontology) and the nature of knowing this reality (i.e. 
epistemology) can be quite tenuous, it is sometimes expedient to show a firm grasp of 
the particularity of issues addressed within the separate philosophical domains (Sayer 
2000).  
Justifying a critical realist ontology 
While not exhaustive, we examine three possible ontological worldviews: empiricism, 
idealism and critical realism. Deriving from a naturalist philosophical school, an 
important claim empiricism makes is that there is a singular reality and access to this 
reality is constitutive of this reality i.e. if it cannot be known, it is does not exist 
(Mounce 1999). Therefore, according to this position the only legitimate reality is that 
which is observable through the researcher’s sensory perceptions. For example, death 
and disease are to a significant degree, objective realities. When we therefore study 
HMIS and the accountability arrangements underpinning PHC delivery, an empirical 
view concentrates on HMIS as observable technological artefacts that capture and 
represent this reality in order to improve accountability. This is what Roberts allude to 
when he writes: 
“Whilst caught within its own image of itself as objective mirror, 
accounting can think only to improve the quality of the mirror image - to 
polish and clarify its techniques.” 
 
For HMIS studies, this implies that the end (PHC as disease-focus), means (HMIS as 
instrumental technologies) and processes (decision-making and accountability as 
measurable outcomes) are objectified. On the contrary, health (Good 1994), HMIS 
(Noir and Walsham 2007), decision-making (Mutemwa 2006) and accountability 
(Roberts 1991; Roberts 2009) are socially constructed and contingent. In explaining 
the implications from a philosophical standpoint, Searle (1995) argues that observing 
action is not enough to understand social reality and therefore inferences must be 
made to the unseen “object/structures” underpinning “causal mechanisms”. For 
instance, while there are proxies designed to render day-to-day HMIS and 
accountability practice visible in the empirical sense, these observations cannot go far 
enough to explain how and why these practices take place. Indeed Roberts warns 
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against the conflation of information-based objectification of accountability with the 
actual practice (Roberts 1991). Therefore, the ontological ‘flatness’ of empiricism 
renders it an unsuitable position in relation to this study’s objective of understanding 
the way a variety of social actors within the PHC make meaning and interpret 
accountability demands placed on them.  
 
In contrast, idealism denies a single objective reality but proffers a plurality of 
realities that is constituted within the depth of social structures albeit these structures 
are exclusive products of human conception (Bhasker 1998). The immediate problem 
we find with this idea is that accountability practices are not wholly determined by 
unbounded agents but to some degree are navigated through interactions with 
institutional structures. This is in the sense of what Hyden and colleagues (2004) 
describe as governance being structurally contingent. In addition, accountability 
arrangements of PHC delivery are characterised by institutional realities objectified to 
the degree that it is impossible for a single individual to “wish” them away (Berger 
and Luckmann 1966). These realities exist concretely in a manner that does not 
depend on human consciousness, consequently rendering an idealist position 
untenable for this study as far as illuminating overarching accountability structures 
that influence particular course of action at the local level.     
 
In light of the inadequacies of empiricism and idealism, critical realism offers a 
distinctive philosophical versatility, which is essential to social science research. 
Although the implications of these wade into epistemological territories, this section 
addresses the stratification of reality in critical realism. Bhaskar (1998) makes a 
principal distinction between the “transitive” and “intransitive” domains of 
knowledge with double implications that: 1) the nature of existence is not dependent 
on our thoughts (idealism) and 2) our observation (or knowledge) of the world should 
not be conflated with or equated to the world or the essence of reality (empiricism). In 
addition to these two distinctions, critical realism proposes three levels of reality: the 
empirical, the actual, and the real.  The empirical is also referred to as “empirical 
realism” (Sayer 2000: 11). For example, we are able to observe accountability actions 
in terms of PHC service provision and data reporting at this level of reality. The real 
in the critical realist sense does not lay claim to an exclusive access to reality but 
conceptually distinguishes a realm of objective, independent social or natural reality, 
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their constitutive forms and potency (Sayer 2000). This is where for example health 
status and cultural practices come into view.  As a conceptual distinction, the actual 
refers to possibilities (latent or active) of instantiation, effects and outcomes of the 
real (ibid.). This level attempts to illuminate the result of interactions and interplays, 
for example, between PHC service providers, civil and political society, local 
bureaucracy and international aid agencies. By stratifying reality in this way this 
research is not only able to observe what is happening but also better explore local 
contingencies (such as motivations and interpretations), structures (such as formal 
accountability demands) and power relations. In other words, events and outcomes 
observed empirically, are shaped, influenced or determined by a complex array of 
latent and activated mechanisms which in turn are given expression according to the 
form, “object” or “structure” from which they derive their existence and actuality. In 
essence, a critical realist stance places this study in a position to proffer insight or 
better still, contributions or problematisations to questions that underlie the role of 
HMIS in primary health care delivery as far as it relates to interactions between 
individuals, institutions and ideologies. 
 
Constructionism 
To briefly delineate the epistemological traditions within which research activities are 
located, this section introduces Crotty’s (1998) three broad epistemological positions: 
objectivism, subjectivism and constructionism.  The first two are loosely related to 
positivism and relativism respectively (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al. 1991). 
Nonetheless, it is noted that these epistemologies are not contained within discreet 
unambiguous boundaries, but come in shades and degrees where through the course 
of history, different schools of thought have located their conceptions on a continuum 
of sort.       
 
Objectivist epistemology argues for the primacy of value-free, detached research 
producing universally indisputable knowledge of facts. The researcher as the subject 
therefore remains independent from his/her object of enquiry. In this sense the goal of 
research is nomothetic and the researcher a purveyor of “truth”. Accordingly, the 
search for truth presupposes a definitive single reality which can be known, specified, 
represented and perfectly communicated. In contrast to objectivism, subjectivism 
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holds that knowledge is the product of interpretations influenced by mental 
conceptions, values and predispositions. Therefore there is no objective knowledge 
because the object of study itself is subsumed in the subject’s consciousness. 
Consequently, we deduce the inherent pluralist nature of subjectivism as it offers 
multiple realities depending on the subject and not the object. In fact, there is no 
object without the mental/conscious observation of the subject. This essentially 
idealist ontology argues that the objective of research is idiographic and the 
accommodation of relativist views of knowledge, truth and reality is necessary.  
 
It is useful to note that there are varied versions and degrees of constructionism 
(Hacking 1999). The idea that everything is constructed i.e. “universal 
constructionism” is more akin to subjectivism and is therefore not concordant with the 
views of constructionism espoused here. However softer views which posits that 
knowledge is a social construction to the degree that it is mediated through social 
actors is amenable with the proviso that there is a limitation to the freedom or 
interpretation afforded social actors according to the peculiarities of the object of 
study (Kallinikos 2004). Hacking (1999) argues that when dealing with claims that a 
“thing” is socially constructed, it is invariably the “idea” of the thing and the 
“classification” of the idea that is referred to as being socially constructed. This 
distinction is important because ideas have their roots in and are sustained by a 
particular social context, which Hacking refers to as the “matrix”. The matrix is a 
complex amalgam of institutions and “material infrastructures”. He maintains that 
these can be categorised as “social because their meanings are what matter to us, but 
they are material, and in their sheer materiality make substantial differences to 
people” (pg 10). Therefore, as can be expected, both the idea and classification cannot 
be conceived independently of the matrix. This is the case with accountability 
mechanisms. They are socially constructed ideas, which HMIS are being framed to 
support but they make a significant difference to poor people in the delivery of PHC.  
 
Realist Constructionism  
There is a strong case that constructionist epistemology is not mutually exclusive to 
realist ontology (Hacking 1999) and that insistence on a dichotomy is based on a 
misinformed premise (Tsoukas 1989). Constructionism therefore proposes the notion 
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of a world which exists independently of human subjects but embraces the idea that 
knowledge of this objective world is appropriated and meaningful within the 
subjective world of social beings (Searle 1995). Through this conceptualisation 
knowledge is produced as a result of subject/object interaction where the subject 
engages the object in the process of “making” meaning (Berger and Luckmann 1966). 
Therefore, what we know is not definitive of what is knowable or what can be known 
(Sayer 2000). In place of the problematic notion of truth (Goodman 1978), critical 
realist research expresses this notion in terms of “practical adequacy” (Sayer 2000) or 
understanding.  
 
We use the schema provided below in Table 4.1 below to summarise how the 
epistemological assumptions of this study are implicated in the research design and 
methods of this study. 
Table 4.1: Contrasting Objectivism and Constructionism (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et 
al. 1991: 30) 
 
As the observer, the researcher assumes that he is a part of the empirical landscape 
with preconceptions and biases about the subject matter. The construction of the 
problem domain is driven by personal interest in the practical and conceptual 
challenge of HMIS implementation in strengthening health care delivery systems for 
poor people. Furthermore, explanations of this domain are geared towards how we 
can better understand the challenges of HMIS implementation in improving lives. The 
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primary strategy of the research fieldwork was to gain sufficient exposure to the 
diverse realities of HMIS implementation and as a result build a rich picture of the 
situation especially in Northern Nigeria. The concepts adopted seek to elicit the 
perspectives of multiple actors in the field and is reflected in the multi level analysis 
ranging macro global policies to micro experiences. Theoretical implications for 
similar research are drawn from the analysis. Particular cases are chosen from 
Northern Nigeria to highlight challenges of implementing HMIS in desperately poor 
regions and the problematic accountability practices that are implicated in improving 
health status.   
 
Critique of philosophical stance 
A defence of the realist position has not been made in relation to the criticism of “dual 
ontologies” (Cruickshank 2004). However, more efforts have been concentrated on 
illustrating the fit between critical realism and the domain of study as opposed to a 
philosophical analysis of critical realism. There is also a related contention that 
critical realism tends to suggest that reality is “out there” while from a 
phenomenological perspective, life is subsumed in reality. This Heideggerian/Kantian 
distinction in my opinion is not germane to this research because whether intrinsic or 
extrinsic, we allude to a reality independent of human conception and as such not 
always fully known. As independence is the operative concept, the elusiveness of this 
reality to consciousness may be construed as being external at that point in time.      
 
Although adopting a constructionist epistemology, this paper did not explicitly 
discriminate between social and individual constructionism. Rather, this essay chose 
to adopt certain author’s (i.e. Searle, Sayer and Hacking) conception of the word in 
relation to the specific object and objectives of this study.  We employ the concepts 
provided in Table 4.2 below, to sum up the implications of a constructionist 
epistemology on the object and objectives of this study: starting with what an HMIS 
study in LDCs means for improving health care and development, how my personal 
interests shape and is shaped by the research design, the diverse methods of gathering 
data through formal interviews and informal conversations, making sense of the 
fieldwork data and experience and providing a contribution through better 
understanding of the problem domain.    
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Table 4.2 Methodological implications of different epistemologies within social 
science (adapted from Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al. 1991) 
 
In the next section, we focus and elaborate on the research design of this study.  
Framework of the Research Design 
 
Myers (1997), with specific reference to IS research, critically analyses the use of four 
possible qualitative research methods e.g. grounded theory, ethnography, action 
research and case study research. 
  
Grounded theory 
Grounded theory is an inductive method advocating a creative and iterative process 
between data collection, analysis and theory formulation (Weick 1989). While this 
does not preclude the ambition to develop new theories (for example in IS research 
see Orlikowski 1993) , it seems more fruitful to build on prior work already 
established in this area (Cornford and Smithson 2006). The reflexive approach of this 
study however suggest that a deductive approach to research design and data 
collection is complimented by an inductive strategy which uses data to sensitize 
further collection of data, to refine and inform the theoretical frameworks used and 
the research design. Indeed this research project started with theoretical ideas 
regarding the nature of the relationship between HMIS, decentralisation and 
community health care (see Appendix 1) but the design of the data collection and 
fieldwork in 2007 and 2008 were based on being “sensitised” and led by what the data 
might suggest to be more critical and relevant to this study.   
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Ethnography 
Ethnographic studies rely on extended periods of “participant observation” (Sanday 
1979) typically through a longitudinal research design (Pettigrew 1990), in order to 
develop a deep understanding of the context of study and possible impact of changes 
over a time period. The importance of context in IS research makes this method quite 
relevant and appealing (Myers 1999). However, it is outside the remit of this study to 
explore the dimension of impact. This is for two practical reasons: first , the impact of 
HMIS on accountability is alleged and will require a study of many years to come to 
any tenable conclusions for or against such a claim. Second, the developmental 
impact of HMIS especially in a context where HMIS implementation is still in its 
nacent stages and will take even longer to study, in my opinion. 
 
Action Research 
Action research is extensvely used in HMIS studies in LDCs (for example Akpan, 
Searing et al. 2004; Sahay and Walsham 2006). The Health Information Systems 
Programme (HISP) is in itself a “large-scale action research project” (Braa, Monteiro 
et al. 2004). Action research evolved out of a need within the IS community to make 
research more relevant to practical organisational problems (Avison, Lau et al. 1999). 
Researchers immerse themselves in the thick of the situation,  guided by theoretical 
and analytical frameworks they engage in developing effective HMIS, reiterating the 
process between theory and  practice within in a cyclical and mutually informing 
relationship. Action research studies have access to rich data and are also able to 
influence outcomes. However, there are also other drawbacks in using this research 
method for this study. One problem is that of critical distance with the danger of an 
emotional investment in the projects such that the critical view of the researcher is 
compromised (Walsham 2006). Action research was a closely suited research strategy 
especially as access to the field was negotiated based on taking up consultancy with 
the HISP network. However, the researcher had limited influence over the actual 
consultancy projects and also felt the need to maintain some critical distance from the 
HISP project. Nevertheless, the researcher felt that it was possible to combine the 
richess of access granted by the consultancy with a critical distance required to pursue 
the objectives of the research. To do this it was necessary to note that the objective of 
the research and its primary commitment lies in grasping and understanding the 
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current complexities and challenges of implementing HMIS without necessarily 
influencing outcomes in the methodological sense proposed by action research. This 
therefore leads us to a case study research design.  
Justifying Case Study Research 
Case study as a research method is used to empirically investigate “a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2003: 13). This paper employs 
the three criteria developed by Yin (2003) to argue that this research topic is best 
investigated using a case study method. The first criteria: the kind of question posed. 
The main question of this research is “To what extent can HMIS improve the 
accountability arrangements underpinning PHC delivery in LDCs?” Yin (2003) 
argues that “exploratory” “what” questions of this sort can be investigated using 
experiment, survey, archival analysis, history and case study research methods. 
However, related sub question are interested in exploring how HMIS are implicated in 
accountability arrangements and their complexities. Yin (2003) argues that “how and 
why” “questions are more explanatory and likely to lead to the use of case studies, 
histories, and experiments” (p.6). Yin proposes that where the investigator cannot 
manipulate outcomes and events in the field (as is the case in this research), 
experiments are deemed unsuitable. Therefore the two options left to consider are 
histories and case studies. To decide between these two, the third criteria is introduced 
i.e. “the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events.” Although 
in building the context of the study it is necessary to include historical and 
“processual” analysis  (Pettigrew 1997), the principal focus of the investigation will 
concentrate on contemporary challenges of HMIS implementation in PHC delivery. 
This therefore leaves the case study method as the most suitable option. From another 
perspective, case studies can also be employed for building new analytical 
frameworks (Eisenhardt 1989) for understanding the complexity of the role of HMIS 
in supporting accountability mechanisms and improving PHC delivery.  
 
Embedded single-case design 
However, there are still important design considerations to decide when using a case 
study research method. Yin (2003) proposes four types of designs: 1) “holistic, single-
case designs”;  2) “holistic, multiple-case designs”; 3) “embedded single-case 
  97 
design”; 4) “embedded multiple-case design” (p 40). The most typical case study 
designs found in the literature are the second and third designs. Studies adopt a 
holistic, multiple-case design in comparing the complexity of HIS implementation 
between countries (Nhampossa and Sahay 2005; Shaw, Mengiste et al. 2007), others  
choose an embedded single-case design to either highlight experiences of HIS 
implementation in different states within a country in order to make analytical 
generalisations to the country level (e.g. Akpan et al. 2004) or emphasise different 
phenomena in different districts within a state in order to generalise findings to the 
state level (e.g. Sahay and Walsham 2006). This study employs the latter research 
design of an embedded single-case which brings different phenomena within the PHC 
delivery system to the fore from the National level to the northern region, to a single 
state, ward and lastly a community.  
 
The circumstance under which it would be suitable to conduct a single case study is 
when the case is either “critical,” “unique,” “typical,” “revelatory” or “longitudinal,” 
(Yin 2003) although there are grave risks (Lee 1998) of jeopardising the whole 
research if the single case fails (Yin 2003:41-42). The choice of a single-case design 
is justifiable from the viewpoint of the case being typical.  
 
Research Methods 
From problem domain to research question 
There are a variety of influences that bear upon the researcher in choosing a research 
domain (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al. 1991). The authors propose that affiliations 
with research communities, important stakeholders and outcome of a critical literature 
review combine with personal motivations and interests in helping to settle on a 
research topic. In this intensively iterative process, the starting point for this thesis has 
been what Silverman (2009) described as “social obligation”. The researcher was 
interested in understanding how HMIS can contribute to improving healthcare 
delivery and implications for the desperately poor. While these interests were at the 
intersection between health care, development and IS, it was important to narrow 
down the scope of the research to a manageable research project and specific set of 
questions. This narrowing was done through a combination of the literature reviewed, 
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alignment of this study with the HISP research community and convictions from the 
fieldwork. Literature reviewed and the HISP research community highlight a few 
problems of HMIS implementation in most LDCs, these included problem of relating 
to the limitations of pilot projects, inappropriate infrastructure, low management 
capacity and lack of trained workforce especially at the primary care level (Shaw, 
Mengiste et al. 2007). The studies conducted in 2007 and 2008 however seem to 
suggest a systemic problem that pointed to the role of political actors in HMIS 
implementation as well as the marginalisation of citizens’ interest in the process of 
health care delivery. As a necessity, feedback from these field trips regarding 
perceptions of critical HMIS implementation issues were reflected in narrowing down 
the research domain. This was particularly necessary as the views of policy makers 
and primary healthcare providers were considered as primary stakeholders of this 
study. A significant objective for the first couple of field trips was to gather empirical 
data regarding critical challenges faced by policy makers and health service providers 
in the implementation and use of HMIS. During these trips, there seems to be a 
convergence and recurring theme pointing to the implications of political and 
democratic arrangements in both the implementation of HMIS and delivery of 
primary healthcare. With exposure to different levels of HMIS implementation for 
PHC delivery over a two-year period, the implications of political and democratic 
arrangements in the intricacies of HMIS implementation became more pronounced 
and roused my intellectual curiosity. This led to revisiting the HMIS and PHC 
literature from a governance perspective. A pivotal point in formulating the research 
question is traced to the work of Roberts (1991) on The Possibilities of 
Accountability. This work seemed to provide a lucid framework for making sense of 
the realities encountered in the field. Combining these factors, a primary research 
question was formulated to understand the challenges HMIS implementation in 
strengthening accountability arrangements in the delivery of PHCs in LDCs. The 
intentional inclusion of “LDCs” in the research question reflects the sustained interest 
in studying HMIS implementation in light of its contribution to improving the lives of 
poor people. It also attempts to address a more recent and urgent call in the ICTD 
literature for studies in LDCs to engage more with the analytical dimensions of 
developmental transformation (Thompson and Walsham 2010; Walsham 2010). 
Using a both the accountability and ICTD literature, three sub questions were 
formulated from the primary research question (these are presented in Fig. 4.1 below). 
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Fig. 4.1: Primary and sub-research questions 
 
Justifying appropriateness of theory for research questions 
From a constructionist epistemology, empirical data can be classified as the 
researcher’s interpretation of interviewees’ account of reality (Geertz 1973 in 
Walsham 2006). Limiting error and misunderstanding can be achieved by adopting 
appropriate theoretical constructs, research methods and valuing the researcher’s 
informed intuition in order to produce data interpretations that are more reflective of 
reality (Valsiner 2000) or practically adequate. As such, the conceptual framework of 
representation, visibility and responsiveness, adopted for this study are employed as 
“sensitizing” tools for the research design, data collection (Klein and Meyers 1999) 
and analysis. While this infers a deductive relationship between theory and empirical 
data, the inherent reflexivity on theory also suggests a somewhat inductive approach 
(Eisenhardt 1989). For instance, as part of the Masters programme preceding this 
study, data analysed from five semi-structure telephone interviews also served as a 
tool for highlighting points of further interests and questions to be pursued in this 
particular study. Therefore there is an iterative process between data collection and 
constructing a theoretical framework.  
Theories are drawn from across disciplines in harmony with a critical realist stance 
that maintains that: 
“Disciplinary parochialism, and its close relative disciplinary imperialism, 
are a recipe for reductionism, blinkered interpretations, and the 
misattribution of causality” (Sayer 2000:7).   
To what extent 
can HMIS 
improve 
accountability 
arrangements of 
primary 
healthcare 
delivery in ldcs?  
How are HMIS implicated 
in the accountability 
arrangements 
underpinning PHC 
delivery in ldcs?  
How can we understand 
the challenges of HMIS 
implementation in ldcs 
through the complexities 
of accountability 
mechanisms?  What kind of developmental transformation is implicated in the implementation of HMIS from an accountability perspective?  
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We have drawn concepts from governance, health care decentralisation in LDCs, and 
theories on socialising and instrumental accountability, to inform our conceptual 
framework. We briefly justify the conceptual framework in light of the sub research 
questions of this study. 
 
The sub questions are constructed to address the primary question examine three 
aspects of accountability: objectives, mechanisms and outcomes. Conceptualising the 
objectives allows us to clearly define the intricacies of underlying rationalities that 
construct understandings of accountability arrangements. As we unpack what 
constitutes accountability arrangements, we therefore see how HMIS are implicated in 
these arrangements. This question helps us to empirically locate HMIS within an 
accountability framework. As the aim of our primary research question is to 
understand the “extent” to which HMIS is able to improve accountability 
arrangements, we explore the mechanisms deployed to achieve accountability 
objectives. In particular, we turn our attention to the practical complexities of these 
mechanisms in order to analyse the potential and limitations of HMIS within this 
domain. The last sub question tries to tackle the developmental context of the research 
question. This is especially from the view of rural poor communities for which the 
original PHC ideology was formulated. The conceptual tool introduced for this study 
therefore provide tools to critical analyse the implicit developmental ideologies 
driving the implementation of HMIS in LDCs. We are more interested in being able 
to highlight bias in emphasis rather than counterposing one form of development 
against another. Through the conceptual constructs proposed to address these sub 
questions, we hope to offer a convincing and coherent analysis of the empirical 
findings that will help us towards answering the primary research question of this 
study. Table 4.3 summarises the justifications provided for the theoretical constructs 
and sub questions developed to answer our primary research question. 
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Conceptual framework Research Question Justification 
Representation 
(Objective) 
How are HMIS implicated 
in the accountability 
arrangements 
underpinning PHC 
delivery in LDCs 
To place the primary 
research question in context 
and tease out the nuanced 
objectives of accountability 
arrangements underpinning 
PHC delivery.   
Visibility (Mechanism) How can we better 
understand the challenges 
of HMIS implementation 
in LDCs through the 
complexities of 
accountability 
mechanisms? 
As we are interested in the 
“extent” to which HMIS can 
improve accountability, the 
complexities that are 
inherent in the mechanisms 
of accountability will 
provide some indication of 
the potential and challenges 
of implementing HMIS 
within this context.  
Responsiveness 
(Outcome) 
What kind of 
developmental 
transformation is implied 
in the implementation of 
HMIS from an 
accountability perspective? 
The primary research 
question is interested 
particularly in LDCs. 
Therefore this construct 
provides a way of addressing 
the developmental 
dimension of accountability. 
Table 4.3: Justifying the conceptual framework in light of research questions 
 
These research questions formed the basis of the empirical fieldwork, which included 
data collection methods, data-requirement/interview themes and potential 
respondents.   
Fieldwork & Case Study 
Having considered the substantive elements of the research project i.e. the nature and 
boundary of what is to be researched, this section details the operational aspects of the 
research i.e. issues surrounding the empirical investigation and fieldwork. It must be 
mentioned here that the methodological plans proposed acted only as a guide and 
were not immutable. The researcher, within the constraints of the research questions, 
operated with a level of flexibility and improvisation reflecting a situated 
methodological response to the reality of situations encountered during the fieldwork. 
The improvisation mentioned here is in the spirit of what Scott (2000) defined as 
“lived methodology”. To begin with, we present our data collection methods. 
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Data collection strategy for fieldwork 
As the overarching strategy guiding the fieldwork is based on an interpretive research 
paradigm (Walsham 1993) and in particular interpretive case study (Walsham 1995), 
the researcher’s fieldwork objective was to observe, gather views, opinions etc and 
builds a coherent narrative containing issues addressing the research questions. 
Interviews are arguably the most significant means of gathering qualitative data and 
semi-structured interviews the most widely used in information systems research 
(Myers and Newman 2007). This was supplemented by analysing documents (Yin, 
2003) and observations of respondents. Accordingly, the primary data collection 
method for this study was made up of semi-structured interview and conversations 
with intentionality.   
Access to health workers is difficult because of the enormous time pressures they face 
on the job. These interviews were designed with the researcher expecting only a 
limited amount of time per interviewee and also prepared to be flexible regarding 
how, where and when the interviews are conducted. As a crucial point, it was 
necessary to work within the interviewees’ timeframe and at their convenience 
without turning out to be a nuisance (Walsham 2006). Where possible interviews 
were recorded on a dictaphone but where the researcher’s intuition suggests that this 
would compromise the quality of response from interviewees (Esterberg 2002) or 
when it seemed to distract, note-taking sufficed (Walsham 2006). Although 
sometimes even note-taking had to wait until later especially where it had been a 
conversation of relevance to the study. In these situations, notes were taken 
immediately after or a recap dictated into the dictaphone. Copies of official 
documentations, project reports and minutes of meetings were taken as part of the 
data. From a constructivist epistemology, the triangulating of information from 
different sources for the purpose of methodological rigour (Yin 2003) was not a 
particular focus as this is more suited to an idealist position. However in terms of 
reflexivity, the researcher considered responses in light of possible perceptions of the 
researcher’s role. For instance, initial responses from respondents seem to suggest that 
HMIS was either working reasonably well or completely dysfunctional. In Northern 
Nigeria, most questions asked were answered in the affirmative to reflect positively 
on the respondent. At other times such as when the researcher was perceived as 
representing a donor programme, respondents usually painted a gloomy picture where 
nothing was working. This made it necessary to ask interrelated questions that may 
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point to issues with practical adequacy. Once these were revealed, it was much easier 
to get a clearer picture and deeper insight into the reality of the situation as it is 
experienced and/or perceived.   
Fieldwork interviews and data collection  
The fieldwork interviewees were split into different levels according to the analytical 
levels of governance actors presented in Chapter 3 (Table 3.1). In Table 4.4 we 
provide an overview of interviewees according to the types of respondents in the 
different analytical levels and their location. 
 
Analytical Level Representative Respondents Location of 
Respondents 
Practitioners from the 
development community and 
senior bureaucrats 
National and state donor 
consultants/officers, WHO 
officials (National level), HMIS 
consultants, NHMIS officers etc 
Abuja, Kano, Yobe, 
Katsina, Zamfara and 
Jigawa 
Government officials and 
individuals in political 
society 
CHEWs, health workers, 
community doctors, LGA M&E 
officers, State HMIS officers, 
state DPRS, state Permanent 
Secretary, PHC Coordinator, 
Local Government Chairman 
Yobe, Katsina, Zamfara 
and Jigawa 
Poor as citizens and 
marginalised members of the 
political society 
 
Rural community members, Local 
Community Volunteers, Ward 
development committee members, 
Village Head, Ward Councillor, 
civil society members, Local 
engagement officers/consultants  
  
Jigawa 
Table 4.4: Interviewees from different analytical levels linked to typical respondent 
designations and location 
 
Before the fieldwork, interview themes were constructed from the research questions 
(Silverman 2009) linked to the conceptual framework and analytical levels. This 
process is presented in Fig. 4.2 below. Each of the three sub research questions is 
related to an individual theoretical construct presented in the conceptual framework. 
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These sub questions were then broken down into interview themes depending on the 
analytical level and type of respondent.  
 
 
  Fig. 4.2: Linking the conceptual framework to interview themes 
 
To give an example of how these themes are constructed, from our analytical 
construct, there are three research question categories. Interview themes were 
constructed for each category however the actual interviews were conducted to reflect 
questions appropriate to the analytical level and particular type of respondent. See 
Table 4.5 below for research questions and the interview themes/questions sample 
design used for this study. 
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Interview theme/question 
Research Question 1: How are HMIS implicated in the accountability arrangements underpinning 
PHC delivery in LDCs? 
Main themes 
 
Explore the perception of PHC delivery in the country/state/LGA/community. 
Investigate opinions regarding the intended and actual role of information in PHC delivery. 
How is policy on HMIS and PHC delivery formulated and implemented and what is the perception 
regarding their impact? 
What is the intended, actual or perceived role of HMIS in PHC accountability? According to whose 
agenda, in light of what evidence and possible examples to substantiate perception.  
 
Understanding the process of health data collection in Nigeria 
 
• What are the main systems used for collecting health data? 
• How are these systems used? 
• What sort of data is collected? 
• Who is primarily responsible for data collection? 
• How is the data used? 
• What is the perceived role of information (e.g. data gathering and analysis) in shaping primary care 
strategies?  
• What are the attitudes of primary care workers to activities regarding health information?    
• Is there a transparent link between information provided by health workers and consequent health 
strategies?   
Research Question 2: How can we understand the challenges of HMIS implementation in LDCs 
through the complexities of PHC accountability mechanisms? 
Understanding the dynamics of primary health care provision in Nigeria  
 
• Are their strategies and mechanisms employed for enforcing policy implementation of primary 
health care? What are they? 
• How do these strategies determine (or detract) from the direction of primary health care delivery?  
• What are the challenges of providing primary health care? 
• What is the typical experience of an health official working in a primary care centre  
 
Understanding the factors that shape and influence primary care provision 
 
• To what extent are the policies from the Ministry of Health instrumental in determining actions of 
local officials providing primary health care 
• What factors affect choices made about the delivery of primary health care?  
Research Question 3: What kind of developmental transformation is implied in the implementation of 
HMIS from an accountability perspective? 
Understanding the interaction between primary care providers and the community 
 
• What are the most influential considerations in terms of decisions made about the delivery of health 
care services to the local community? 
• What kind of information is valued at the community level? Why and what purpose are they intended 
to serve? 
• What do communities expect in terms of accountability? 
• How do communities perceive accountability arrangements? What are their views? 
• In what ways do citizens feel that their needs are responded to or neglected? 
• Perceptions regarding the main challenges of health care delivery  
• Perceptions regarding health needs and priorities 
Table 4.5: Sample design of research questions and interview themes/questions 
 
Each of the themes starts with a general topic area to allow the respondent to freely 
discuss around the themes as opposed to closed questions. This is in a sense trying to 
avoid leading the respondents in particular directions (Esterberg 2002). Also, from the 
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general discussions more specific follow on questions were asked about responses 
that seem particularly relevant either in terms of the theoretical constructs or being 
unexpected. The idea was that the questions and themes were fluid so that the 
information from interview flowed naturally (Burgess 1984).  
The interviews and study were conducted in Nigeria with a particular focus on 
Northern Nigeria and Jigawa state in particular. According to our conceptual 
framework, the empirical content draws on fieldwork at different levels of the health 
system including federal, state, LGA and community. This design has been used in 
the health systems literature. For instance, Atkinson, Cohn et al. (2008) look at how 
various arrangements from local to national levels affect the propensity towards 
health promotion and disease prevention within a decentralised health system. Their 
study in Brazil and Chile found that there are pathways that lead to either “active” or 
“basic” levels of health promotion and disease prevention activities and initiatives. 
They state that these have implications at each administrative level of the health 
system “regarding vertical and horizontal system structures, relationships to local 
government, management options and human resource incentives” (pg. 153). In the 
HMIS literature, this multilevel approach has also been adopted (Kimaro 2006).  
 
There were seventeen (17) trips altogether made to the field between October 2008 
and September 2011. These totalled over 9 months of being immersed in the thick of 
HMIS implementation in Nigeria.  However, only 12 of these are detailed in Table 4.6 
below. While the other five trips were useful in gaining more in-depth knowledge 
about HMIS implementation in Nigeria, the data yielded were mostly peripheral to the 
interests of this research.   
 
Out of the twelve trips, we can identify three defining fieldwork trips that shaped the 
understanding of the research domain: 1) October to December 2008 (mainly senior 
bureaucrats, international partners and donor community – Analytical level A from 
Fig 4.5); February to March 2009 (mostly government officials in Katsina, Yobe and 
Zamfara – Analytical level B); and July 2010 (predominantly community level in 
Jigawa – Analytical level C).  
 
The first defining phase was fieldwork conducted between October and December 
2008 in Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory. Semi-structured interviews and 
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discussions included 1) a senior official at the National Primary Health Care 
Development Agency in the Planning, Research and Statistics division; 2) the Health 
Promotions and Information Systems Officer from the World Health Organisation; 3) 
Head of the National Health Management Information Systems (NHMIS) at the 
Federal Ministry of Health; 4) a Community Health doctor from the Department of 
Community Medicine and Primary Care; 5) a consultant doctor to the World Bank’s 
Health Systems Development Programme. The interviews were in-depth lasting 
between 75 to 90 minutes each.  
 
Between February and March 2009 a HMIS situational analysis questionnaire was 
administered to twenty-one local government M&E officers across three Northern 
States of Katsina, Zamfara and Yobe. In addition a modified version of this 
questionnaire was also administered at the health facilities to sixty-two Officers in 
Charge and health workers. A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted at 
the state level including the DPRS, State HMIS officers, SPHCDA M&E Officer and 
Permanent Secretary. The researcher conducted interviews at the State level and also 
to elicit the opinions of fieldworkers who administered the questionnaires. 
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Dates Analytical 
levels 
Research 
Location  
Main activities / (respondent types) 
9th Oct – 
10 Dec 
2008 
A3 Abuja Research question scoping (FMOH, 
NPHCDA, WHO  
12 Feb – 
25 Mar 
’09 
A and B Kano, Katsina, 
Yobe and 
Zamfara 
HMIS situation analysis 
7 Apr. – 
8 May 
2009 
A Kano, Abuja Donor and Federal level view of HMIS 
(FMOH, NPHCDA, WHO, PRRINN, 
NPHCDA, PATHS2) 
13 – 26 
July 2009 
B and C Kano, Jigawa Observe and interview community level 
representatives (PRRHAA) and state 
HMIS officer 
26 Sep. – 
15 Oct. 
09 
B Katsina Interstate data review involving HMIS 
representatives from Jigawa, Katsina, 
Yobe and Zamfara  
6 – 14 
Nov. 
2009 
B Jigawa Observed state Health Data 
Consultative Committee meeting and 
facilitated intrastate HMIS data review 
5 – 12 
Dec. 
2009 
B Katsina Facilitated Katsina intrastate HMIS data 
review 
5 – 22 
July 2010 
C Jigawa  Interviews in Tsakuwawa community  
25 – 30 
July  
2010 
A and B Kano Training of HMIS officers from Jigawa, 
Katsina, Yobe and Zamfara and donor 
officials 
16 – 26 
March 
2011 
A and B Kano Facilitated interstate data review 
involving HMIS representatives from 
Jigawa, Katsina, Yobe and Zamfara 
19 June 
– 9 July 
A and B Abuja, Zamfara Review of malaria M&E and HMIS 
system; Involved other states such as 
Cross River and Nasarawa; 
 
Interviewed NHMIS officers at FMOH 
and WHO officers 
July 30 – 
Septemb
er 
A and B Abuja Situation analysis of malaria M&E and 
HMIS system; Involved other states 
Zamfara, Cross River and Nasarawa; 
 
Interviewed NHMIS officers at FMOH 
and WHO officers 
Table 4.6: Field trips with corresponding analytical level, activities and respondents. 
 
Between 13 and 26 July 2010, a number in interviews were conducted in Tsakuwawa 
village in Jigawa State. These were usually lasted from early morning until evening; it 
                                                
3 Level A=Development community and senior bureaucrats, B = Government officials and local 
political agents; C= Poor citizens 
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also included a weekend spent with the community. In addition to the interviews held 
at the village level, other interviews, data review workshops, meetings of health data 
stakeholders in the state and minutes of meetings at state and village levels were used 
to create the empirical narrative of this study.  Some of the documents obtained from 
the fieldwork study are as follows: 
 
Federal level 
1- National Health Management Information System, Policy, Programme and Strategic 
Plan of Action - 2007 
 
2- Revised National Health Policy 2004 
 
3- National Strategic Health Development Plan (National Health Plan) 2010 – 2015 
 
4- Nigeria Vision 20:2020: The First National Implementation Plan 
 
5- Draft National Health Bill 2011 
 
6- Nigeria Health System Assessment 2008 
 
7- Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 2008 
 
8- Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 2003 
 
9- Meeting Everyone’s Needs: National Economic Empowerment and Development 
Strategy (NEEDS) 
Jigawa State 
1- Jigawa State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (JSEEDS) 
2- Health Data Consultative Committee Minutes of Meeting – November 2009  
Tsakuwawa 
1- Ward Development Committee Minutes of Meetings 
 
From these data collection methods we turn to the strategy adopted for analysis. 
Data Analysis 
Data collection and analysis began by transcribing all notes and audio recordings and 
storing them electronically while hard copies of all relevant documentations were 
kept. The data were then coded manually according to analytical themes. This is a 
conventional analytical strategy where specific theory or theories are used to inform 
the collection of data and subsequent data analysis (Walsham 2006). Within this 
iterative process the researcher highlights themes from the different data sources, 
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detailing the most recurring or significantly pronounced themes for the narrative. Data 
analysis for this study was guided by the theoretical concepts of representation, 
visibility and responsiveness. Even though qualitative analysis can be conducted 
using specialist software such as Atlas, NVivo or Nudist (Weitzman and Miles 1994), 
these software packages are not as formalised as traditional statistical software 
programs. Therefore the process can be quite cumbersome because they require that 
the researcher to provide the logic and coding algorithm that would underpin data 
analysis (Walsham 2006). Hence, the manual coding adopted. 
Unit of Analysis 
In this study, we have tried to capture the multi-level essence of PHC delivery and 
HMIS implementation. In keeping with the objective of making sense of the 
implementation challenges of HMIS in the country, the unit of analysis for this study 
loosely corresponds to the HISP HMIS strengthening project in Northern Nigeria. 
With critical distance from the project itself, the researcher extended this remit to the 
community level in order to explore the developmental impact of such initiatives. 
According to the constructionism approach of this study, the “unit of analysis” “may 
include the complexity of ‘whole’ situations” (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al. 1991: 
30). 
 
 
Critique and Limitations 
Validity, reliability and generalisability of interpretive research 
The design and approach of this study are laden with the researcher’s subjective 
interpretations of data as well as ingrained values and preconceptions. It is therefore 
necessary to make a statement of defence for the reliability and validity of intensive 
research design in the IS field and the interpretive nature of the data (Orlikowski 
1991). A more operationally subtle methodological complexity is associated with 
“construct validity” (Yin 2003). That is, linking the questions pursued on the field to 
the overall research question. However, from the discussion above on interviewee 
themes, conceptual framework and research questions, this is already addressed. 
Questions regarding the reliability of the proposed research design address the 
methodological difficulty of “replicability” (Lee 1989: 35).  Adequate allowance is 
given in this research design by transcribing all interviews, copying all relevant 
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documents and making the epistemological and analytical assumptions explicit. This 
is because the reliability of case study research depend on procedural transparency 
(Klein and Myers 1999, Yin 2003). There is emphatic support for the methodological 
“validity of idiographic research explanation” (Tsoukas 1989) which not only refutes 
the proposition that qualitative research designs are only appropriate for exploratory 
research, but argue that they also have a high utility for explanatory research (Yin 
2003). This is especially true of idiographic research designs guided by a realist 
ontology (Tsoukas 1989). A fundamental difference between nomothetic and 
idiographic research design in this regard is that while the former makes 
generalisations based on law-like regularities, the latter depends on another type of 
logic for example, “development of concepts, generalisation of theory, drawing 
specific implications in particular domains of action, and contribution of rich 
insights” (Walsham 1995: 299), “analytic generalisation” (Yin 2003) or “causal 
tendencies” (Tsoukas 1989: 551) otherwise the single case design of this study might 
be “scientifically” challenged methodologically (Lee 1989).  
 
Practitioner/Researcher dilemma and language barriers 
As alluded to earlier, access to the field was granted through the HISP network 
already working in Northern Nigeria. There were three dilemmas here but all were 
resolved to some degree. 
 
The first dilemma was the tension of whether I was a practitioner who was conducting 
research or a researcher who was also a practitioner. This part of the dilemma was 
addressed by concluding that there was no need to make this distinction. The most 
important point was to be fully engaged in the field of enquiry. Practically, I used the 
consultancy as an opportunity to carry out interviews and conversations with a 
significant number of people I would otherwise not have had access to, or with great 
difficulty. For example, during the situation analysis exercise in Katsina state, field 
participants were asked questions before, during and after. This is especially as there 
is a lot of waiting for people who are either not able to keep an appointment on time 
or not showing up. This helped to elicit more information directly related to the 
interests of this study.   
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The second problem was in the field with respondents. I was usually introduced as a 
consultant or from the United Kingdom (UK). With my student card, I had the 
opportunity to fully explain my role as a researcher. While at first it seemed that this 
was positive and made the respondents more eager or receptive, before long I realised 
that responses seemed to be tailored to perceptions of my affiliations. As a consultant, 
some respondents seemed to paint a gloomy picture while others were keen to present 
an impressive state of affairs. An additional confounding factor was the neccesity of 
going through a gatekeeper who facilitated access to particular respondents. This was 
especially applicable at the local level. The problems were two-fold, first the 
gatekeeper was invariably from the state level and as such usually a line supervisor or 
hierarchical superior of the respondent. This often made respondents defensive and 
answer questions that would not show them up: responses were typically suggesting 
that everything is as it should be and all the systems and processes are working well. 
While in no way ideal, gatekeepers recognising the dilemma of the respondents 
commented telling the respondent to feel free to express all the problems they were 
facing because if they don’t they can’t be helped. The suggestion of an intervention 
would usually reverse the initial position taken by the respondent enthusiastically 
listing problems including ones not asked about. It was difficult to navigate this 
especially as I did not want to ask questions in a way that gives the respondent an 
impression that there was a right or wrong answer. After spending considerable time 
in the field it was easier to address this issue by asking multiple questions around the 
same theme and then asking for clarification if there were inconsistencies in the 
responses. For instance an LGA &E officer responds that he conducts supervision of 
facilities under his jurisdiction every week. There are about 40 to 50 of these facilities 
and some are about 50 miles from his station. We calculate with him the implications 
of his answer which is 10 facilities daily and at least 100 miles on a motorcycle. With 
this we get a better explanation such as particular health facilities usually those close 
by or sponsored by a donor programme.  
 
The third problem encountered in the field was the language barrier most pronouced 
at the community level. The official language in Nigeria is English but in poor rural 
villages not many speak well enough to converse. Depending on the kind of 
interpreter I had, there were different problems encountered. In the first instance, 
there are interpreters who misinterpreted the question asked and by extension the 
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responses did not seem to entirely make sense. This was however not too difficult to 
address as it meant taking more time to explain the question to the interpreter. 
Another kind of challenge I had was with an interpreter who was a health care  
worker and also a community member where I was conducting the interviews. This 
interpreter seems to be mediating the responses through his own interpretations and 
sometime even antagonising the respondents. On some ocassions the questions asked 
were changed according to his understanding of what should be asked. On an 
ocassion when I noted that I am interested in the respondents’ perception, he said that 
they were “illiterates” and could not reason along the lines of the questions asked. To 
address this issue, I would pick up on times when he antagonises the respondents and 
gently affirm that their views matter.  
 
The extensive conversations and interviews in the field over time helped develop my 
understanding of the realities of HMIS and PHC delivery in Northern Nigeria. This 
understanding is essentially my interpretation but one that I sought to render 
practically adequate through the theoretical framework, research design and methods 
adopted for this study. In the next section we will introduce the case study narrative 
with the views of stakeholders represented as this is in keeping with a constructionist 
epistemology.  
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Chapter 5: Case Study 
 
Nigeria’s HMIS-PHC System: Macro to Micro Level View  
Introduction 
With an approximate population of 150 million, Nigeria is the largest country on the 
African continent (World Bank 2011). The country has 36 states and a federal capital 
territory. These states are divided into six geopolitical zones: North-Central, North-
East, South-East, South-South, South West and North-West. There are 776 Local 
Government Areas (LGAs) in the country with some of the smallest having less than 
a population of 80,000 (DfID HSRC, 2000). It has a significantly diverse ethnic base 
with over 200 people groups speaking twice as many indigenous languages and 
dialects (World Bank 2011). There are three main languages spoken i.e. Hausa 
(mostly in Northern Nigeria), Igbo (in Eastern Nigeria) and Yoruba (Western 
Nigeria). The official language is English dating back to British colonial rule. Poverty 
is endemic in the fabric of the society as there is an estimated 70% of the population 
who live below the poverty line (Elumilade, Asaolu et al. 2006). With 
institutionalised corruption, the country was judged to have one of the worst five 
health indices amongst the WHO member states (Ewhrudjakpor 2008?).   
HMIS Development in Nigeria  
Historical Context 
From the 1960s, the FMOH operated a medical statistics system that provided 
quarterly or annual data on hospital-based births and deaths, human resource for 
health care, disease and mortality data, and hospital related programmes (FMOH 
2006). At this time the country had not developed a comprehensive plan for health 
care delivery. By the late 1970s, Nigeria along with other countries signed the Alma 
Ata declaration and committed to the PHC approach as its main strategy for 
developing a comprehensive health system. As a result of three military incursions, 
political instability stalled the formulation of the required national health policy 
intended to support the overhaul of the health system. Although PHC strategy was 
adopted by mid-1980s, the health system was characterised by the proliferation of 
vertical programmes focussing on immunisation, malaria, eradication of guinea worm 
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and control of leprosy and tuberculosis etc. In addition, an outbreak of yellow fever, 
revealed a weakness in the information system for disease surveillance and 
notification (FMOH 2006). The first comprehensive national health policy was not 
completed until the late 1980s, establishing new organisational structures within the 
civil service, including the Department of Planning Research and Statistics (DPRS). 
The policy also advocated a NHMIS across the federation for which the DPRS will be 
responsible.  
The objective of the NHMIS was to develop appropriate information infrastructures 
with mechanisms for collecting and analysing data. Objectives of the information 
produced from the NHMIS were set out to: 
“- assess the state of the health of the population; identify major health 
problems; - set priorities at the local, state and national levels ; monitor the 
progress towards stated goals and targets of the health services; provide 
indicators for evaluating the performance of the health services  and their 
impacts on the health status of the population; provide information to those 
who need to take action, those who supplied the data and the general 
public.” (FMOH 2004; FMOH 2006) 
In the 1990s the operational and strategic framework for a paper-based HMIS was 
developed with assistance from the World Bank and the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DfID) but was not sustained with the subsequent 
withdrawal of donor support (Asangasi and Shaguy 2009). By the early 2000, an 
assessment of the HMIS was conducted through a DfID sponsored health systems 
strengthening project, Partnership for Transforming Health Systems (PATHS). There 
were numerous problems identified in the assessment. This included the lack of 
political and financial support, inordinate data requirements that neither reflected 
priority diseases nor appropriate for lower level use, and “major technical problems” 
with the Health Information For Action (HIFA) software programme (Heywood 
2008).  
By the mid-2000s, amidst “high-level negotiations” PATHS states (Kano, Jigawa, 
Benue and Enugu) whittled down the MDS from over 1000 to 127 data elements, with 
a slightly moderated version subsequently adopted nationally (Shaw, Mengiste et al. 
2007). In addition, the District Health Information System (DHIS) was adopted 
nationally as the standard NHMIS software (Shaw, Mengiste et al. 2007). From the 
late 2000s, there have been major efforts to revise the HMIS in a way that would 
provide better integration across health programmes and improve data reporting. The 
latest revision in 2010 included data elements on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
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Malaria. It also excluded extensive disease data elements, which overlapped with the 
Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) data sets. In creating a better 
harmonisation, the age cohort in the newly revised HMIS has been changed to reflect 
the categorisation in the IDSR. These forms where applicable are also disaggregated 
by sex.   
 
HMIS in Nigeria is weak and still burdened by a proliferation of vertical programmes. 
Donor support for strengthening the health system and HMIS in the country has more 
recently amplified the need for accountability and the central role information plays 
(DFID 2011). These are articulated in a number of published statements. For instance:  
 “In the current financial climate, we have a particular duty to show that we 
are achieving value for every pound of UK taxpayers’ money that we spend 
on development. Results, transparency and accountability are our 
watchwords and guide everything we do. DFID regards transparency as 
fundamental to improving its accountability to UK citizens and to 
improving accountability to citizens in the countries in which it works…” 
(DFID 2011) 
 
Part of this accountability strategy is to publish comprehensive details of projects and 
programmes while emphasising transparency in Nigeria more widely, by  
“promoting transparent government finance and accountable public 
institutions to help Nigerians hold decision makers to account; providing 
information about our current and planned programme to Nigeria’s federal 
and partner state governments, and encouraging other donors to do the 
same” (DFID 2011) 
 
These emphases come in the wake of a Global Fund investigation into suspected 
mismanagement of funds up to the sum of one million US dollars by a principal 
recipient (Office of the Inspector General 2011).  
Data flow policy 
 The NHMIS policy provides a description of the different requirements for health 
data provision at the different levels of government administration. Data flow policies 
are formulated under the auspices of the federal Department for Planning Statistics 
and Research. The system describes data flow practices and feedback (see Fig.5.1 
below). Data is collected from communities, collated at the health facilities, and 
aggregated at subsequent levels of government administration i.e. LGA, State and 
Federal. The current policy stipulates that health facilities should return data on a 
monthly basis, LGAs report these aggregated data to the state on a quarterly basis 
while states are meant to send their data to the federal government biannually.  
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Fig 5.1 NHMIS Data Flow Diagram and IDSR Pathway 
 
At the community level there are nationally designed data collection forms called 
HMIS 000. These are mainly pictorial and data is captured using a tally system. At the 
health facilities routine data is captured in different registers depending on the service 
provided e.g. immunisation, labour and delivery, growth monitoring, antenatal care 
(ANC) etc. At the end of each month the data in the registers are aggregated in a 
summary form called the HMIS 001. At the local government level, HMIS 001 
summary forms are aggregated in HMIS 002 summary forms and the same happens at 
state level with HMIS 003 forms. In addition to the administrative requirement to 
submit data, reports are to be verified and validated at every level. This exercise 
therefore serves as the basis for downward feedback. As such, all M&E officers from 
the local government meet monthly at the state level and report directly to the State 
HMIS officer. The WHO sponsors these meetings around the country because they 
are used as an avenue for collecting data.  
Composition and Organisational Structure 
Under the Nigerian concurrent legislative list, the constitution allows the provision of 
a decentralised health care system across the three tiers of government i.e. federal, 
state and local. It is constitutionally recognised that local government agents have the 
principal authority and responsibility for PHC delivery.  
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At the federal level, the National Primary Health Care Development Agency 
(NPHCDA) is a parastatal with the mandate to support the community health model. 
An Executive Director who is a political appointee heads the NPHCDA. The agency 
has a mandate to mobilise financial, human and technological resources for PHCs 
throughout the country and provide technical support to states and LGAs. Part of this 
support is to develop PHC standards and guidelines to monitor, supervise and 
evaluate the delivery of PHC services across the country. There is an equivalent State 
Primary Health Care Development Agency (SPHCDA) at the state level but are not 
active in all states. At the state level the key health players are the Commissioner for 
Health, the Permanent Secretary, the Director of Public Health, Director of Planning 
Research and Statistics (DPRS), Executive Chairman of the Hospital Management 
Board, and the Executive Director of the SPHCDA (in states where active). At local 
government level, the Local Government Chairman is the political head of the PHC 
system while the Primary Health Care Coordinator is the most senior public health 
officer. The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Officers are public officials 
responsible for health facility data in the area. Depending on the type of facility, there 
is usually an Officer in Charge, nurse, midwife and a number of Senior and Junior 
Community Health Extension Workers (CHEW). Health posts usually just have an 
Officer in Charge who is likely to be a CHEW. A junior CHEW is often assigned to 
the community who are helped by a number of volunteers like Village Health 
Workers (VHW). The recruitment and payment of health workers come under the 
responsibility of State Ministry for Local Government rather than the State Ministry 
of Health (SMOH).   
 
At the local government level, there is a further decentralised administration in place. 
This is known as the Ward system. Where functional, there is a Ward Development 
Committee (WDC), which has members from smaller committees in the villages. At 
the local government secretariat, they have a management committee, which has 
representatives of committee members from various wards. Smaller committees 
include Community Development Committees in villages with representatives at the 
ward and LG health committee. The Village Health Committee is usually chaired by 
the Village Head.  These committees serve as a gateway to the community. 
Community health information, opinions and grievances about public services are 
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also channelled through this body. See Fig. 5.2 for relationship between 
organisational structure and the NHMIS (FMOH 2006). Community engagement is a 
central component of the NHMIS policy and all levels of government are required by 
policy to “devise appropriate mechanisms for involving the communities in the 
planning and implementation of services on matters affecting their health” (FMOH 
2006: 7). 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.2 HMIS Operational Organogram  
 
HMIS and PHC Delivery 
PHC delivery to communities is usually challenging because they are often isolated 
without adequate roads, accommodation, electricity, and other social amenities. 
Consequently, attracting experienced and qualified health workers to rural areas is a 
problem. The quality of care provided at rural communities is often very poor and the 
situation is further compounded by the breakdown of supervision arrangements 
because some of these communities are hard to reach. Accountability to local 
constituents does not really exist because of an endemic problem with the democratic 
process.  
 120 
 
 
Historically, there is a widespread lack of appreciation for the need to use data for 
planning. However, beyond the continuance of a defective legacy practice, an FMOH 
official noted also that data reveals inefficiencies. Using investment in PHC as an 
illustration, he expressed the inefficiency of a policy that purports to promote the 
PHC system but invests more in secondary and tertiary health institutions. While this 
is known by sheer observation, the lack of hard data prevents a strong evidence-based 
case to be made against the practice. The subtext is that the actors in influential policy 
positions are maintaining the status quo through their passiveness in order to protect 
their interests. For instance, ideological preferences and political gains stand to 
benefit more from high-visibility status-symbol projects like building tertiary, 
specialist and teaching hospitals. 
 
As far as HMIS is concerned, there is no incentive for a health worker to be interested 
in data because this has little or nothing to do with their career progression. There 
seems to be a constraining environment even for those who are the exception. There is 
a weak implementation of the data flow structure even though it exists in the 
country’s health policy. The LGA is the most critical level of government as far as 
information flow is concerned. However, the LGA is deemed the weakest arm of 
government especially in terms of capacity. There is a strong perception that the LGA 
is a bottleneck where corruption is rife, jobs are given to unqualified - and most likely 
disinterested - candidates because of their connections. The LGA chairman is a key 
stakeholder in the process because his office determines budget allocation. For 
instance, a health facility might be generating data but the LGA M&E officer might 
not be able to pick them up because there is no transportation support. In the same 
light, an LGA Chairman may prefer to build markets rather than invest in health 
because the latter is deemed intangible. In concluding about the role of communities 
to effect change through the democratic political process, the Nigerian populace 
seems to have been militarised and have therefore lost the sense of seeing political 
leaders as accountable public servants.  
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Northern Nigeria Context 
 
At a regional level, some insight was shed on HMIS within the PHC system from 
some northern states in Nigeria. States in Northern Nigeria typically have the most 
dire health indices in the country especially for maternal and child health.  
   
Challenges of HMIS Policy Implementation 
 
The state M&E officer working within the SPHCDA in Katsina state complained that 
there are no HMIS forms at the LGAs and health facilities have to resort to writing on 
pieces of paper. He continues by lamenting the total neglect at the LGA level. He 
links the poor quality of data to this neglect:  
 
“If you go to one LGA at three different times, you will get three different 
data. The problem is that there is no support from the LGA. Nobody is 
funding them. They are complaining.”  
 
Nevertheless, HMIS activities at the SPHCDA are relatively well funded with 
technical officers given funds to routinely collect PHC data from their designated 
LGAs around the state. When asked whether this information is used, the state M&E 
officer explains:  
“They don’t use it because, besides PHC data, there is no authentic data of 
secondary health facilities. They don’t have the data. The state doesn’t use 
it for planning.”  
 
He goes on to explain the process:  
 
“We collect the data and show it to my manager. We have a software 
system now but the unfortunate thing now is that no one trained me to 
analyse the data… I can collect the data and collate it but I cannot analyse. I 
can’t do it by myself. I have a desktop but the software will not work on it. 
I have a lot of data in my system at work.”  
 
A Local Engagement Consultant (LEC) who is an indigene of the state but also 
employed by a donor agency to work on HMIS (among other duties) stated the lack of 
political will and inappropriate institutional arrangements for effective monitoring and 
supervising of health facility staff as a major problem affecting data flow from 
communities and health facilities. He sees the problem facing PHCs as a systemic 
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issue: 
 
“There is a lack of political will generally at PHC level. This is especially 
on policy implementation: from Federal to State to Local Government … 
[For instance] one PHC Centre is 2km away from another while some don’t 
even have any. The policy should be looked into right from the Federal 
level. For instance every ward should have a primary health centre about 
5km away from another.”      
 
During an HMIS situation analysis in Katsina state at both LGA and health facility 
level, in Mani LGA, the state HMIS officer pointed out that resources were grossly 
inadequate especially human capacity. There were a series of deficiencies which were 
tied to the lack of political will or support e.g. unavailability of forms and the 
conspicuous lack of a planning and policy framework for HMIS. With regards to the 
dissemination and use of information, the state HMIS officer noted that although data 
quality is poor, “unreliable data is still better than no data.” In Mashi LGA, the picture 
is not materially different. The SMOH officer who conducted the assessment reported 
that, “there is no consideration for HMIS at all.” In fact, speaking about a particular 
Ward he says that they appear to be neglected and uncared for. The situation doesn’t 
seem to be limited to HMIS but the general welfare of the community as he says the 
ward “has no water so [health workers] have to struggle going to houses to get water 
when a woman in labour comes to the health centre.”         
  
The Director for Planning Research and Statistics in Katsina state submits that a 
pervasive absence of data culture results in the lack of support for HMIS in the state. 
He however points out an irony that policymakers want information but are not 
prepared to “support the process.”  It was later clear the information is not sought 
routinely for use but as a derived demand. For instance when asked how the data is 
used for planning, the DPRS first laughs and then responds by saying, “Only when 
the federal want data everyone runs around looking for data.” He asserts that the very 
existence of the HMIS team in the state is made possible through HSDP (World-Bank 
sponsored) funding. Commenting on the SPHCDA, the DPRS agrees that they are 
working well because they are funded adequately. However, he complains that data is 
not shared with the state HMIS unit.    
  
In Yobe State (North East Nigeria) where this HMIS situation analysis was also 
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conducted, there were similar themes. When the HMIS officer was asked about the 
adequacy of resources, his response had a touch of surprise at having to state the 
obvious: 
“[Resource level] is very poor- a health facility in Damaturu LGA said they 
are 12 in number only 1 of them is in charge of the M&E and they have no 
knowledge. Equally, with the secondary health facility in Fika LGA, you 
can rate from the answers he gave that he needs additional training, and a 
need to go for further education.” 
 
 The minimal demand for data manifests in the lack of supervision and monitoring for 
health data reporting and a corresponding apathy from health workers. For instance, 
the State HMIS officer matter-of-factly stated that, “Government is not paying much 
attention to the health sector, you can see that people are dying from one disease or 
another.” He adds that, “It is unfortunate that services rendered by donors should 
really be provided by the Government.”  
 
A Demand-Side Programme Officer for one of the donor partners working in the state 
noted that immunisation data is reported to the WHO because they pay LGA M&E 
officers. On community engagement she gives an example that the people refused to 
engage because they did not have confidence in the staff. This was primarily because 
the community had previously complained about the incompetence of the Ward Head 
but nothing was done because of his connection to one of the state Commissioners. 
Consequently, the community refused to turn up during the immunisation plus days 
(IPD) exercise. She also pointed out that data collected at the health facilities is often 
doctored in the aggregation process. This was corroborated by the National 
Communications Strategy Officer for the same donor who was also emphatic in 
stating that they “take data straight from the clinic not falsified from the LGA.”  
 
Speaking to the Permanent Secretary and DPRS about these issues, the problem is 
once again laid at the doorstep of the LGA: 
 
“The problem with LGA is that they want us to come and distribute the 
forms to the facilities. With Local Government, they don’t work unless they 
see money. We sent them all the forms but it is just gathering dust. You are 
even lucky to meet them at the office. Sometimes the M&E officers take 
the form to their house including the generator.”  
 
On a visit to the PHC Coordinator in Damaturu LGA, we found that he was not in the 
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office. When questioned about this, the HMIS Officer made a few calls and reported 
back saying, “he is still at home. There is no work so there is nothing to do here.” 
Proceeding on to the M&E office in the same LGA, we also learnt that the M&E 
officer does not come to work – and in fact had not been to work in the last 6 months 
- because she felt her appointment in that particular post was “a political disciplinary 
action.” The State HMIS Officer gave four possible reasons why public servants may 
not turn up for work: 1) The government doesn’t provide the “necessary things to 
keep people in office”; 2) A qualified staff may be subject of vindictive action by 
political agents and therefore posted to a remote area. They in turn may decide not to 
come to work; 3) “If your staff doesn’t come to work and you report them, nothing 
will happen. They can also decide to inform a top official in another Ministry”; 4) 
“Even if you want to work and identify training workshops to help, there’s no 
funding.” 
 
The assistant M&E officer in response to a question about community forms simply 
stated that there are no community forms “because there are no community workers.” 
In reference to health facilities, he noted that some of these facilities are just 
buildings; most of them are manned by only one person “who is not even trained to 
do the job.”  He concludes by making the following statement: 
 
“When you show enthusiasm on data collection the feeling is that the M&E 
officer is getting extra funds for himself... Some don’t want to continue 
collecting data because they are not well resourced… Sometimes they fill 
the form in notebooks and not official forms. When directed to do 
otherwise, the LGA doesn’t have the forms available to give them.” 
 
When the Permanent Secretary was asked whether there was a State HMIS policy, he 
noted that the state is not without its weaknesses: “Our problem is that for a while we 
don’t give much importance to monitoring we just assume that monitoring is a waste 
of time. So we don’t have any policy.”  
 
Picking up on the issue of donor activities in the state and how this impacts data 
integration, the Permanent Secretary argued that human resources in the health sector 
in the state and indeed throughout the country is being “overstretched by the WHO.” 
He also made the point that the added incentive given health workers acts as a 
disincentive to perform their primary duties. He explains: 
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“When you call them [M&E Officers] they will run away, they are working 
against their own people. When we share these views with other colleagues 
everyone seems to be saying the same thing… WHO overworks our people 
on IPD for no reason … Even other [donor] partners are accusing WHO.”   
 
In Zamfara state, the State Team Manager for one of the donor health projects 
complained that the “HMIS system is already overloaded.” There are many 
different forms to fill and while there is a positive attitude to capturing data, 
capacity at the state level is low. The state however only captures data on 
immunisation, IDSR (monitoring 21 major diseases including cases and 
mortalities) and ANC. He further explained that the paper trail is difficult 
because the completed forms on IDSR is sent to the WHO while the LGA M&E 
officers only capture immunisation data. The only way out of vertical reporting 
according to him is the introduction and use of the HMIS forms designed by the 
federal government. But in relation to these forms he says, “We don’t have the 
forms, so how do you want people to perform miracles?”   
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Jigawa State 
 
Jigawa state in North East Nigeria was created out of Kano State on 27 August 1991 
to form one of the thirty-six States in Nigeria (see fig 5.2 below). Jigawa State has 27 
local government areas with its capital in Dutse. The State shares boundaries with the 
Republic of Niger to the north, Bauchi State to the southeast, Yobe State to the 
northeast, Katsina State to the northwest and Kano State to the west. Its land mass is 
about twenty two thousand four hundred and ten (22,410) square kilometres.  The 
population of the state was projected to be 4.7m in 2009.  
 
 
Fig.5. Map of Jigawa state in Nigeria4  
 
Composition and organisational structure 
The state has benefited from relatively sustained donor assistance for its HMIS 
development (see Table 5.1). This started in 2003 with pilot projects in eight LGAs. 
In Nigeria, two states, Jigawa and Enugu, operate a district health system. In Jigawa 
state it is called the Gunduma. Jigawa State Assembly enacted legislation, which 
allowed the incorporation of the Gunduma system in 2007. 
                                                
4 Source: Wikipedia - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Nigeria_Jigawa_State_map.png 
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Table 5.1: “Phases in HMIS Strengthening Activities” (Shaw, Mengiste et al. 2007) 
 
This was achieved under a DfID sponsored health systems strengthening programme: 
Partnership for the Transformation of Health Systems 1 (PATHS 1). The rationale 
was to make the healthcare delivery system more responsive. Within this system, 
there are three local governments reporting to a Gunduma Council - making a total of 
9 Gunduma Councils - who in turn report to the Gunduma Health System Board 
(GHSB) at the state level. Health facilities are under the Gunduma Board system. 
However the HMIS Unit is under the State Ministry of Health (SMOH) and has 8 
staff comprising 6 from the ministry and 2 from the GHSB.  Among the staff are 1 
HMIS Specialist, 4 Statistical Officers, 2 Public Health Officers and 1 Administrative 
Officer. M & E Coordinators are in charge of the HMIS Unit at the Gunduma 
Councils while Local Government Area (LGA) M & E Officers are responsible for 
HMIS activities at the local government level. The State Ministry of Health recruited 
68 Health Records Technician in 2008 to improve data collection in the secondary 
and some of the primary health care facilities in the State.  
 
Investments for HMIS activities come from various sources such as the SMOH, the 
World Bank Health System Development Programme (HSDP) II, Gunduma Health 
System Board (GHSB), PATHS 1, PRRINN-MNCH (Programme for Revitalising 
Routine Immunisation in Northern Nigeria- Maternal, Neonatal and Child Health) and 
PATHS 2. There has also been increasing support from the state Ministry of Health 
e.g. in providing office space. With funds from HSDP and HSDP II initiatives, the 
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state has also been able to procure some computers. The main challenge is that the use 
of data for planning is at its nascent stages therefore still minimal. This is in addition 
to low capacity at the Gunduma Council and LGA levels on the District Health 
Information System (DHIS). As part of capacity building on the use of DHIS to 
capture and analyze data all the staff at the State level are trained and currently use 
DHIS software.   
 
Jigawa has established, in accordance to national policy guidelines, a Health Data 
Consultative Committee (HDCC). This forum brings together a multi-sectoral cross-
section of stakeholders who are the main producers and consumers of health-related 
data in the state. The committee is a going concern composed typically of 
representatives from the SMOH, GHSB, Federal Medical Council, and donors 
partners like PRRINN-MNCH, PATHS2, WHO, State Agency for the Control of Aids 
(SACA) and Community Participation for Action in the Social Sectors (COMPASS). 
The committee deliberate on a number of issues at quarterly meetings. At one such 
meeting the Chairman made a passionate presentation about addressing the need to 
translate interventions into improved healthcare service delivery and better health 
status for the people. He stressed the necessity of developing a strategy that redresses 
the apparent disconnect between health service providers/planners and client 
communities. This was especially in light of the poor performance of the state in the 
2008 Demographic Health Survey.  However, other important concerns articulated 
included the underlying challenges of developing a platform for data sharing among 
stakeholders. To this extent the committee is yet to become a cohesive unit with 
established platforms, processes and procedures for sharing information.  
  
The present institutional arrangement where health facilities are under the GHSB 
while the HMIS team is within the SMOH seems to be potentially divisive. In 
addition to the underlying tensions at the state managerial level, conflicting 
accountability arrangement at the local level also make the decentralised system more 
complex (this is across the country and not just in Jigawa state). For instance, health 
workers are employed and paid by the Ministry of Local Government while they work 
directly for the Ministry of Health and report to the Gunduma Council. The difficulty 
arises either when there are conflicting directives from the Gunduma and SMOH or 
when sanctions need to be mete out to underperforming staff. Workers are essentially 
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not reporting directly to the body that pays their wages and as such can afford to skive 
or put in substandard work without fear of punitive action.  
 
From the perspective of the SMOH, it seems that donor programmes while useful in 
terms of providing financial and technical resources, are notoriously disruptive. For 
example the DPRS laments that,   
 
“Donors have come to impose their agenda at the expense of the state’s 
priorities and pre-scheduled programmes. 80% of the budget is spent on 
curative rather than preventive care; more money is invested in urban areas 
than rural areas where you have the most population; 60% of donor funding 
is on immunisation; most of the donors concentrate on polio… this strategy 
is supposed to be cost effective but in reality it is proving to be very 
expensive. There is a total disconnect between funding investments and 
health needs. Access to health services is very low; maternal, child and neo-
natal mortalities are unacceptable; because we can’t pay our officers what 
donors’ pay, there is always an underlying conflict. Allegiance is usually to 
the donor who has the funds. This barrage of programmes is carried out at 
the expense of our primary duty. ” 
  
 
A donor-sponsored PPRHAA (Peer and Participatory Rapid Heath Appraisal for 
Action) assessment was conducted in 114 health facilities, 9 hospitals, 9 Gunduma 
Councils and 1 Gunduma Central Board in Dutse. This assessment is a rapid data-
gathering instrument conducted at the health facility and local government levels. It is 
implemented by health workers, and incorporates a process for peers in the workforce 
and communities to participate in subsequent appraisal and action planning processes.  
During a feedback session, which gave assessors an opportunity to discuss their 
findings from the PRRHAA exercise with Officers in Charge (OiC) of health facilities 
and community representatives, issues related to data flow processes were distilled in 
a gallery presentation. From the gallery presentations where strengths and weaknesses 
were displayed, the assessment of health facilities showed data collection being more 
or less consistent. However, the lack of data use for planning was also noted across 
board as a corresponding weakness. The quality of data reported is often unreliable. 
An interview with the state HMIS officer suggested that data reporting is still 
problematic and as such LGAs are being encouraged to pick up the data instead of 
waiting for them to be reported. Furthermore, he expressed notable weakness in the 
analytical capacity of health facility workers and LGA officers. The state HMIS 
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officer also reported that data verification is not conducted before reporting and 
copies of reported data are not kept at the health facilities or LGAs.  
 
Donor-sponsored data review workshops are conducted periodically with the aim of 
strengthening HMIS in the state. LGA M&E officers, Gunduma Council 
Coordinators, representatives from the Gunduma Board and the SMOH HMIS unit, 
attend this workshop. Participants at one of these data review workshops identified 
that there were problems with feedback at all levels even though M&E coordinators 
and officers were aware of the feedback process. One of the participants expressed, 
“We have the mechanisms in place but the question is whether they are utilised”. 
Better performing LGAs shared some practices which they attributed to their success.  
These practices demonstrate both initiative taking and proactive leadership. Below are 
a couple of examples: 
 
“At the end of every month there is a meeting with health facilities to 
conduct analysis and [there is support from the LGA to penalise Officers in 
Charge of HFs who don’t submit data e.g. by withholding their allowance] 
…” Gwiwa LGA  
 
“Photocopies of the forms are made and distributed to the [Officers in 
Charge] and Ward Focal person who make sure the forms are available at 
health facilities.”  Yankwashi LGA 
 
Tsakuwawa Village 
 
Tsakuwawa is a rural village in Miga Local Government under Jahun Gunduma. It 
has a population of about 7000 people with half of these comprising women and the 
rest men and children. The only health facility in the village is a health post offering 
treatment of common conditions, routine immunisation, drug revolving fund, 
antenatal clinics, minor surgery (stitching) and outreach services. Outreach services 
are targeted mainly for those who do not attend the health facilities. Routine 
immunisation is provided on Tuesdays while outreach services are conducted every 
Wednesday. Some of the services provided at the outreach services include routine 
immunisation, illness examining and prescribing medicine. This is usually conducted 
by the Officer in Charge of the health facility and lasts for about 4 hours. Because the 
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health facility cannot offer delivery services, all deliveries have to be referred to the 
General Hospital in Jahun. 
Civil Society in Tsakuwawa 
The village receives support from a donor on community engagement where Local 
Engagement Consultants (LEC) are employed to act as an interface between the 
community and health facility. The LEC for HMIS was a first point of call to gain 
insight about the community. His opinion was that before donor intervention there 
were no routine immunisation and ANC services were intermittent. With community 
engagement, demand for ANC increased but the unintended consequence was that 
many of the health facility staff had to go on training to be able to cope with the 
increase in demand. Many of the staff left were men and this was unacceptable within 
the particular cultural context especially when it involved women’s health. The local 
engagement consultant then decided to have a rotational system within the community 
where a male and female staff will always be available in the health facility. This was 
a local arrangement, which was not formally designed by the local authority. The 
LEC explained, “sometimes you have to breach protocol in order to implement a 
temporary solution after which formal approval can then be sought from the necessary 
authorities who can put a more permanent solution in place”. According to him, the 
community engagement initiative makes a difference. He states that since June 2009 
there are committees meeting monthly and the tracking of new born babies is done 
ideally on a daily babies but cross referencing can be improved by comparing what 
the local village volunteers record and the immunisation coverage at the health 
facility. There was a local consultant engaged by the donor to facilitate the 
Community Engagement project and oversee the activities of Local Community 
Volunteers (LCVs). He provided insightful details about the programme and also 
acted as a translator during the fieldwork. He explained that the main remit of the 
LCV is to enlighten the community on RI, ANC and polio. They work with TBAs 
who inform them of births in the community. Once they are aware of a birth, they 
visit the parents and inform them about RI. Sometimes parents may need persuading. 
LCVs work in pairs who make it a point of duty to gather 15 people in their assigned 
settlement to discuss 4 topics over a period of 4 weeks. The topic is about the benefit 
of RI, the second is the consequences of non-compliance, the third is the side effects 
of RI and how to overcome these and the last is a dramatisation of how even though 
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diseases cannot be seen they can still exist. Once the pair of LCVs have covered these 
topics they find another group of 15 people until the entire settlement is covered then 
they proceed to a wider catchment. The LCVs are comprised of 20 men and 11 
women. The information passed is mostly verbal with lots of demonstration and 
drama sketches.  The Secretary of the LCVs who has always lived in the community 
provided some background into both the initiative and health development systems in 
the community. He described that before this Health Partners initiative for community 
engagement, the community had a high prevalence of whooping cough, polio etc.  
 
There was a Community Development Committee set up informally in 1992. The 
Village Head (who was quite elderly) set up this committee. It consisted of about 10 
of the most respected people in the community. They were people with either 
political, economic, religious or youth connections. The committee was however 
dormant because there was no champion to further its agenda. In 2004 the village 
head handed over the committee to his son. A formal ward development committee 
(WDC) was started in 2007 following a government directive. This committee 
typically includes the Village Headmaster, Youth Leader, Women’s Leader, TBAs 
and religious leaders. The WDC meet to discuss medicine stock and upcoming routine 
immunisation exercises. The Village Head noted that the LGA gives the committee 
2000 NGN to 3000 NGN (approximately 10-15 GBP) after every immunisation 
programme to share among all the members, which comes down to about 150- 200 
NGN per person. He adds that this is not done consistently and there is no fund for 
conducting meetings. In 2008 the Ward Development Committee leveraged the fact 
that the then Commissioner for Health was from the community to request for water 
supply and a bigger health facility. The Commissioner provided borehole water. 
However, expanding the facility was “trickier to achieve” so he ensured that the 
health facility was equipped with the minimum service package. The LCV Secretary 
added, “It is rare to find a health post that is able to conduct as many services as this 
one does.” 
  
 
 The Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the health facility (is from South-West Nigeria, 
but was raised in Jigawa state) had been working in his present role for about 18 
months. He explained that there is a lot of persuasion involved in outreach services. 
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Records of outreach services are not kept unless important information is being 
disseminated. The problems with outreach services (and causes of ill health in 
general) are directly linked to the lack of education and ignorance. For instance, he 
says that routine immunisation is seen as a conspiracy for family planning. He notes, 
“Some even say that it is HIV being injected”. He states that another problem in the 
community is open defecation. There was an informational programme for educating 
especially the men in households to build latrines in their houses: “we told them the 
dimensions, how deep and wide it should be.” Communication mode is mainly verbal 
but there are also pamphlets and posters for immunisation with information on when 
to bring a child in for immunisation. He asserts that the officer in charge of the health 
facility tracks dropouts of routine immunisation by sending information to the 
community through the town crier. Commenting on the community volunteer scheme, 
he says these volunteers include TBAs who take pregnant women to the hospital 
when they are in labour and as such mainly discuss improvement of routine 
immunisation and maternal care during their meetings. He briefly mentions that the 
observance of cultural Muslim practice called purdah5 does not allow women to come 
to the health facilities without their husband’s consent. He says, “these women 
usually do not have enough money to buy drugs so the health facility may provide 
these to the women free of charge as an incentive for them to continue attending the 
health facility.” There is a desire for the health facility to provide in-patient care and 
delivery services. He is adamant that there is a real need to “expand the health facility 
here and get more staff but the government is not responding.” The Assistant Officer-
in-Charge recounted that “there was a problem even in the last 3 months that malaria 
nets were shared but it was not sufficient so it didn’t go round.” He stated that this 
caused uproar among people who felt they were being victimised for supporting a 
political party in opposition. This theme would be revisited and recalled a number of 
times as different groups in the community express divergent opinions about the 
incident.  
   
The Officer-in-Charge of the health facility explained the role of the WDC tracking 
defaulters (i.e. mothers who have not brought their children to the health facility for 
                                                
5 A Muslim practice where married women are insulated from the outside world (see Yunus (2003) for 
examples of the social implications of this practice to development programmes).  
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immunisation) with the help of the LCVs. They track all newborns every week: LCVs 
and health facility staff were both given a book each by a donor to record details of 
children born in the community. The LCVs record the newborn details in the book 
and refer them to the health facility for immunisation. The health workers also record 
details of immunised children into their book. LCVs are therefore able to cross 
reference their records and the health workers’ to find out which children were not 
brought for immunisation. The Officer-in-Charge states that, “unfortunately, LCVs 
don’t get any support and that is the essence of volunteering”. He explained that a 
donor representative tried “to enlighten the community about taking ownership of our 
health programmes and knowing our rights.” According to the Village Head, the main 
problem with community engagement is that there are many different interests and 
motivations and it is very difficult to align these. This is because “people have their 
own personal problems that do not allow them to be bothered with polio.” These are 
mainly financial problems. The WDC is majorly concerned with health so there is 
little scope to do anything about socioeconomic problems. When the government 
provided malaria nets but half of the people did not get any, he explained that people 
used this as an opportunity to lash back and react against any immunisation 
programme. He said,  
 
“The nets were not enough because the government chose to use 
distribution of cards as a means of estimating how many nets were needed. 
There were major errors made because these cards were just handed out to 
youths in the community to distribute and they skipped a lot of houses. The 
government decided to use this means for political reasons because we had 
advised against this and recommended that the LCVs should be used for 
this work.” 
 
Another development association set up in village in 1986 is called Tsakuwawa 
Development Association (TsADA). This association applied for a Junior Secondary 
school which was granted and created in 1990. Subsequently they applied to the 
government to have it upgraded to include a senior secondary school and this was 
done as well. TsADA sponsors children whose parents cannot afford sending them to 
school. Some of the other primary focus of TsADA is community projects, 
environmental sanitation, supervising and assessing teachers’ performance.  
 
 
The similarity between the WDC and TsADA is that they both share a common vision 
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of working for the community. The difference is that TsADA is more concerned with 
education and sanitation while WDC is more focussed on health, health facility 
utilisation, immunisation and ANC. The WDC members go around the community 
informing people about the health facility. There are other committees in the 
community including the Youth development committee, Education development 
committee and Religious development committee. 
  
The Village Head also echoes the sentiment that the most critical health problem in 
the community is poverty: “for instance, as a householder, if I have no money, there is 
no food also; I would not have any funds for medicine.” Illiteracy is also seen as a 
major contributory factor of health problems in the community. The Village Head 
surmises that this is why TsADA contributes a small amount towards covering 
healthcare costs and providing academic grants for community members who need it 
most. He contends that poverty and ignorance help to sustain the status quo of 
unaccountable public officials. Education is therefore deemed as a vital catalyst for 
voice. The traditional chiefs also speak about the problem of ignorance. From their 
perspective, education is valuable but not everyone can afford to send their children to 
school. They further argue that while education is free for girls, it is expensive to buy 
school lunches. One of the mothers attending the antenatal clinic however has a 
different viewpoint that expresses the mutually reinforcing vicious cycle of “poverty 
and ignorance.” She maintains that parents have to make sure that their children get to 
school: “Sometimes children abscond, parents don’t ask and don’t visit. The parents 
can’t monitor their children because they go to the farm [in order to feed the family].” 
 
The local facilitator contended that, “Women in this community don’t want to work, 
there’s such an overreliance on their husbands.” He further submits that is why the 
rainy season is such an extremely busy period because the husbands have to farm and 
get enough food to last their families for the extensive period of time they would not 
be around. In his opinion, the perception of poverty is sometimes down to attitude 
regarding work. He attempts to substantiate his proposition by making a comparison 
as follows: 
 
“In Ringimm where I come from, there is a stark difference. 70% of the 
men are educated that is why it is one of the 5 Emirates in Jigawa state. The 
community has produced eminent Professors, Doctors and Engineers. The 
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women are very industrious looking for opportunities to make financial 
contributions to the home. There isn’t much donor presence there so NGOs 
are more visible.” 
 
The Assistant Officer-in-Charge seems to share this opinion as in a different 
conversation he says, “There is no work the women are doing. They say their religion 
forbids it. Some can work selling bean cake in their house as long as they don’t come 
out. Others complain that their husbands take the money or borrow it and never return 
it.”  
 
One of the LCVs observes that before the community engagement programme “it was 
not possible to bring babies to the clinic and I would have to force them to do so in 
my capacity as Settlement Head.” That is no longer necessary because the women are 
now proactive in this matter. The health worker only needs to inform the women 
when they are next due for immunisation.  The mothers use weeks to keep track of 
this for instance, four Tuesdays from today. Days are determined from central mosque 
prayers which take place every Friday. The LCVs just need to remind the women 
about their scheduled immunisation. According to him, the 4th and last immunisation 
visits are the most difficult because he thinks the women become negligent and don’t 
keep to the schedule. The LCV scribe makes a point of following the schedule from 
the cross-referencing done with health facility records and will therefore send notice 
if a defaulter is discovered in the settlement.  He notes that the positive thing about 
the system now is that “drugs are available and we have dedicated health workers.” 
The downside is that “the community size is too big for the HF and we need a bigger 
HF.” Another negative point expressed is that some people who didn’t get malaria 
nets earlier distributed are saying, “Go with your clinic”. While examining the 
immunisation records kept at the health facility there was an obvious increase in 
dropout rate in DPT1 and DPT3 between April and June 2010. The local facilitator 
explained that this is attributed to the net distribution: 
“People in the village began to say that, “the free nets which we can see we 
did not get but the vaccine which we cannot see we are getting; take your 
vaccine, we don’t want.”” 
 
A CHEW living in the village also made a connection about the perceptions of 
providing people in the community with something tangible they can use as opposed 
to vaccinations they deem intangible and suspicious: 
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“The issue with polio vaccination is seen as excessive. Let government do 
something new that can help us and benefit us all. What I have in mind is 
like money to buy food etc. The level of polio victims is reduced so people 
are tired of it. There are only 7 polio rounds. This is intensive but there is 
the incentive to give one [bar of] soap for each child you bring to 
immunise. Sometimes the government is providing the vaccine but not the 
required number of soap. This makes it disappointing for those who don’t 
get the number of soaps they expect.”  
 
The Health Promotions Officer living in the village but working within the Gunduma 
Council explains that the community “tells us their priority conditions: like during 
IPD sometimes, they say they want anti-malarial drugs instead of house-by-house 
IPDs.”  
 
 One of the female LCVs interviewed expressed that while all aspects of work as an 
LCV are important she adds,  
 
“I feel that the most critical is the enlightenment. When a woman delivers, I 
use the opportunity that we have enlightened them before to actually bring 
the babies to the clinic myself. This is because by tradition women are not 
allowed to go out for 7 days after delivery. However the first RI visit is 
scheduled before 7 days.” 
  
She explains that the most problematic issue she faces is the comparison made with 
polio vaccination and the inherited challenges. Polio had such negative reception 
because the community members believe that they were infertility vaccines. She 
therefore concludes,  
 
“This is why the main cause of health problems in this village is ignorance.  
People go for traditional medicine when they are sick. Only if they don’t 
get better do they come to me and I refer them to the health facility. We 
need to educate people but you know that will increase the demand for 
health services which [means we] will need to improve [the health 
facility].” 
  
She later made an appeal that “if members of LCV can get support they will do more; 
I mean support in the way of skill acquisition. Most of the members are unemployed 
and this will help them to earn a living. The support should come from LGAs and 
donors.” To make effective demands on the government she suggests that all the 
community development committees in the community must present their case as 
“one voice.” The Assistant Officer-in-Charge in a private discussion expressed some 
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reservation that while LCVs are somewhat helpful, not all are active. He explained 
that most of them signed up as volunteers not knowing what it meant. In his opinion 
he felt that their expectation was probably that the LGA would pay them. But as 
nothing is forthcoming they are gradually withdrawing. The Village Head’s second 
wife also suggests that it is necessary to provide monetary incentive for the LCVs. A 
CHEW living in the village explained this situation within a cultural and economic 
context: 
 
“Some people describe the Nigerian man as someone who wants you to go 
straight to the point: Nigerians are not looking for volunteering. If you call 
someone, they are hoping that there would be something for them. Our 
people are suffering. For example, if you call me to pass on information, I 
can agree because I am standing before you. However this would be 
difficult in practice because people need to make ends meet… If you 
however give me N500 -N1000 [2 - 4 GBP], you will find that I will work 
very hard because they can work for one week without making this kind of 
money.” 
 
 
Following a specific personal experience, another LCV explains that he put himself 
forward for the role: “When my daughter was sick I took her to a traditional doctor 
but she didn’t get better until I tried the clinic. This enlightenment motivated me to 
want to let other people know as well.  The most important aspect of this work for me 
is that in addition to the training we gave the 15, I do house to house and I was able to 
convince my friend to bring their child for RI.” As a strategy, evidence of the last 
measles outbreak is employed to show that the children that were immunised fared 
much better than those who were not. 
 
 From community members, one of the women who was attending the health facility 
for the first time to receive ANC emphatically stated that the main problem with 
health is lack of money:  
 
“If I have money then it does not matter what my husband says, I can go to 
the health facility. But when we both don’t have, then the situation gets 
worse. Ignorance is also a main problem. This is because instead of sending 
the boy to school the father will send him to the farm so they can eat.” 
 
 She explained that in her community there are only TBAs whose role is mainly to cut 
the cord when a child is born. She mentions that the TBAs also give traditional 
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medicine and when there is a complication “they will rub the back and pray.” In her 
opinion, training of the TBAs is imperative and she suggests, “Government should 
provide female workers because many women are at home who can’t afford 
transportation to the hospital.” In spite of this, the Officer-in-Charge observed that 
ANC attendance has almost halved, as women now prefer to go the Jahun Hospital 
because of the incentive of free drugs.  
 
On the issue of providing female health workers the CHEW who lives in the village 
explains that there are no female CHEWs because most parents don’t like to send 
their daughters to school after secondary school. “So they just look for marriage for 
them.” This is because there is the perception that “there may not be enough security 
in the school to prevent immorality.” He explains that where there are no female 
CHEWs in a health facility this prevents the provision of ANC services. The CHEW 
explained that he has petitioned the Government but there has been no response.  
 
In a discussion with 21 young men sitting under the shade, they argued that the 
community has no voice and that while the Local Government is a bit responsive it is 
not doing enough. They see the political system as biased as one points out “If you 
[your community members] are not under the ruling party, you don’t get anything.” 
Some think this was the case with the distribution of nets. Not all think the problem 
with the net distribution is political. A young man thinks that the distributors sold it. 
Another says it was related to insufficient card distribution which determined who got 
a net and who didn’t. Another says the cards were sufficient but the distributors hid 
the cards and gave them to those they like. Nobody writes petitions because they feel 
that you are petitioning the cause of the problem so they would not listen. The 
perception is that hiding of cards started from the Local Government. In a similar 
discussion with 10 elders, the idea that a government could be voted out of office if 
not responsive to the needs of the people was met with rapturous laughter.  
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Chapter 6: Case Study Analysis and Discussion 
Representation, Visibility and Responsiveness 
Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first we draw from our accountability 
framework developed in Chapter Three, to analyse our case study through 
representation and visibility constructs. In the second section, we employ our 
responsiveness construct to discuss the implications of our case study analysis. As 
noted in the methodology section of this thesis, our primary aim is to make sense of 
the complexity of implementing HMIS in LDCs to improve accountability 
arrangements. We employ representation to analyse what these accountability 
arrangements are in terms of their objectives while visibility helps us to examine the 
mechanisms that underpin these objectives. These constructs respectively address the 
following sub-components of the primary research question -“To what extent can 
HMIS improve accountability arrangements of primary healthcare delivery in 
LDCs?” -  
  
1. How are HMIS implicated in the accountability arrangements underpinning 
PHC delivery in LDCs?  
2. How can we better understand the challenges of HMIS implementation in 
LDCs through the complexities of accountability mechanisms?  
 
In the discussion section we use our responsiveness construct to examine the 
implications of the case study analysis on the kind of developmental transformation 
that is implied in the implementation of HMIS from an accountability perspective. 
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Representation: Mirroring and Mediation 
Representation is conceptualised as the objective of accountability. From an 
instrumental perspective, these objectives are based on narrowly defined criteria such 
as transparency, cost effectiveness and efficiency. However, from a socialising view, 
the objectives of accountability are not predefined but emergent and contingent on 
complex interactions and interests within a local context. We term the former as 
mirror representation, and the latter as mediating representation. Theoretically, we 
commit to the proposition that both forms of accountability are required in order to 
analyse and navigate the reality of PHC delivery in LDCs. However we note that the 
technical rationality underpinning mirror representation, while vital in placing PHC 
delivery and accountability within its hierarchical context, does not illuminate the 
day-to-day negotiations and (re) interpretations by socially embedded actors. Through 
a technical rationality PHC delivery is objectified and therefore the objectives of 
accountability are skewed towards measurable goals and a form of organisational 
structure that defines unambiguous roles and responsibilities against targets and 
performance requirements. Measurable and a-contextual targets form the basis for 
which local agents are held to account. HMIS within this accountability arrangement 
are conceived as supporting mirror representation in two ways: rendering 
accountability measurable through the transposition of PHC delivery from a complex 
web of action into relatively simplified data classifications; and from this reductionist 
process, HMIS is amenable to evaluating the performance of local agents against 
measurable PHC goals. The objectives of mirroring entail the determination of data 
sets, the centrality of reporting rates and data quality. From these processes, 
accountability objectives are determined regarding performance targets and service 
quality. Within this domain, the objective of accountability is for the HMIS to 
accurately depict a predetermined reality of PHC services by holding local officials 
accountable for capturing and reporting data on one hand, and providing the 
appropriate services on the other. This form of accountability is enunciated through 
the discourse on HMIS and rational decision-making for health care delivery. From 
this perspective, HMIS is seen as providing necessary information that allows local 
agents to make appropriate decisions regarding the delivery of healthcare. This is 
clearly articulated in Nigeria’s NHMIS policy: 
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“…the Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH) has initiated a review process 
anticipated to lead to a NHMIS that would facilitate efficient, effective and 
accurate planning and evidence based decision making.”  
 
The focus of our analysis does not argue against this approach but attempts to unpack 
the broader socio-political, institutional and cultural dynamics of the local context 
within which these hierarchical demands are deployed. We also attempt to open up an 
analytical space that enriches our understanding of the complexities of implementing 
HMIS to improve PHC delivery accountability. Through our analysis, we attempt to 
show that we can gain a richer understanding into the accountability arrangements 
underpinning PHC delivery by illuminating the dynamic socio-political context that 
bears upon these accountability objectives. In this light, we introduce a socialising 
viewpoint where the objectives of accountability are socially embedded and as such 
constructed according to relational power dynamics and diverse mediating interests.  
 
Using the concept of representation as mirror and mediation we conceive of HMIS as 
implicated in PHC accountability arrangements that go beyond predetermined 
performance objectives but entangled in a pervasive negotiation of interests that 
constantly redefine the objectives of accountability in a manner that makes them 
socially dynamic and unpredictable. By analysing these dynamics we attempt to 
answer the first sub-question of this thesis: “how are HMIS implicated in the 
accountability arrangements underpinning PHC delivery in LDCs?” To address this 
question we first consider the intricacies of accountability objectives as defined from 
a top-down hierarchical view. We show that even though determining accountability 
objectives at this level is objectified, the process itself is entrenched in power 
relations. Next, we elaborate on the complexity of these accountability agenda by 
analysing the localised interpretations of these demands and how accountability is 
socially constructed and embedded through the mediation of diverse interests and 
motives. 
 
Representation: Hierarchical View 
The hierarchical view of mirror representation distils the technical rationality and 
instrumental accountability objectives that is inscribed in efforts to standardise and 
objectify PHC delivery through HMIS policy demands and the implementation of 
decentralised organisational structures. It encapsulates the essence of PHC delivery 
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within a global health agenda of disease prioritisation and high-level coordination and 
direction defined by national and international institutions and agencies. The practical 
reality of the hierarchical view in the context of LDCs is that, it is also characterised 
by a weak state mediating its interest through negotiations, contestations and alliances 
with powerful global health actors. Analysis of these accountability dynamics gives 
us a means of drawing implications for HMIS implementation. 
 
We employ three theoretical constructs under the hierarchical view, to shed light on 
our empirical findings: mirror representation, administrative decentralisation and 
distorted communication. Mirror representation analyses how the hierarchical 
objectives of accountability are predicated on the objectification of PHC delivery; 
administrative decentralisation illuminates accountability objectives within the 
organisational structure for PHC delivery; and distorted communication highlights the 
inconsistencies deriving from the multiplicity of competing objectives that is 
introduced through the mediated interests of diverse actors. 
 
Mirror representation  
Against the backdrop of a technical rationality, accountability objectives of mirror 
representation, as analysed here, are constructed through the objectification and 
abstraction of PHC delivery. Objectification and abstraction from a hierarchical view 
seeks to provide an overarching accountability structure that renders PHC delivery 
measurable and sets out a clear course of action for multiple local agents across a 
wide geographical and cultural context. This rationality is clearly expressed below:   
“The National Strategic Health Development Plan is the first of its kind in 
the history of the development of the Nigerian Health Care Delivery 
System which will serve as the overarching, all encompassing, reference 
document for actions in health by all stakeholders to ensure transparency, 
mutual accountability for results in the health sector” (Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 2010: 22) [Emphasis in original].  
 
There is little or no room for variations or context sensitivity in terms of the set 
targets. In Nigeria, around 10,000 wards across 774 LGAs in 36 states and the FCT 
are all brought under a single accountability rule for the delivery of PHC services to a 
population of approximately 150 million. HMIS are at the centre of this 
objectification as they provide the tools, techniques and vocabulary that makes it 
possible to render accountability objectives for PHC delivery measurable through 
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targets for predetermined health indicators such as the health-related components of 
the MDGs. The abstraction of accountability objectives for PHC delivery from their 
local contexts derives from processes that define uniform goals across an expansive 
and heterogeneous domain. The objectives of accountability are therefore predicated 
on predetermining universally desirable outcomes of PHC delivery. One of the means 
through which this objectification is achieved is the definition of an MDS. According 
to Shaw (2005), this represents the “most important data elements selected from all 
primary health vertical programmes” (pg 632). Our interpretation of these criteria is 
that the MDS is underpinned by an instrumental HMIS design that embodies the 
objectification of PHC delivery and accountability objectives of mirror representation. 
In the first instance it reconstructs PHC delivery according to a defined dataset and in 
the same breath subject local agents to this single accountability rule. As we have 
mentioned before, our analytical aim is not to argue against this objective of 
accountability but rather to bring it to the fore and critically examine its implications. 
Indeed, to some extent we show later that this objectification is necessary (probably 
even desirable). This is in a sense Hyden et al’s (2004) argument that governance is 
both contingent and structural such that agents’ activities are not without boundaries 
or constraints. It is also in light of Roberts (1991) proposition that it is crucial to have 
unifying accountability objectives to stem what would otherwise be irreconcilable 
interests and goals. We return to this theme later. However, we state at this point that 
it is important to be critical in examining the extent to which the interests represented 
in the MDS reflect and balance the developmental needs of poor communities against 
externally driven global priorities. This is particularly a strong point in Easterly’s 
(2006) critical thesis on the design of developmental programmes in poor countries. 
The interplay between local and global actors in the definition of an MDS not only 
implicates HMIS in its objectification role but also in its mediation role. We will 
therefore analyse this further through our concept of mirror representation. 
 
HMIS as mirror representation 
From a hierarchical view, HMIS is designed to mirror PHC delivery therefore its 
implementation is part and parcel of the parameters for which agents are held 
accountable. By this, we see that it is not enough to provide health services that 
communities want or request; at a hierarchical level it is rather that at a minimum, 
these services are captured in the formalised HMIS and in line with the prescribed 
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representation objective (i.e. the MDS). The construction of this mirror representation 
is achieved through the transposition of PHC service delivery into specific indicators 
representing desirable targets. Thereby local agents are held accountable for PHC 
delivery through the data they report. As mentioned earlier, we find this reflected in 
the determination of an MDS for the country. There are however other data sets and 
information sources that are components of the formal HMIS like those used for 
disease surveillance (such as the IDSR) and health surveys (like the National 
Demographic and Health Surveys (NDHS)). The routine HMIS mirrors PHC delivery 
through indicators such as reproductive and child health, specific disease incidence 
and prevalence. In terms of data reporting, accountability objectives set at the 
hierarchical level is the “% of States whose routine HMIS returns meet minimum 
requirement for data quality standard” (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2010: 96). This 
confirms Roberts (1991) notion that accountability objectives of mirror representation 
prioritise data quality. An essential quality target for the HMIS entails 70% of LGAs 
and health facilities in all states reporting. From the data reported, agents are held 
accountable according to indicators on PHC service provision, the utilisation of these 
services and the health status of the population (e.g. through data on maternal and 
child health, morbidity and mortality). The IDSR as an integral part of the HMIS, 
mirrors the status of twenty-two priority diseases in the country. Accountability 
objectives are measured in terms of the “% of States that submit timely disease 
surveillance reports” (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2010: 96). The DHS evaluates 
health status of the population against the backdrop of broader socio-cultural factors. 
In this regard, states’ MOH are held accountable for the health component of these 
surveys.  
 
From the viewpoint of the FMOH and federal level stakeholders, the different HMIS 
forms and registers produced and distributed across the country are of themselves 
indicative of the accountability demands placed on lower level officials to report and 
provide services as required by the data elements and indicators in these forms. 
Precisely because accountability objectives are embedded in the design and 
intentionality of HMIS implementation, the hierarchical view emphasises the 
imperative to improve the quality of HMIS mirror representations. As mentioned 
earlier, this is precisely Roberts’ (1991) point regarding mirror representation when 
he proposed that the primary goal of this form of accountability is to improve the 
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quality of representation. Without this quality, accountability objectives of measuring 
PHC delivery indicators are weakened.  
 
Apart from the challenges of a weak routine HMIS in Nigeria, what we find with the 
notion of mirror representation is the diverse negotiations that seek to influence what 
the HMIS mirrors. By analysing HMIS as mediating mirror representations, we see 
how at the hierarchical level, accountability objectives are negotiated to reflect 
particular interests and ideological leanings.  
 
Mediating interests within mirror representation 
Various actors at the hierarchical level negotiate the representation of their interests in 
the design and implementation of the MDS (or essential data set: EDS). A national 
PHC review explained the challenges:   
 
“The Nigerian NHMIS policy document has already defined an EDS and 
developed series of indicators, but they are too restrictive while some are 
too amorphous to address the needs of specific programmes. This has led to 
many programmes collecting data outside the national EDS as well as the 
development of parallel reporting systems. The lack of coherence in 
reporting was observed as far back as 1992 when the review team from 
WHO concluded that the operation of parallel information systems in 
Nigeria was a serious problem, which required urgent attention in view of 
the duplication and waste of time and effort, created particularly at the local 
level.” (HERFON 2007: 304) 
 
In the NHMIS policy document, it was observed that initially, over 50 different forms 
were required at the federal level alone (FMOH 2005). Health workers at PHC levels 
had to fill out NHMIS forms requiring over two thousand data elements (PATHS 2 
2012). These data elements are determined at the federal level through the Health 
Data Producers and Users (HDPU) forum (including FMOH, WHO, donors, federal 
vertical programmes, state representatives etc). The criteria for mirror representation 
are constantly contested and negotiated especially by partners to reflect their interest 
in particular vertical programmes. The influence of these negotiations is apparent in 
the newly integrated HMIS forms. Major changes reflected were the inclusion of 
HIV/Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria (ATM) and the exclusion of most of the disease 
components captured in the IDSR (some data elements still duplicated) but changing 
the age groupings of the HMIS to reflect the IDSR. A senior official at the FMOH 
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explains the power relations that underpin this process as efforts are made to whittle 
down the extensive data requirements: 
 
“Partners are crying that some indicators and elements are not captured. All 
partners meet at federal level [for the HDPU forum]; partners have a strong 
influence [and] we need them because we don’t want them printing their 
forms. Some of them support the state in printing tools so we need to look 
at their data elements and make sure that their interests are represented” 
[emphasis mine].  
 
HMIS are implicated in accountability arrangements that are partly necessitated by 
the complexity of harmonisation and coordination of data sets at a hierarchical level. 
This is a form of accountability that attempts to mediate the interest of the FMOH 
through donors who wield considerable influence over the data PHC health workers 
and HMIS officials collect and report. By accommodating donor interests, the FMOH 
attempts to improve the prospects of the routine HMIS mirroring PHC delivery. The 
harmonisation of interests are however a particular difficulty as explained in the 
account of this senior FMOH official who expressed this as a primary challenge of 
HMIS in the country. The first quote below was in 2008 and the second in 2012:  
“Donor partners are interested in funding vertical programmes and not 
strengthening national health systems. This is money down the drain.” 
 
“We need partners to release control over their data as the HMIS needs a 
central platform to store data and harness information; there is a need to 
harmonise data elements and indicators but the major challenge is that 
partners come with their programme and software.”        
 
These vertical programmes are ideologically driven by principles of SPHC and, 
relative to the routine HMIS, have significantly more financial and technical support 
from donors and international partners. In a review of the health system, it was stated 
that disease-specific data that reflect global health priorities are better represented in 
the country:  
“… recent data on key MDG indicators…are generally available. The data 
highlights that Nigeria fares relatively well… with respect to timeliness of 
reporting on key health indicators.” (Kombe, Fleisher; et al. 2009) 
 
A senior FMOH official contended that the data interests represented in the MDGs are 
not necessarily working within the national HMIS: 
“The MDG office has a different channel of communication and we don’t 
get to see what their data looks like. The data they collect will satisfy 
vertical programme management and do not dovetail into national 
concerns.”  
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The accountability objectives of these vertical programmes are constructed externally 
and therefore bring with them a particular expediency for even further objectification 
and abstraction as comparisons are made not just within countries but also globally. 
Greater objectification and abstraction necessarily diminishes the contextualisation of 
health priorities. This is particularly like in our case where resources are channelled to 
these global health programmes and HMIS implementation skewed towards 
accounting for the increased investments (Carlson 2007).  
We submit that implementation challenges of HMIS in LDCs reflect the complexity 
of navigating the interests of multiple global and local actors in light of a technical 
rationality that objectifies PHC delivery. This is primarily because the objective of 
accountability as mirror representation places a demand on pre-specifying the content 
to be represented in order to construct tools that mirror these requirements. In other 
words, hierarchical actors, through ideological lenses and predetermined programme 
targets, interpret PHC delivery services and then design, support and/or prioritise data 
tools that seem most appropriate to mirror PHC delivery according to these interests.  
 
We introduce administrative decentralisation in the next section to analyse the 
instrumental and socialising forms of accountability that are implicated in 
determining the performance criteria of mirror representation. 
 
Administrative decentralisation 
We approach our analysis of administrative decentralisation in light of accountability 
being structurally contingent (Hyden, Court et al. 2004) in that hierarchical 
accountability seeks to provide a unifying objective for potentially irreconcilable 
local priorities (Roberts 1991). These constructs capture the need for a centralised 
coordinating mechanism that is able to provide an overarching accountability 
framework (Kimaro 2006). This aim was expressed in the NHMIS policy:   
 
“The Federal NHMIS Unit is at the apex of the national health information 
system and provides a focal point for co-ordinating health information 
activities nation-wide.” 
 
By policy, the NHMIS unit at the FMOH coordinates all decentralised HMIS-related 
activities that seek to strengthen the PHC system. Horizontally, this is in consultation 
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with international health agencies, other relevant federal ministries and parastatals 
like the NPHCDA. Vertically, the NHMIS unit in consultation with other federal level 
partners provide direction for state HMIS units, LGAs and health facilities. As a 
distinct feature of hierarchical information, accountability is often upwards from 
communities to the federal level. This is in concert with the perception of 
accountability arrangements within the formalised HMIS structure.  
 
Administrative decentralisation necessitates strategies for coordinating multiple 
activities at sub-national levels through standardisation. The HMIS is conceived to 
play a central role in this standardisation:  
“The role of government must extend to ensuring standardization… of 
health data infrastructure, especially with respect to establishing and 
strengthening relevant organizational structures for Health Management 
Information System (HMIS) activities” (FMOH 2006) [emphasis mine].  
 
In an interview with an officer at the NPHCDA, there is an echo of this mandate for 
the hierarchical level to provide a structure within which local officials carry out their 
duties: 
“Now for the Federal, … as a development agency we are supposed to be 
the ones to ensure that there is a form of national standard, and a form of 
national system, maybe with some variation but broadly in Nigeria we are 
supposed to be able to say this is the system, this is how it operates.”  
 
 
The objectives of accountability for PHC delivery are implicated in the role of 
hierarchical information, the nature of performance targets, and mediating the 
interests of multiple principals. The role of hierarchical information is defined 
through accountability objectives that demand subordinates to collect and report data 
that provides a mirror representation of the health status of their domain. The 
emphasis is often unidirectional i.e. upwards. It is within this context that states and 
LGAs are held accountable for reporting hierarchical information that accurately 
reflects the health status of their populations and also the performance of their PHC 
service delivery. Communities, health facilities, LGAs and states are required to 
report HMIS data as designed at a higher hierarchical level. The goal of this exercise 
points to the instrumental conception of data for decision making as expressed in the 
NHMIS policy document: 
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“For effective management of health care services, efficient National 
Health Management Information Systems (NHMIS) is required. 
Government mandate requires that a National Health Information System 
(NHIS) shall be established by all the governments of the federation to be 
used as a tool to support evidence based decision making…data collection 
format consists of a fewer number of summary forms for communities, 
health facility, LGA and states…”  
 
As the federally published reporting rates of states and LGAs reveal, there are 
significant challenges in this upward accountability arrangement. A senior official of 
the FMOH expressed that information does not flow up regularly from states, 
constraining the ability of the federal level to obtain “a full picture” of the health 
profile and status of the country. In Nigeria, accountability objectives constructed 
through performance data on reporting rates, PHC service availability and service 
utilisation reflect the premium placed on bringing together representation fragments 
to make up a complete picture.  
 
Our theoretical constructs suggest that at the federal level (being a principal), it is 
important for senior bureaucrats to have the capacity and resources to process data 
(fragmented representations) reported. Also, the quantity and quality of information 
available is crucial to determine the performance of lower level officials in 
implementing PHC policies. Both of these are mainly lacking in the Nigerian context. 
In a conversation with a senior FMOH official in 2008, he explained that the NHMIS 
unit did not have a budget allocation; the analysis of state data (which was not 
reported by all states and LGAS) could not be published for a couple of years due to 
resource constraints. While there is a general assent to the principle of using 
information locally to plan health care delivery, much of the accountability activities 
at the hierarchical level are based around the FMOH attempting to strengthen data 
reporting with the hope that through feedback forums this will lead to officials 
“feeling” responsible in translating the reported data into better service delivery. Even 
where the FMOH receives scanty data, there are efforts to produce an analysis and 
feedback to states as a way of encouraging data reporting. The feedback forum 
convened by the FMOH evaluates the performance of states according to the 
proportion of their LGAs and health facilities reporting data and their service 
availability and utilisation rates. What we note here is that within this forum, data 
reported is used to provide a measure of PHC performance. The implication is that the 
objectives of accountability are defined by the data reported. In this context, there is 
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an understanding that most data reported are of poor quality but these data reports are 
used as a means of sensitising states to improving their data reporting performance. 
We therefore see a recurring theme of accountability objectives being subsumed 
within the idea of HMIS supporting the process of mirror representation. Performance 
within the bureaucracy from a hierarchical view centres on achieving the goals set by 
the FMOH through a rational process of collection and reporting predetermined data 
elements up hierarchical levels. There is however another dynamic, which unfolds as 
we analyse the implications of a multiplicity of principals determining the criteria for 
mirror representation within a decentralised system.  
 
Administrative decentralisation embodies the instrumentality of accountability 
objectives determined at a distance by diverse global and local principals. The 
determination of these objectives is underpinned by power relations, which influence 
the outcome of what is to be represented. As the dependency on donors has become 
woven into the institutional fabric of public service delivery it is often taken for 
granted especially in the implementation and strengthening of HMIS (see Table 6.1 
below). To illustrate, the HDPU forum as an important HMIS forum in the country 
did not hold in 2011 because there was no budget for this activity. At a high level 
presentation by the Head of the NHMIS, the following points were made about 
funding: 
 
“•As usual finances may be a constraint to the 
conduct of the HDPU 
•FMOH is seeking to obtain funds from NACA 
[National Agency for the Control of Aids] 
through the Global fund grant 
•It is also expected that partners working within 
states support the attendance of their government 
partners within the states” 
Table 6.1: Mediation of interests at the hierarchical level 
 
The sourcing of funding through the Global Fund grant is significant as we earlier 
observed that the newly integrated HMIS tools have given significant prominence to 
ATM, which is the primary remit of the Global Fund. The influence of donors on 
what is represented has direct implications for the construction of accountability 
objectives as mediation of interests. The complexity of data representation shows that 
where donor interests are not represented, this leads to the proliferation of data tools 
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in health facilities. We analyse this as the fragmented representation of (un) 
accountable practices. It is a form of “de facto accountability” (Madon and Krishna 
2010) where the HMIS is fragmented due to parallel accountability structures 
introduced by donors. This is especially the case in Nigeria’s decentralised health 
system where donor partnership with states makes it possible to work directly with 
LGAs and communities. What our analytical lens helps us to understand is that 
different interests construct different accountability objectives. Therefore, with the 
proliferation of interests in vertical programmes come the fragmentation and 
compartmentalisation of accountability practices. In theory, forums such as the HDPU 
are opportunities for reorienting accountability on the axis of the nation’s most dire 
health needs. As the Head of the NHMIS and an NPHCDA officer commented that 
the top diseases in the country are known. This was echoed by an official at the WHO 
noting that the NHMIS does not need to be extensive or sophisticated but scaled down 
and focused on local health priorities. However, with donors mediating their interests 
for vertical programmes and the FMOH vying to strengthen its position by creating 
alliances, the MDS includes extensive data elements that represent the interests of a 
network of actors. This is why in Nigeria, although the FMOH convenes the HDPU 
meeting and the rhetoric is that it is driving the efforts, the reality is that the MDS is 
the outcome of interest negotiations and does not necessarily reflect local health 
priorities. As the FMOH seeks to address the issue of an overburdened MDS and 
reduce the size of the dataset, donors invariably proceed to capture their data locally 
through parallel systems.  
 
The analysis presented above has implications not just for the integration of data 
requirements in the national MDS but also in terms of accountability arrangements 
underpinning the reporting of routine NHMIS. With donors setting up parallel 
reporting structures and providing direct support to states, accountability 
arrangements are modulated as local interests come into play in light of global actors 
or principals who provide resources in turn for the information demands they make. A 
State HMIS officer echoes these sentiments: 
“There are problems with HMIS especially in the North because they don’t 
like spending money on HMIS. They depend on donors primarily and this 
is not sustainable. When the money for HMIS is released, it is all for 
sharing. Some donors have problems especially when they deviate from 
FMOH policy.” 
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While donors might be able to satisfy their need for accountable practices on 
resources invested, at the same time these public officials do not necessarily account 
for routine budgets released for HMIS activities or actively motivate for funds. This is 
a fragmentation of accountability practices as it is not across board.  
 
Using our concept of distorted communication we further unpack the challenges of 
HMIS in terms of data quality and how the mirroring of local health priorities are 
modulated through the mediation of interests.  
 
Distorted communication 
 
Distorted communication highlights the intrinsic weaknesses of hierarchical 
accountability as reflected in poor data quality and the misrepresentation of local 
health priorities. This can be understood as the anomalies and unintended outcomes 
within a system that conceives of HMIS as a technical rational process of data sets 
being designed to be completed and reported by lower levels for decision making 
higher up the hierarchy. We interpret distortion not just in light of data quality 
representation but also in term of a misrepresentation of local health priorities, which 
is typified in the bias towards vertical interventions and moreover practices deviating 
from the stated goals of an overarching hierarchical demand. As an illustration of the 
former, the NHMIS policy document narrates the constraining environment of PHC 
data reporting: 
 
“It is instructive to note that… data came from 18 out of 8,797 (0.21%) 
health centres in the country. Yet this information is necessary for planning 
and monitoring of health services in PHC Centres.” (Federal Ministry of 
Health 2005: 26) 
 
From this context, we can better appreciate the challenges of using information to 
determine local health priorities for PHC delivery. These challenges were expressed 
in an interview with a WHO official: 
“Planning has been driven by external priorities, historical evidence, 
belatedly recognising a problem and then dealing with it. But the one thing 
it doesn’t appear to be is systematic, proactive and based on data that is 
being generated.”  
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The skew towards a disease focus as misrepresentation is highlighted by a research 
officer at the NPHCDA who gave an illustration of how parallel programmes 
constitute a narrow approach to tackling local health priorities:  
“… roll-back malaria programme should be a unit under the department of 
public health… but now it is even bigger than the [FMOH]: it has its own 
big building and everything… now they are so big, they go out fashioning 
their policies and everything to fight malaria, as if malaria is the only 
health problem.”[Emphasis mine] 
 
In case of the last form of distortion, noticeably, directives at the federal level do not 
result in intended performance outcomes at sub-national levels. This translates into 
the NHMIS not being able to accurately represent health status and the state of PHC 
delivery in the country. To understand this problem, we consider the 
misrepresentation of local health priorities by political society. There is a widespread 
perception that the prioritisation of PHC in Nigeria is only in policy and not in 
practice. A state HMIS officer alludes to this as he explains that  
“Nigerians are very good on paper [i.e. policy formulation] but when it gets 
to implementation it’s another story. The problem starts when money is 
released- everyone wants to have a share of the cake.” 
 
More directly, a WHO official explains that:  
“The part of the health service that caters to the least of the people gets the 
biggest budget. Right now [PHC prioritisation is] all words. At the 
community, there is a total disconnect. What is happening at the federal 
level does not translate into action at the local level: it’s just a disconnect.” 
 
At all levels, a major weakness of the HMIS is incomplete and poor data quality. A 
nuanced understanding of how objectives of accountability are socially constructed is 
brought to the fore as we introduce how local actors mediate their interests in light of 
the objectives of powerful principals and international donor partners promoting 
vertical programmes. To understand this we analyse how donor-supported data 
collection at the local level attempt to address the problems of data paucity and 
quality through selective mirroring, which we see as another form of distortion. In 
return for donor support, data collected reflect the priorities of these international 
partners. We use this concept of selective mirror representation to analyse the 
accountability implications of a vertical approach. Significant resources are 
channelled towards specific programmes and efforts are made for data to mirror 
performance against expected targets. For example, in most health facilities there are 
conspicuous displays of immunisation graphs and disease surveillance charts (even 
though these are not necessarily used or even understood locally). Selective mirroring 
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can be interpreted as supporting the instrumental value of data but in this case it is the 
interest of those demanding and producing the data. Health workers that seemed to 
have little or no interest in routine HMIS data display basic but elegantly “out of 
place” data representations (see Fig. 6.2). The fact that these graphs and charts are 
present in the most remote and sometimes even dilapidated health facilities, is not 
easily reconcilable to the reality that some of the health workers had such limited 
capacity (or motivation) for reporting routine HMIS data. The general sense from the 
field was that health workers were more accountable in reporting these selective 
health data compared to routine HMIS data. Selective mirroring often comes with its 
resources to develop skill sets and/or increase motivation (not necessarily transferred).  
 
 
Fig 6.2: Immunisation and disease surveillance data displayed in health facilities. 
 
We submit that the emphasis of mirror representation, either towards general or 
vertical health priorities, underlies the modulation of hierarchical accountability 
structures and reinterpretation of information demands according to represented 
interests at lower levels. In other words, accountability demands to report routine 
HMIS datasets are reinterpreted in the light of selective mirroring to reflect local 
interests. These interests are influenced through monetised incentives that direct 
accountability towards donors and international partners. In a report discussing the 
impact of duplicate IDSR data elements in the revised HMIS data set, it was stated 
clearly that health workers would most likely report the IDSR and probably not the 
HMIS because the former is monetised (Anifalaje 2011). HMIS implementation is 
therefore implicated in balancing an understanding of the intrinsic value of health data 
and the accountability mechanisms that draw attention to the local opportunities that 
are appropriated through the value placed on health data by a patron. 
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The point we are making in this section is that mirror representation within a 
decentralised PHC structure goes beyond the administrative and institutional 
processes that sets into motion a chain of mirror representations across hierarchical 
levels, but is implicated in the dynamics of diverse local interests. Accountability 
objectives of mirroring are therefore modulated through these interests and made 
sense of in view of the characteristics and motivations of health workers and other 
local agents.   
 
 
We further elaborate on these dynamics in the next section where we analyse the 
socialising forms of accountability that underpin PHC delivery and HMIS 
implementation through the way they are contextually defined and redefined; we 
examine how the objectives of accountability are shaped according to local 
interpretations of information demands from global and local actors. 
 
Representation: Localised interpretations 
 
We understand localised interpretations of representation through the interaction 
between the local bureaucracy, political society and citizens in mediating the 
objectives of accountability. These interpretations provide a situated understanding of 
actions of local bureaucrats and service providers who manoeuvre within the 
overarching demands of hierarchical accountability vis-à-vis a political society that 
mediates its interest through patrimony and citizens employing varied means (such as 
weapons of the weak and communitarian citizenship) to engage political society and 
the local bureaucracy for responsive PHC service delivery. Within our theoretical 
theme of representation, we focus on how the objectives of accountability i.e. the 
mirroring of PHC delivery, are constructed through mediation. Localised 
interpretations of accountability objectives therefore shed more light on the 
complexity of HMIS as mirror representation as they are reconstituted as being 
mediated through a complex web of social actors who constantly contest, negotiate 
and construct their outcome.  The theoretical constructs we employ here are decision 
space (both formal and informal), political and civil society. We use decision space to 
analyse how agents’ discretion come into play within a decentralised organisational 
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structure and their implications for constructing the objectives of accountability. The 
objectives of accountability as socially embedded are further illuminated as we 
analyse how political and civil society mediate their interest in the delivery and 
demand for PHC services.     
 
Decision Space 
 
We identified three broad interactions within decentralised organisational structures 
that have implications for the situated understanding of accountability objectives. 
These interactions are within the bureaucracy i.e. hierarchical relations between state 
officials as principals and local agents exercising their discretion in light of 
hierarchical information demands for mirror representation; direct interaction between 
donors partners and the local bureaucracy mediating their interests according to the 
goals of donor partners; and the interaction between the state and donors interpreted 
according to their accountability to citizens.  
 
Accountability within weak hierarchical information demands  
 
The nature of accountability mechanisms from a decentralisation perspective implies 
that information demands made by a principal on an agent must be legitimised 
through the provision of resources. HMIS in Nigeria is under-resourced at every level 
from the FMOH to LGAs. Without providing required resources, information 
demands made by the FMOH (principal) on the state and LGAs (agents), in a sense, 
has limited effect. While we are not debating the vast and controversial field of health 
financing for PHC delivery, we are limiting our focus to resource issues that are 
directly implicated in health workers’ ability to capture the reality of PHC delivery 
and health status and report this to the next level. Our case of HMIS implementation 
in Northern Nigeria shows that health workers provide services under severe resource 
constraints. This is particularly evident in the chronic shortage of NHMIS data tools 
especially at health facility levels. Of the many accounts regarding lack of data tools, 
an LGA M&E officer describes the situation: 
 
“There is problems usually with funds. There are Village Health Workers 
that have been trained to fill in data. But they do not have forms to fill. If 
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we had funds we can photocopy the forms and distribute to the clinics. If 
only I have the forms, I can even use my own funds to go and collect the 
data. The state promised to send the forms but still have not got them for 
about a year.” 
 
An official at the WHO echoes these sentiments that:     
 
“…the chances are you can’t do your job, there is no money, no vehicle, no 
forms, if there are forms there is no money to photocopy them when you 
run out, if you photocopy them you can’t get out to pass them around, the 
people who provide the data are out of the habit of collecting and delivering 
because it happens haphazardly and therefore forget. So at the end of the 
month nobody is saying where is the data…” 
 
Some health workers without the necessary forms and registers improvise using 
notebooks, which they have often purchased themselves and try to adapt the notebook 
to the design of the formal HMIS register. The improvisation of data tools at health 
facility level satisfies the LGA M&E officer who exercises an understanding of 
systemic resource constraints and commends the efforts and dedication of the health 
worker. On the other hand, as the registers are difficult to replicate exactly LGA 
M&E officers find that they cannot easily incorporate these data into the predefined 
format. Some officers decide to exclude the data altogether while others make up 
phantom numbers. The underlining principle of local accountability in HMIS 
implementation is that where hierarchical information demands are defined without 
the necessary resources, improvisations to work around the constraints are deemed 
highly commendable even though they might not fulfil formal accountability criteria. 
In this case HMIS data reporting typifies symbolic routine accountability where 
expectations are low or non-existent and the criteria for evaluation does not extend 
beyond the presence or absence of data. The shortage of resources promotes 
opportunistic behaviour where some health workers carry on with other enterprise 
such as farming and do not turn up for work. It is therefore not just data generation 
and reporting that is neglected but also the provision of health services to the 
community.  
 
What this analysis shows is that the challenges of data quality, reliability and use in 
Nigeria requires an understanding of how the demand for performance is structurally 
enabled or constrained through the (non) provision of required resources. The quality 
of mirror representation points to the necessity of mutual accountability.  
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Accountability objectives mediated through donor interests 
  
Decentralisation of health care in Nigeria means that donors can work directly with 
states governments in supporting the collection of particular data elements, which 
may not reflect the national HMIS data set. Therefore donors providing resources for 
states’ and LGAs’ HMIS activities effectively become principals. We find this in our 
case study where Jigawa developed a state-specific HMIS dataset (Shaw, Mengiste et 
al. 2007) through support from donors working directly with the state. Arguably this 
means that local health priorities of the state were reflected in their dataset, in addition 
to any donor specific data to be monitored. From a state level analysis, Jigawa is 
judged to be making progress in terms of developing its HMIS. However, at the 
federal level, the evaluation of reporting rates for this state was nil in four reports 
from January 2007 to December 2008. In a discussion with a senior official at the 
FMOH, he acknowledged that progress was being made in Jigawa but the required 
data was initially not captured or being reported according to the criteria and 
predefined format stipulated: 
 
“Jigawa was doing things it’s own way. They had customized their system 
but were not reporting what the federal wanted. The HMIS is a state-driven 
initiative supported by partners so we told them that their data would not be 
published.” 
 
Using a state-defined MDS (Shaw et al. 2007), Jigawa state was effectively 
contextualising its HMIS implementation. However, this did not address the structural 
accountability demands of hierarchical information. In other words, at the federal 
level, data submitted which does not conform to the predefined format is not accepted 
as a valid submission and the state is considered as “non-reporting” and therefore not 
represented. Following the review of the NHMIS forms at the federal level and the 
adoption of the DHIS as the national NHMIS software, contextualised representation 
in Jigawa state became more feasible. Jigawa state was already collecting some of 
these data elements and therefore only had to include those that were absent. As the 
NHMIS policy allows states to add data elements and indicators they may consider to 
be of particular importance to their local context, Jigawa state still retains its state-
specific data elements. The DHIS however allows state HMIS officers to extract the 
data elements required at the federal level and report these biannually. As a result, 
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Jigawa state data was included in the first 2009 semi-annual HMIS report produced at 
the federal level. Our analysis suggests that states can become accountable to the 
federal level as a reflection of donors’ interests. This is the case where activity at the 
federal level makes it expedient for donors to direct state accountability to the federal 
level. We see this in the publication of non-reporting status of Jigawa state. As a 
publicly available document, donors invariably find it difficult to defend their 
performance indicators to their stakeholders where these state-specific improvements 
are negated at the federal level. As a researcher on my first field trip to the FMOH, it 
was surprising to find that Jigawa state was not reporting HMIS data when this state 
was chosen precisely because of the expectation that, owing to donor support, they 
were far advanced in HMIS implementation. Therefore, to some degree these 
publications are powerful tools that influence accountability arrangements (this will 
be discussed in more detail under our section on visibility). We can also deduce from 
this finding that HMIS implementation creates accountability arrangements that 
emphasise the role of local interests in the partnership between states and donors. The 
outworking of this local interest implies that states become accountable to donors in 
return for resources and support. The perception of a senior official at the federal level 
is expressed below:  
 
“Jigawa is doing well because they have support from partners. I hope that 
when partners pull out the success will be sustained. I have my doubt. Good 
information does not come cheap. You need to put money into data for 
decisions; some states cannot do that except through partners that value 
data but states don’t put value on data.” 
 
A state HMIS officer in Jigawa sheds light on the tenor of this accountability structure 
by describing the impact of an interim end of a donor project before it restarted under 
a new contract: 
“For the 2 months after the initial PATHS project, reporting rate really 
suffered. We did not have the funds to conduct supervision or data review 
workshops. If people are not given money they don’t report data. Even 
when funds are linked to data reporting, you can tell that some Gundumas 
are cooking the books but to address this we need to visit the culprits and 
investigate but we don’t have transport or the means to buy fuel into our 
personal cars. We don’t even have money to print out forms not to talk of 
supervision.” 
 
An LGA M&E officer further illuminates this accountability practice where local 
interests are mediated through donor incentives therefore creating conflicting 
understanding and interpretation of hierarchical demands for routine information:  
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“When you show enthusiasm on data collection the feeling is that the M&E 
officer is getting extra funds for himself and the health facility staff as well. 
Some don’t want to continue collecting data because they are not well 
resourced.” 
 
Accountability to citizens on the fringes in state and donor partnership 
 
We analyse how donor mediated accountability structures impact on PHC delivery 
and health status in Jigawa state. As important components of the NHMIS 
(Oyemakinde 2007), we provide this analysis through a government official’s 
interpretations of the 2008 Demographic and Health Survey. Against the backdrop of 
Jigawa’s poor performance in the 2008 Demographic and Health Survey, the Chair of 
the state’s Health Data Consultative Committee expressed the need to translate health 
interventions into improved healthcare service delivery and better health status for the 
people of the state. He noted the necessity of developing a strategy that redresses the 
apparent disconnection between health planners and client communities. His 
submission was that:  
 
“Jigawa was last in many health areas at a presentation of the 
Demographics and Health Survey 2008 held in Abuja. The greatest 
problems in the state are malaria, maternal deaths and immunisation; the 
highest number of donors are in polio (6 out of 8 partners) which is the least 
of our problems. A lot of money is given to immunisation but we are still 
recording zero. Health profile is dire in the state because people are battling 
with illiteracy and poverty.”  
 
In analysing this statement we can conclude that the underlying factors of poor health 
cannot be divorced from socioeconomic developmental needs. State accountability 
objectives to its citizens therefore need to reflect these mutual priorities. The 
implications for HMIS performance in Jigawa state is that data captured does not fully 
address the developmental health needs of the community; prioritisation of services, 
rather than reflecting local priorities, are driven by global health imperatives. In the 
face of weak accountability to citizens, donors’ vertical initiatives drive the healthcare 
agenda, which do not reflect local health priorities.  
 
In the next section we analyse how political and civil society impinge on HMIS and 
PHC delivery accountability arrangements. 
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Political and civil society 
We introduce political and civil society as theoretical propositions that provide an 
explanation of some practices at sub-national levels, their practical implications for 
constructing accountability objectives, and the role of HMIS implementation. Our 
analysis finds that accountability objectives are constructed through the interaction 
between political society and bureaucratic performance; we also find that through 
“weapons of the weak”, civil society engages political society in light of the latter’s 
influence on bureaucratic performance. 
 
Political society and bureaucratic performance 
 
We find that the interaction between political society and the local bureaucracy has 
two negative unintended consequences for performance and accountability objectives. 
The first is the patrimony of political society that provides employment in the delivery 
of PHC services; the second relates to local agents exercising their discretion within an 
informal decision space in response to a negative perception of political meddling with 
the particular job postings.  
 
In order for local bureaucracies to be accountable in the implementation of PHC 
policies and provide appropriate standards of health care services to communities, 
they require the necessary capacity and skill set. Our findings show that in Nigeria 
(Northern Nigeria particularly) there is a significant shortage of capacity especially at 
local levels where the responsibility for PHC delivery is primarily located. From the 
perspective of a senior FMOH NHMIS official, the single most important problem in 
NHMIS implementation for PHC delivery is capacity. A national health review 
enumerated these as: 
 
“…inadequate and ineffective staff training in data analysis, interpretation 
and use at all levels; misreporting of conditions, poor understanding, low 
confidence and acceptability; weak monitoring, evaluation and managerial 
capacity at the periphery and the absence of a strong central coordinating 
institutional framework ” (Federal Ministry of Health 2005 in HERFON 
2007: 304) 
 
Although the lack of capacity is a significant problem in implementing HMIS, 
politicians do not necessarily consider this a priority. Nevertheless, providing jobs to 
supporters, friends and family is perceived as a political expediency and this 
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significantly impacts on the mix of available capacity, motivation and accountability 
arrangements. A community health doctor expressed that for PHC delivery “the major 
setback is ‘politicalisation’: if you are not connected, like, to the chairman or other 
VIP, nothing will be done.” 
 
This is reflected in the creation of employment as a major political agenda especially 
at the local level. However, this might be at the cost of providing the appropriate level 
of capacity in the health facility. Below, an official at the NPHCDA describes choices 
that local political officials usually have to make regarding the employment of health 
workers:   
“The state employ[s]… higher cadre workers whose salaries for 1 person 
could be equal to 4 times that of the junior worker that the local 
government would be more inclined to employ; those junior workers are the 
grassroot workers who the Chairman want to keep happy. Whereas most 
people the State government employ are usually those who stay in the 
urban centres and are less likely to want to go to the rural areas.” 
 
An explanation by a WHO official captures an aspect of this dynamic and its 
implications:  
“There are too many people - who do not have a clue about what they are 
supposed to be doing - in positions that are absolutely critical to the health 
of a fairly large number of people. You multiply that out and that’s what the 
problem is. We have a problem with human resource capacity and training; 
people who really shouldn’t be there. Nigerian politics is about who [you 
know], so you get a Local Government Chairman, and he wants to give 
people jobs... [In the end] you get people who might not only be 
unqualified for the role but those who might not even be interested, just 
wanting to draw a salary and to enrich themselves…”  
  
Working within the framework of this political society, local politicians undermine the 
efficiency of PHC service delivery by recruiting people in healthcare facilities who 
cannot deliver due to incompetency or apathy. Weak meritocratic mechanisms 
therefore create an alternative social interpretation of performance demands.  For 
example, a respondent at the federal level explained: 
 “So at the end of the month nobody is saying, […] ‘you’ve failed to meet 
your target’. No, it’s all to do with the various internal things like ‘have you 
been good enough to your boss’. It is totally mechanistic and [performance] 
does not [correlate with promotion]”.  
 
We can understand this challenge through the notion that, to an extent, the influence 
of political society systemically undermines capacity and motivation for HMIS 
implementation. This is pertinent because capacity and motivation is directly related 
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to accountability (Bossert 1998), which in turn sheds light on our construct of HMIS 
as mirror representation.  
 
Another problem is that some health workers interpret their appointment and/or 
postings as politically motivated punitive action. These prove to significantly weaken 
accountability as these officers may refuse to turn up for work, even though they 
receive their monthly salaries. Consequently, absenteeism was a recurring theme 
during the fieldwork. An Officer in Charge of a health facility lamented that: 
 
“We have about 50 people officially posted to this clinic. Only about 3 
report because the rest don’t want to work in this locality for political 
reasons. Nothing can be done even if you report them.” 
 
An LGA deputy M&E Officer stated resignedly that the M & E Officer doesn’t come 
to work, and has in fact not been to work in the last six months, because she feels that 
the appointment was a political disciplinary action. These findings show that political 
interference in the bureaucracy not only affects performance but also the 
accountability mechanisms that may be introduced to improve this performance, such 
as HMIS. Non-reporting or poor reporting of data can be linked to patrimony in 
political society, which relegates the improvement of performance accountability 
through HMIS in favour of social and political affiliations. In this case, the 
accountability of health workers and the local bureaucracy is not derived from formal 
institutional mechanisms but related to powerful state actors and political patrons. The 
performance of HMIS in terms of service provision within these accountability 
arrangements can be understood from the way citizens engage with service providers, 
the local bureaucracy and politicians. 
 
Civil society’s “weapons of the weak” in engaging political society 
 
Our theoretical framework proposes that desperately poor citizens in communities 
though shy away from open confrontation, depend on organising “weapons of the 
weak” for covert political scheming (Scott 1985 in Corbridge 2005: 45). From our 
case study, we see non-engagement as a “weapon” that citizens deploy in the attempt 
to exercise their agency. For instance, where they conclude that health workers are 
incompetent or nonchalant, citizens refuse to use the health facility. This leads to low 
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service utilisation, which is a key performance indicator captured by the HMIS. This 
becomes particularly important in cases where it is in the interest of local politicians, 
service providers and local bureaucrats to demonstrate improving performance in 
service utilisation such as immunisation coverage. The global effort to eradicate polio 
in Nigeria presents a case in point. Especially in Northern Nigeria where there is 
significant resistance, huge funds are being channelled to states and LGAs to improve 
the uptake of polio antigens mainly through Immunisation Plus Days (IPD) mass 
campaigns. Citizens are aware that they hold some form of influence in this domain 
and use this as a platform to make their voice heard. These citizens attempt to mediate 
their interest within political society through donor and international partners’ 
immunisation programmes. A community engagement consultant working for a donor 
programme explained how a community refused to be engaged during an IPD 
exercise, which is the flagship for polio mass campaign, sponsored by the WHO. She 
explained that this was because they questioned the competence of the health workers 
and the suitability of the Ward Head:    
“There was a ward that refused to engage because they did not have 
confidence in the staff. The Ward Head is connected to the commissioner 
for Education and therefore nothing was done about this. Consequently, 
there was no turn out at the IPD.” 
 
The sense that chaotic political society is sometimes inhabited by uncivil society is 
reflected in how communities refuse to engage when they suspect that their interests 
have not been represented because they did not support the ruling party. A health 
worker gives this account:   
 
“Politics is disruptive in this village (and many other villages in fact). There 
was a problem even in the last three months that malaria nets were shared 
but it was not sufficient so it didn’t go round. This caused uproar among 
people who felt they were being victimised for supporting a political party 
in opposition.”  
 
The impact of this disruption was quite visible in the take up of immunisation services 
as HMIS records held at the health facility showed a significant dip. Explaining the 
increase in the dropout rate, the local engagement facilitator for the community said: 
 
“This is attributed to the net distribution. People in the village began to say 
that, ‘the free nets which we can see we did not get, but the vaccine which 
we cannot see we are getting; take your vaccine, we don’t want’.”  
 
 166 
The Village Head concurred that the most difficult aspect of social mobilisation is that 
“people are tired of polio immunisation”. This was exacerbated when the government 
provided malaria nets but half of the people did not get any. People used this as an 
opportunity to lash back and react against any immunisation programme. According to 
him, the nets were not enough because the government chose to use distribution of 
cards as a means of estimating how many nets were needed. There were major errors 
made because these cards were handed out to youths in the community to distribute 
and they skipped a lot of houses. It was key to note that he felt the government decided 
to use this means for political reasons because “we had advised against this and 
recommended that the local community volunteers should be used for this work”.  
 
The direct implication for HMIS is related to data quality: there is reportedly 
widespread falsification of immunisation data at all levels but especially in the 
aggregation process at LGA and state level. For instance, there are accounts of health 
workers disposing of polio vaccines and spending time instead under a tree shade, 
“meticulously cooking the log books” (Anifalaje 2007: 37).  At these levels there are 
remunerations given not just for the recording of data but officers are also held 
accountable for service delivery. Within political society, citizens’ non-engagement is 
effectively a mediation of their interest through non-representation in the formal 
HMIS. This non-representation is a form of engagement with political society whose 
interests are partly defined by their patron’s performance targets on service utilisation. 
In this case, the WHO captures immunisation data through the District Vaccine 
Distribution and Monitoring Tool (DVDMT), which only requires aggregated data 
from LGA and state levels. Once again, we come to the trade-off theme between 
abstraction and contextualisation. As performance targets for these immunisation 
programmes rely on aggregated data, accountability to citizens is limited and local 
officers can easily manufacture data to satisfy accountability to international partners. 
We can understand that the more aggregated data is, the more abstracted it becomes. 
Therefore, data presented at the LGA level is significantly abstracted from its context. 
In this arrangement, accountability to citizens is weak as evaluation is constructed 
based on formal data reported rather than community views.  
The challenges of HMIS implementation are related to the influence of a political 
culture that undermines the performance of the bureaucracy and the bias of 
 167 
accountability mechanisms towards externally driven targets, which compromises the 
quality of data produced from the HMIS.  
  
To answer the first sub-question of this thesis (“how are HMIS implicated in the 
accountability arrangements underpinning PHC delivery in LDCs?”), we find that 
weak accountability to citizens plays a major role in understanding the outcomes of 
HMIS implementation for PHC delivery. Accountability to donors and global health 
priorities is locally reinterpreted vis-à-vis hierarchical demands. HMIS data instead of 
mirroring the status of PHC delivery are modulated into socially defined opportunities 
for mediating self-interests of health workers, government officials and political 
agents.  
 
Through our ‘visibility’ construct, we will analyse how the interplay between 
hierarchical accountability mechanisms and social forms of accountability illuminate 
the challenges of HMIS implementation. 
 
Visibility: Discipline and Direction 
Visibility as a theoretical construct is introduced to unpack the intricacies of PHC 
accountability mechanisms and their implications for HMIS implementation. This 
approach highlights the socio-political complexities of effective regulation through 
discipline and how participatory interactions improve our understanding of socially 
constructed accountability arrangements. Therefore, visibility concepts go some way 
in answering our second sub-question, “How can we better understand the challenges 
of HMIS implementation in LDCs through the complexities of accountability 
mechanisms?” We present both a hierarchical view, to analyse the formal 
accountability tools for PHC delivery, and a localised view that expands on the 
interactions that define the mechanisms of accountability.   
   
Hierarchical View 
This section analyses instrumental accountability mechanisms embodied in enforcing 
the implementation of PHC policies. These are mechanisms deployed for the 
hierarchical objective of mirror representation. The theories used presuppose the 
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following: the need to make subaltern agents visible in terms of responsibilities for 
which they will be held to account; hierarchical accountability mechanisms are 
strengthened through constitutional edicts, policy directives and other legal 
instruments; empirically, visibility mechanisms seek to make government officials 
and health workers accountable for the reporting of HMIS data and provision of PHC 
services to citizens. We therefore attempt to understand the complexity of 
implementing the PHC system in Nigeria from the hierarchical perspective of this 
visibility lens. We analyse our finding using our theoretical proposition of integrity of 
regulation.  
 
Integrity of regulation 
From this perspective, our findings reveal that the challenges of HMIS 
implementation can be analysed in three broad terms: the legislative context that 
constrains (or supports) the hierarchical objectives of instrumental accountability; the 
rituals of routine accountability that conceives of different modes of sanctions and 
rewards within a hierarchical view; parallel accountability structures that reflect the 
multiplicity of enforcement mechanisms and interests.     
 
Legislative framework 
A legislative framework provides a means to enforce PHC accountability objectives 
set at the federal level.  In the context of Nigeria’s PHC delivery system, we analyse 
the implications of the inadequacy of the constitution to clearly define roles and 
responsibilities for health care delivery across the three tiers of government. 
Currently, a draft health bill seeks to improve formal accountability arrangements by 
providing specific legal powers for enforcing the implementation of PHC policies in 
the country. According to our theoretical proposition, the bill (if or when it receives 
presidential assent) is introduced to provide disciplinary visibility in the delivery of 
health care. An extract from the bill reads:    
“There is hereby established for the Federation the National Health System, 
which shall define and provide a framework for standards and regulation of 
the health services…” (Government of Nigeria 2011: Section 1.1) 
 
Presently, there is currently no established “framework for standards and regulation of 
health services” even though the constitution broadly delineates responsibilities by 
placing health on the concurrent legislative list and thereby PHC delivery as the 
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fundamental responsibility of the local government. However, there is no legal 
framework addressing local government accountability for the delivery of primary 
healthcare. We interpret this ambiguity of responsibility as a product of poor 
visibility, resulting in the weakening of discipline. This ambiguity has far-reaching 
implications for the implementation of routine HMIS as a means of supporting PHC 
delivery and strengthening accountability. The complexity of regulating 
accountability for PHC delivery in Nigeria can be attributed to the governance 
complexities of a federal system where state and local governments are to a large 
extent autonomous, limiting the influence of the federal government (WHO (Africa) 
2009) to enforce policies regarding PHC delivery or HMIS.  A senior official at the 
FMOH explained that in cases where LGAs are not submitting data, the best that can 
be done at the federal level is to pay an advocacy visit to the LGA Chairman and 
appeal to him regarding the value of health data. One of the direct implications was 
expressed in a national review of the primary health care system and the health 
system respectively: 
 
“Responsibility for the production of the data collection tools remains a 
contentious issue. It would appear that at the LGA level, there is no 
investment in the production of the forms. They are dependent on the 
federal level for supply. The inability of the federal level to meet this need 
has led to a dearth of these forms across the country.” (Lucas 2008: 304) 
  
“…the constitution’s silence on the precise division of roles and 
responsibilities across the tiers makes for considerable ambiguity in the 
management of the health system.” (Kombe, Fleisher; et al. 2009: 11)  
 
Visibility in the hierarchical sense requires that those held to account are 
unambiguously identifiable and mechanisms in place to enforce responsibility. In 
relation to our case, there is a lack of visibility e.g. in terms of defining a legally 
binding responsibility for the printing of HMIS forms. As a consequence, PHC 
delivery is underpinned by weak hierarchical accountability due to the absence of an 
appropriate legal framework.  
What the Health Bill proposes to achieve is to make agents more accountable by 
clearly identifying and creating powers to enforce responsibility through the 
establishment of appropriate legal instruments. Without this visibility, we observe an 
immediate impact on the availability of HMIS mirror representation tools. This is 
significant because these tools are critical in the rational design of PHC delivery and 
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the evaluation of state and LGA accountability in implementing the national health 
policy. However, nebulous accountability directives leading to this shortage of supply 
limits the capacity of the federal level to govern at a distance and create a 
disconnection between HMIS policy and local implementation. As a result, conflicts 
of interests are amplified as states and LGAs are expected to expend resources on data 
tools that may not reflect values placed on health data. In addition, these tools are also 
part of a disciplinary mechanism that attempt to improve hierarchical accountability 
and may be at odds with local agents who stand to lose some autonomy in 
unaccountable practices. Hence, one of the most noticeable challenges of HMIS at 
sub-national levels is the inadequate supply of data tools, forms and registers. Fierce 
political lobbying both in favour and opposition to presidential assent for this Bill is 
an indication of its potential impact on power relations and hierarchical accountability 
structures for health care delivery in the country. Visibility for discipline brings to the 
fore, weak hierarchical accountability and limitation of HMIS as mirror 
representation. This is understood through our concept of an informal decision space 
and distorted communication. In the case of the former, states and LGAs agents do 
not exercise their discretion in line with prioritising PHC delivery or the expectations 
of an information-based health care system. Dire health indicators in Northern Nigeria 
exemplify this, as did a state official from the MOH and a rural community elder in 
Tsakuwawa respectively:  
 
“Government is not paying much attention to the health sector: you can see 
that people are dying from one disease or another.”  
 
“Nobody asks us about our health. We know the work of the Councillor but 
he might not be interested in this community and not respond. Any problem 
you take to Councillor, he does not take responsibility if we can’t afford 
drugs or health facility treatment.”   
 
As a feature of hierarchical information demands, distorted communication takes the 
form of non-reporting, poor reporting or falsification of data. It is tenable to conclude 
that in the absence of adequate data reporting tools, HMIS has limited capacity to 
represent the health status of citizens and provision of PHC services. This limitation 
has direct implications for accountability to citizens. We can infer that low political 
will for PHC delivery is evidenced from the overreliance on donors and international 
partners. A respondent from the WHO provided a critical analysis of PHC planning in 
the country:  
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“Our health agenda is informed by international partners; WHO does 
national surveys. When you get to levels where you need sophisticated 
reasoning, like health systems, we should know where our problems are; 
where resources need to go; which local governments are performing and 
which are not; where there are infrastructures and where there aren’t any.” 
 
This analysis can be understood from the governance perspective of citizenship 
experienced as a deficit due to the inability of the state to “see”. We propose that 
HMIS implementation is weak in Nigeria because its instrumental impact on making 
visible is at odds with interests that sustain the lack of state accountability to citizens 
in the provision of PHC services. In its current state, the validity of routine HMIS is 
questioned because of distortions (i.e. data quality issues) but we submit that poor 
visibility is an expedient of a state that does not want to account to its citizens. HMIS 
implementation is consequently entangled in disciplinary mechanisms that are defined 
by the rituals of routine accountability.  
 
Rituals of routine accountability 
Without a legal framework to effectively enforce PHC priorities, publication of the 
semi-annual HMIS report by the federal level, can be conceived as a visibility tool 
deployed as part of a disciplinary mechanism. This publication provides information 
on how states are performing regarding the reporting of routine data, the provision of 
basic health infrastructure, available PHC services, and level of service utilisation. 
Recently (in the last two publication July to December 2008 and January to June 
2009), these reports have included the performance rankings of states (see fig. 6.3). 
 
A senior FMOH official alluded to this initiative as a mechanism to enhance 
visibility: “when the data is published, hopefully it will encourage states to submit 
data.” According to our framework, the ritual of routine accountability operates 
through rewarding good performance through praise (or higher status) and 
discourages poor performance through exclusion. While the first three HMIS semi-
annual publications did not include performance rankings of states, the introduction of 
scorecards to rank performance can be seen as an integral component of routine 
accountability rituals.  
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Fig. 6.3: HMIS publication as visibility for discipline  
 
The rationale of exclusion in the case of non-reporting states and the high-ranking 
status of performing states as a reward is clearly articulated by a senior FMOH 
official: 
“Ranking of states is a powerful tool because it fosters competition among 
states and by using a performance scorecard it’s creating a lot of storm; we 
want to give plaque for Best Performing States.” 
 
The complexity of this disciplinary mechanism can be traced to the implicit 
assumption that visibility will engender dialogue between states (i.e. “healthy 
competition” during reviews), which will improve 1) reporting rates and 2) service 
availability and utilisation. In essence, this formal hierarchical tool relies on the 
socialising forum of dialogue between states to influence subaltern officials to 
exercise their discretion in reflecting federal level policy on PHC delivery. However, 
as this mechanism primarily addresses HMIS as mirror representation (i.e. data 
reporting), routine accountability is also subject to distortion i.e. poor data quality. 
Local officials to be held accountable exert some influence as the generator and 
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provider of data. At the heart of this distortion is the notion that asymmetric power 
relations do not allow the free flow of information, as there is always the fear of 
recrimination.  
Moreover, there is little or no capacity to verify and validate the information supplied 
and while the publication itself alludes to data quality issues, this is not addressed 
within the disciplinary mechanism. There is an expectation that through reviews of 
the analysed data, state representatives will be motivated to engage more effectively 
with data reported especially where it reflects negatively on the state due to incorrect 
reporting. The converse is however not tackled where incorrect reporting reflects 
positively on the performance of a state. We therefore find that PHC accountability 
mechanisms in Nigeria is based on hierarchical information demands, which given the 
lack of a legal framework and resource constraints, emphasise a basic requirement of 
data reporting. Consequently, the distortion in HMIS data representation is accepted 
as a necessary outcome of the prevailing socio-political context.  There is an 
acknowledgement that officials expected to meet the set targets for HMIS data 
reporting are working within constraining environments. An FMOH official explains 
below: 
“The performance benchmark is for 70% of LGAs and health facilities 
within a state to be reporting routine HMIS. However, all states must report 
to the federal level. At the moment not all states are reporting yet because 
of their status: no HMIS forms and no money. We have written proposals to 
state governors.” 
 
Without the appropriate political commitments to HMIS in terms of resources, 
accountability mechanisms assume a superficial form where health workers and 
HMIS officers play to the gallery. For instance, after a visit to Kiyawa PHC in Jigawa 
state, the following entry was made in the researcher’s notes regarding how 
accountability is navigated through an awareness of hierarchical demands and the 
ability of local officials to present token representations: 
 
Research notes: 17 July 2009 – A ‘form’ of accountability maintained 
 
Health workers are aware of the administrative demands of their jobs but only adhere 
to these superficially as other contingent issues take precedence. While there is a level 
of awareness about data management processes and use, this only seems to serve as 
an obfuscation of reality on the ground, which is a major disconnect between data, 
information and practice. The pride in showing off collated data, charts and graphs 
 174 
quickly dissipates when you probe around meanings; or their veracity crumbles after 
basic validation checks. Critical evaluation of data is missing, as officers are either 
generally unaware or reticent in admitting to problems. The initial story is always that 
data is collected, collated, validated, and reported to the Officer in Charge who also 
checks the data quality.  A case in point is Kiyawa health facility where the records 
officer was asked whether data is collected, reported, verified, validated and used. 
The immediate response was in the affirmative. When the actual records were 
inspected closely, it was quite evident that the data was not verified neither was it 
reliable. Some data elements were missing and others were spotted as having too high 
values. For instance there was an input of over 1000 new ANC attendants in one 
month. This was a record that presumably had been “verified” and “validated” before 
being reported. At the Labour Ward it was surprising to find that termites had eaten 
the forms. Even more surprising was that the Labour ward staff reported that the 
clinic had no record of maternal mortality. This was because TBAs, who deliver most 
of the births, do not report data to the clinic but to the LGA as the JCHEWs required 
to collect data from the TBAs do not do so.  
  
We suggest that through various interactions with donor programmes, local officials 
have become quite savvy about expectations and are able to clearly articulate how 
information processes should be like while they may not be so forthcoming about how 
they really are. One may also argue that this understanding (of the ideal) is a critical 
first step for strengthening HMIS in the country. Nevertheless, the complexity lies in 
being taken in by accounts that depict the ideal rather than exploring under the surface 
to find possibly hidden realities that are often not so palatable. This was similarly 
articulated in a technical brief on HMIS in Nigeria: 
“In order to sustain the National Health Management Information System 
(NHMIS), the gap between rhetoric and practice needs to be reduced so that 
managers and politicians practically support data collection, processing, 
analysis and dissemination by allocating and releasing realistic budgets for 
HMIS” (Heywood 2008). 
 
As mentioned in the methodology chapter, fieldwork interviews were replete with 
rhetoric and this has been particularly strengthened in Northern Nigeria where there is 
a high concentration of donor activities.        
 
Parallel accountability structures 
At sub-national levels, rituals of routine accountability are more complex as multiple 
stakeholders engage directly in the use of sanctions and rewards as a means of 
achieving and maintaining accountability. The challenge here is the level of 
fragmentation, owing in part to ambiguity in the roles of diverse health ministries and 
agencies and the influence of international and donors partners. For instance, in 
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Katsina state, the SPHCDA is reported to have adequate resources for HMIS activities 
in the state. The state M&E Officer illustrates how discipline and dialogue are 
required for the quality of data representation: 
"Those who send data, send it either weekly or monthly, I compare with 
past submissions and show them if there are lapses. Sometime I go to them 
directly to show them what they have done and if there are mistakes I show 
them and what corrections to make… Sometimes the state calls us for 
meeting with the LGAs […] asking for explanations on the [data reported] 
and [to make a presentation].” 
 
“… we are using Zonal Technical Officers (ZTO). We go with an insider 
from the local government to assess the data reported. These people are 
given Twenty-Thousand Naira [GBP 80 monthly] to go round. They have 
no reason to stay in the office… “If you don’t report and something 
happens, we will query the officer in charge of the zone””.  
 
The potential distortion created by hierarchical distance is somewhat mitigated by the 
corresponding dialogue that takes place through ZTOs and “an insider” for data 
collection and feedback. Implementing a robust HMIS in the state is however 
challenged because there is no legal authority to hold SPHCDA officials accountable 
for reporting this data to the SMOH. While by policy it is acknowledged that the 
SMOH should be the repository of all health data generated in the state, power 
relations and personality clashes add to the complexity of coordination, especially in 
the context of a poorly resourced SMOH HMIS unit.  
 
At the local level the need for political buy-in is much more evident in the use of 
sanctions and rewards. An LGA M&E officer in Jigawa state explained this: 
 
“At the end of every month there is a meeting with health facilities to 
conduct analysis and [there is support from the local government Chairman 
and PHC Coordinator to penalise Officers in Charge of health facilities who 
don’t submit data for example, by withholding their allowance] …”  
 
This disciplinary mechanism however points to a parallel accountability structure 
supported by the WHO, primarily for disease surveillance data and routine 
immunisation. The monthly data review forum sponsored by the WHO is primarily 
for monitoring and disciplinary purposes by withholding remuneration in the absence 
of required reports. We therefore understand these review forums to be fundamental 
to the rituals of routine accountability where local officials are compared, rewarded 
and sanctioned according to set targets. Data quality is often perceived as dubious for 
many reasons but with WHO-supported data, this is seen to reflect calculated attempts 
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by officials at local and state level to present data that will not jeopardise their 
financial remuneration. This is especially where the WHO not only pays for submitted 
data but also the provision of particular services such as supervising immunisation 
campaigns. It therefore follows that if the data aggregated from the health facilities 
suggest lower than expected coverage, these returns are manipulated before it is sent 
to the state level where the same process is repeated. The sentiment expressed by a 
state Permanent Secretary is that health workers, local and state immunisation officers 
“manufacture data that is not there”. Nevertheless, because this process is more or less 
routinised and with access to relatively constant resources, donor programmes like 
PRINN-MNCH interested in routine immunisation try to build a closer integration 
between this system and the routine HMIS. Problems arise where there is an overlap 
with data reported from the HMIS usually different from that in the WHO system. 
This has led to data review workshops to understand the discrepancies. These 
workshops invite data generators at health facility levels to meet with local and state 
immunisation officers who are responsible for aggregating the data. These workshops 
are always impassioned with health facility workers challenging the figures presented 
by their superiors and revealing the inherent distortions. These forums are convened 
in an environment relatively free of power asymmetries. Conversations with HMIS 
practitioners in the field suggest that there is an understanding generated through this 
dialogue which helps to appreciate the socioeconomic and political cause of 
communicative distortions and the necessity of operating parallel reporting structures 
to cope with the uncertainties that underpin routine HMIS reporting. This localised 
understanding is of externally driven incentive mechanisms, which conceives of data 
as commodity instead of responsibility. In this case, the value of data is derived from 
expectations of additional financial incentives for carrying out HMIS activities. HMIS 
officials and health workers responsible for routine HMIS data find their activities 
and accountability mediated through monetised incentives provided by donors. The 
impact is that the state relies on donor-supported mechanisms to generate data to 
support its HMIS, which is subject to the priorities of the particular donor. In addition, 
the distortions in the data reflect the nature of incentive schemes provided by the 
donor.  
Through the concepts provided by the integrity of regulation, we were able to analyse 
how the wider development community, senior bureaucratic officers, local 
government agents, health workers and politicians navigate and construct PHC 
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accountability arrangements in the absence of a legal framework and how these 
dynamics impact on the implementation of HMIS especially through distorted 
communication. Using concepts from participatory mechanisms, we now turn to how 
citizens are mutually engaged with political society and service providers in 
constructing accountability structures for their health services.  
 
Localised Interpretations 
Participatory mechanisms  
 
Participatory mechanisms provide analytical tools to help us explore quotidian 
practices of socialising accountability. We find in the interaction between health 
workers and communities, accountability mechanisms that are shaped through mutual 
understanding. These mechanisms humanise the impersonal hierarchical demands of 
work, rely on dialogue for constructing mutual accountability arrangements and are 
activated through communitarian forms of citizenship for engaging in political 
society.  
 
Humanising work within the impersonal local bureaucracy 
 
We analyse the accountability of health workers to the communities they serve as a 
social practice that aim to validate the relevance of health workers in providing PHC 
services through contextually sensitive approaches. For instance, the officer in charge 
of the health facility and his assistant in Tsakuwawa explained that: 
  
“The main cause of health problems in the community is poverty. They 
don’t have money to take care of their children. One of the most common 
concerns in the community is the inability of mothers to feed their children 
and pay for drugs… We have had numerous appeals at the health facility 
from women requesting credit to buy drugs until their husbands get back… 
I have to buy paracetamol for some of the women just to encourage them to 
come.”  
 
“These women usually do not have enough money to buy drugs so the 
health facility may provide these to the women free of charge as an 
incentive for them to continue attending the health facility.” 
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From our theoretical lens, we suggest that the need for socialising the experience of 
work is more intensely sought at the local level and in contexts where health workers 
and citizens are prone to feeling like objects within the giant state machinery. This 
makes it desirable for individuals to cushion themselves against the harsh 
impersonality of hierarchical demands. Health workers in Tsakuwawa cushion the 
harshness of hierarchical demands with the comfort of being appreciated and 
acknowledged. This was illustrated when the assistant in charge of the health facility 
spoke about the community being endeared to him, how the women sometimes bring 
food and are very happy for him to carry their babies (see Fig. 6.4 below).  
 
 
Fig. 6.4: Humanising work – Ass. OIC of Health Facility  
  
Respondents from the community feel that the health workers were committed and 
competent. They frequently made contrasting comparisons with previous staff that did 
not turn up for work and had a nonchalant attitude towards the health of the 
community. In the humanisation of work, social interaction between health workers 
and community members yield an understanding of how health must be seen within a 
wider developmental context. For instance, the community identified poor education 
as a major cause of health problems. A health worker living in the community 
succinctly explains his perception of this link: 
“There is no development without knowledge and education. This is a big 
problem to our people. Poverty and ignorance are the main problems of 
health in this community. To increase the level of awareness in the 
community is critical for improving health.”  
 
Traditional chiefs in the village expressed that prioritisation is important: “until you 
can eat, before you go to hospital and those that do not have enough to eat are more in 
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this community - about 80% do not have enough.” A group of young men made 
similar points that the “biggest problem in the community is lack and 
unemployment.” They propose that, “the government needs to help with farming, 
illiteracy and poverty”. Accountability of health workers to the community albeit 
limited in a developmental sense, is based on the appreciation of community 
information needs and socio-cultural sensitivity in service delivery. Some of the 
important information that the community values from the health workers relate to the 
availability of free drugs. This is disseminated through the town crier letting the 
community know that the health facility has received stock of free drugs.  
 
What we find is that developmental priorities articulated through contextual data 
exchanged between health workers and communities rarely feature within the formal 
HMIS system (Madon, Krishna et al. 2010). The assistant officer in charge of the 
health facility stated categorically that, “we don’t keep records of outreach services 
unless important information is being disseminated.” The “important information” 
referred to is related to formal hierarchical information needs. As a result, critical 
information regarding the developmental health priorities of local communities and the 
contentions regarding formal provision of PHC delivery are excluded from the formal 
HMIS. Accountability mechanisms underpinning the delivery of PHC services are 
identified through the social practices of how health workers position themselves to be 
sensitive to community needs. Health workers and the community in general recognise 
that interactions are located within the structural context of formal PHC provision. To 
this end, broader developmental needs are locally acknowledged through informal 
channels but are not addressed. One of the implications for HMIS implementation 
challenges is that their relevance at the local level is related to the degree to which 
they are flexibly conceived beyond the formal demands of selective PHC to 
incorporate socially contingent developmental priorities of communities that impinge 
on health and health care delivery. These informal dimensions of community health 
priorities embody the requirements for developmental transformation of poor 
communities.  
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Dialogue as a form of interest mediation 
Through dialogue, we explore how participatory mechanisms between citizens and 
community groups produce understanding and the role of information in this 
interaction. LCVs are a community group that provide a dialogue forum for 
community members to express their concerns and fears regarding PHC services. 
Within this forum the expressions of power relations is limited so that there is a free 
flow of information, opinions, ideas and contrary views. Responses from both LCVs 
and community members portray the image of information being used as a way of 
communicating the health problems of the community and promoting dialogue for 
increasing mutual understanding of the problem:     
 
“People listen because they enjoy the dialogue and the evidence. Posters 
and group discussions in Hausa are the primary means of communication.”  
  
“The most problematic side of dealing with the community is usually when 
you speak to them the first time. This is due to the association people make 
with polio. As a strategy we use the evidence of the last measles outbreak to 
show that the children that were immunised fared much better than those 
who weren’t.” 
 
LCVs and health facility staff were both given a book each by a donor to record 
details of children born in the community (Nsa Not dated,). The LCVs record the 
newborn details in the book and refer them to the health facility for immunisation. 
The health workers also record details of immunised children into their book. LCVs 
are therefore able to cross reference their records with the health workers’ to find out 
which children were not brought for immunisation. The referral of newborns relies on 
social ties between the LCVs and the community. However tracking defaulters 
through the book given by the donor, suggests instrumental accountability from health 
workers and LCVs towards the predetermined priority of the donor. This in a sense 
explains the expectation of LCVs to benefit from this alliance because there is a 
perception that they are not just helping the community but also adding value to a 
donor project. In response to this expectation, the Officer in Charge of the health 
facility explains that: 
“Unfortunately, [LCVs] don’t get [financial] support from any quarters and 
that is the essence of volunteering. A donor tries to enlighten the 
community about taking ownership of our health programmes and knowing 
our rights.” 
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Through our concept of communitarian citizenship, we analyse the mechanisms 
through which communities take ownership of their health priorities and engage 
political society for much needed resources. 
 
 
Communitarian citizenship 
Communitarian citizenship is conceived as a form of political culture where political 
officials are engaged for public services and resources based on an affiliation with an 
ethnic group or community (Abah and Okwori 2005 in Cornwall et al. 2005). The 
account below illustrates how on one hand this is a highly contextual arrangement and 
on the other, it undermines equitable public service provision: 
  
“The NPHCDA planned to build PHCs that are evenly spread around the 
country. By the time they finished with their planning you found it was all 
politically directed. If you are a Local Government Chairman, you lobby 
like hell to make sure it goes into your local government and your ward... 
So you find a crazy situation where centres are concentrated [in some areas] 
and some areas are [not] served.”  
 
In Tsakuwawa, the provision of a borehole and more recently, the expansion of the 
health facility, were attributed (rightly or wrongly) to the then Commissioner of 
Health who was from the community. However, in the same breath people lament 
political nepotism that benefits other communities. For example a respondent from the 
community stated that, “the village where the governor comes from is completely 
modernised. There is money but it is just misappropriated.” We find that although 
communitarian citizenship allow for powerful state actors to be held accountable for 
the provision of public services, the extremely heterogeneous society that makes up 
Nigeria, constitutes a problem for this form of accountability as expressed in a review 
of Nigeria’s primary healthcare system:    
“In some respects, Nigeria’s record in health development has been 
disappointing in that smaller, poorer neighbours have outstripped us in the 
achievements of their health services… Our slow start is in part related to 
the enormous size of our population, the great diversity of language and 
culture and the complex political systems in the federal state” (Lucas 2008: 
xi) 
 
From a localised perspective, Nigeria’s complex political system is exacerbated 
through activities of politicians seeking visibility by engaging in activities that portray 
them as pro poor. This is in light of what Corbridge et al. (2005) describe as the need 
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for politicians to be seen actively engaged in issues regarding the poor. We see this in 
Jigawa state where the state Governor offered citizens and residents in the state an 
opportunity to report dysfunctional public services and other public needs by directly 
sending a text message to his mobile phone. This was intended to address state 
responsiveness to community needs and also provide a sense that the citizens were 
valued and visible. Not surprisingly, individuals applauded this effort. For instance, a 
member of a civil society NGO gave this illustration: 
 
“For six months we had no power supply. Now we have power supply as a 
result of many texts to the governor: government is now responding. The 
governor also acknowledged that the people have been very patient.” 
 
It is however a different story with actual state officials who found it to be impractical, 
reactive and not always respecting constitutionally defined responsibilities across the 
three tiers of government. A SMOH official reported:    
 
“The governor has given everyone - the public - his mobile number so that 
people can send him messages directly about public services in their 
communities. This is not effective because we are spread so thin as our 
health care delivery remit is now effectively taking over what is LGA 
function.”  
 
To conclude, we note that the tendency towards communitarian citizenship needs to 
be balanced by an overarching accountability structure. This suggests that the 
implementation of PHC policy need to be strengthened in order to provide the 
required structure within which participatory mechanisms do not compromise the 
equitable distribution of public services. To answer our second sub-question, we 
submit that HMIS challenges can be conceived through 1) the limitations of discipline 
in supporting hierarchical information demands; 2) diverse social constructions of 
accountability practice and 3) achieving a balance between overarching hierarchical 
accountability arrangements and the need to support highly situated local 
accountability structures. 
 
Evaluating this balance is the essence of responsive performance and provides further 
insight into the extent to which HMIS are able to support accountability arrangements 
that underpin the delivery of PHC in LDCs.  
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Discussing implications through responsive performance 
In this section we discuss the implications of the case study analysis through our third 
conceptual construct of responsiveness. The particular question this construct attempts 
to elucidate is, “What kind of developmental transformation is implied in the 
implementation of HMIS from an accountability perspective?” 
 
Responsiveness is an evaluation construct that attempts to analyse accountability 
outcomes in terms of implied developmental notions. We present a hierarchical view 
and a localised interpretation of these accountability arrangements. The former focuses 
on performance indicators and the imperative of an information culture as instrumental 
to development. The latter emphasises understanding locally defined developmental 
priorities through dialogue. 
 
Information culture: performance management 
From a hierarchical view, we analyse government policy documents regarding the 
framework for PHC delivery and how the role of HMIS (and ICTs) are articulated. 
Using the concept of an information culture, we draw developmental implications 
from an accountability perspective.  
 
Mirroring  
We noted in Chapter Three that mirror representation to an extent is driven by a 
technical instrumental rationality and a developmental ideology of health as an 
economic commodity for economic growth. The implication of this notion for our 
study is that we conceived this hierarchical view as providing an overarching 
development agenda through which local interpretations take place. The 
developmental ends that are articulated at the federal level have far-reaching 
implications for the extent to which HMIS can contribute to accountability 
arrangements that produce developmental transformations. The more performance 
focussed the HMIS is, the more abstracted it becomes and the less it contributes to 
people-centred development. Our evaluation draws this conclusion in our case study.    
Important policy documents such as the National Strategic Health Development Plan 
(2010-2015), Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (National Economic Empowerment 
and Development Strategy), National Health Policy and the Vision20:2020 all provide 
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strong statements regarding the role of information and ICTs in improving both 
healthcare delivery and development. We observe in these policy documents, the 
instrumental value of health leading to socioeconomic development: 
“Nigeria recognizes that a healthy population is important for socio-
economic development. This has been underscored in the Vision20: 2020, 
and the National Development Plan” (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2010: 
13) 
 
Specifically related to the social sector of which health and education are an important 
part, the instrumentality inherent in the government’s vision is articulated in respect 
of an investment in human capital which is able to yield economic returns: 
“The social sector is strategic for national development, as it deals with 
improvements in the quality and capacity of a nation’s human resources, 
which is a critical element for national development. Investment in the 
social sector is targeted at ensuring that the nation’s human resource 
endowment is knowledgeable, skilled, productive and healthy to enable the 
optimal exploitation and utilization of other resources to engender growth 
and development. It is people that drive the economy; improving their 
productivity, protecting the vulnerable in the society and enhancing their 
wellbeing and quality of life are the essence of development 
planning.”(Government of Nigeria 2010: 146) 
 
Central to this technical rationality is the need for measurable performance 
management indicators expressed in the overarching aim of Nigeria’s developmental 
plan: 
“They indicate among others the current situation, challenges to be 
addressed, the objectives to be achieved, as well as, the strategies that will 
be employed to achieve the desired results. They also, contain set targets, 
programmes and projects and investment plan for each of the sectors.” 
(Government of Nigeria 2010: 6) 
 
Not only are objectives, visions and aims rendered according to measurable 
performance statistics but we also find the technicalisation of the challenges that 
legitimise the rationality underpinning these objectives. For instance, one of the key 
strategies proposed in the Vision 20:2020 document is based on ICT-led economic 
growth: 
“Developing a national framework for transforming the nation into a 
knowledge-based economy is a Key Result Area…This is in recognition of 
the increasing role of knowledge in engendering economic growth and 
development as well as social transformation and modernization” (pg 218). 
 
“This is underpinned by human capital development that will breed better 
informed citizenry with higher creative capacity to generate wealth, 
employment and reduce the level of poverty. The adoption and adaptation 
of new technologies will create longer-term gains in productivity and 
employment; as well as significantly improve the skills base of the nation’s 
labour force” (pg 219). 
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As the brainchild of the Bretton Woods institutions, LDCs are required to develop 
poverty reduction strategies in light of a technical rational approach to development 
(Craig and Porter 2003). We therefore see this reflected in the National Economic 
Empowerment and Development Strategy replete with policy statements that underlie 
an economic view of health and development as represented by SPHC. This is first in 
terms of an instrumentality that specifies a definite causality between health and 
development (poverty) and secondly in terms of its orientation towards vertical 
programmes: 
“HIV/AIDS is a major social and health problem. It also threatens the 
country’s productivity and economy. The plan is to improve the system of 
health care delivery, with emphasis on HIV/AIDS and other preventable 
diseases, such as malaria, tuberculosis, and reproductive health–related 
illnesses.” (Pg xi) 
 
 “The goal of the NEEDS health component is to improve the health status 
of Nigerians in order to reduce poverty… The new policies will target 
priority diseases, such as malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and 
reproductive health–related illnesses”  (pg 38). 
 
 
In the Vision20: 2020 document plan, the challenges of the health sector in the 
country allude to the limitations of a hierarchical structure being able to engender the 
appropriate responsiveness within a diverse context such as Nigeria: 
“The Nigerian health care system is faced with numerous challenges. These 
include: Size and diversity of the country: The size of the country, the 
diversity in culture, social and economic conditions… and health outcomes 
across the zones of the country are major challenges to health planning in 
the country.” (Government of Nigeria 2010: 160) 
  
Nevertheless, these challenges at the hierarchical level fuel motivations for redress 
through a technical rationality (at least in policy terms). For instance, the objectives 
set out in NEEDS implementation plan is to improve the country’s evidence-based 
based approach: 
“Improve existing or set up new mechanisms to generate and use evidence 
and information for developing and implementing health policy, 
programmes, and plans… Improve data on the burden and socioeconomic 
impact of diseases in Nigeria” (Nigerian National Planning Commission 
2004: 39).   
 
It is important to reiterate that an information culture relies on a measure of 
objectivity regarding means and ends.  We observe a similar viewpoint from the 
health sector objectives stated in Jigawa’s State Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy (SEEDS) document: 
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“Development and promotion of health-related information, education and 
communication activities. This includes the introduction of a strong health 
management information system to ensure systematic planning and 
monitoring including surveillance and control of major diseases” (Jigawa 
State Government Not dated,: 62). 
 
Strengthening HMIS in the country takes pride of place in the government’s 2010-
2013 strategic objectives: 
“• To provide an effective national health management information system 
(NHMIS) by all the governments of the federation to be used as a 
management tool, including monitoring & evaluation, for informed 
decision-making at all levels”; 
• “To utilize research to generate knowledge to inform policy, in order to 
achieve nationally and internationally health-related development goals;” 
(Government of Nigeria 2010: 161) 
 
 
In the above objectives, information and knowledge are conceived as instrumental 
tools that can be deployed to yield better decisions and development. We note that 
these objectives also include community participation but as it stresses citizens’ 
responsibilities over their rights it does not necessarily reflect the developmental ethos 
of government supporting communities to determine the direction of their healthcare 
provision. This is akin to what Hyden et al.  (2004) note when they propose that in 
developing countries the vulnerability of many poor individuals prevent them from 
exercising their formal rights and as such civic responsibility often take precedence 
over rights.  
 
Accountability implications 
These policy objectives can be better understood in the context of our comprehensive 
accountability framework. It is especially important to see how at the hierarchical 
level the objectives, mechanisms and outcome of accountability are implicit in our 
concepts of representation, visibility and responsiveness.  Table 6.2 below provides 
an example of how we can classify a number of typical policy goals outlined for 
strengthening HMIS according to our framework. 
 
From the underlying instrumental rationality of these policies we further see evidence 
of accountability outcomes of responsiveness towards economic performance. This is 
especially prominent in the vision for ICT:  
“The increasing globalization driven by ICT makes it imperative for 
Nigeria as an emerging market to irreversibly consider the application and 
promotion of ICT strategy to facilitate its rapid growth and development… 
It would also require the application of the new knowledge to drive other 
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soft sectors: governance, entertainments, public services, media sector 
tourism, et cetera.” (Government of Nigeria 2010: 222)  
 
“Deploy ICT in government for transparency and accountability as well as 
to enhance efficiency, effectiveness and increase government capacity to 
deliver citizen centred services to attain national competitiveness” (pg 226). 
 
The NEEDS document articulates a view of accountability at the local level: 
“At the local government level, planning and public accountability 
mechanisms should be institutionalized. State governments are expected to 
work with local government councils to develop medium-term plans. Such 
plans should be prepared with the participation of all relevant stakeholders. 
Periodically (say, every quarter) the local council should convene town hall 
meetings of all relevant stakeholders—traditional rulers, community heads, 
ward councillors, and representatives of the private sector, labour, NGOs, 
and civil society—to discuss the sources and uses of funds, results 
achieved, challenges, and a road map for the future. Town meetings should 
help promote good governance, transparency, and accountability at the 
local government level and greatly improve service delivery and poverty 
reduction.”  
 
“A complaints point will be established in each ministry and state 
enterprise as well as the Planning Commission, where citizens who receive 
poor service or are rudely treated in government offices will be able to 
register their complaints. Services covered include… data and information 
dissemination […], and services delivered by health…and other institutions 
that deal with the public. The monitoring by the Service Delivery Unit will 
be done in collaboration with the relevant supervisory authorities and the 
Public Complaints Commission. Over time governance will be 
depersonalized as much as possible, so that the bulk of communication will 
be through the Internet rather than by mail or by queuing up at government 
offices. E-governance is the ultimate goal.” (Nigerian National Planning 
Commission 2004: 108-10)  
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Analytical Category Accountability proposition Illustrative Examples of Policy  
NHMIS datasets objectify PHC 
delivery; are abstracted, as they are 
determined at a distance; and 
attempts to construct an 
accountability objective based on a 
mirror representation of health 
status.  
“Ensure availability and periodic 
review of NHMIS 
indicators/minimum dataset and 
data collection tools at all levels” 
 
Administrative decentralisation is 
supported by the accountability 
objectives of hierarchical 
information centrally coordinated. 
“Coordinate data collection from all 
programmes at all levels and ensure 
smooth transmission to the National 
Health Management Information 
System” 
Representation 
Appropriate capacity is a 
prerequisite for accountable 
bureaucratic performance  
“To build capacity of health 
managers and workers at all levels 
in data management” 
 
Visibility 
 
The integrity of regulation relies on 
accountability mechanisms of an 
appropriate legislative framework 
for hierarchical disciplinary 
purposes. 
 
“Provide a legal framework for the 
implementation of the NHMIS 
policy and strategy”  
Responsiveness The outcome of accountability is 
directed towards performance 
management.  
“Strengthen existing, and support 
for complementary data sources for 
monitoring health system 
performance” 
 
Table 6.2: Example of hierarchical level analysis of HMIS Policy objectives through Representation, 
Visibility and Responsiveness 
 
While the above accountability policy goals provide a dialogue platform for citizens 
to hold service providers, local political agents and bureaucrats to account, the 
mechanism for effecting this system relies on discipline rather than understanding. 
The implications are that in addition to the distortion that we expect from hierarchical 
accountability, the requisite capacity for supporting this forum is weak. More so, the 
instrumentality that the town meetings should “help promote good governance, 
transparency, and accountability at the local government level and greatly improve 
service delivery and poverty reduction” does not bear out in current practice and 
seems far-fetched from experience. The experience being that these meetings do not 
actually take place and when they do it is mainly for the mediation of the self-interest 
of those who attend. Usually, the meeting such as these only take place when there is 
some form of remuneration for participants.  Therefore, we will present the analysis 
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of perceptions of actual information culture and accountability at the hierarchical 
level.  
 
A senior official at the FMOH explains the relationship between information culture, 
HMIS enhancing visibility and accountability arrangements:  
“Our people are not yet used to making use of data for management of 
health programmes. To that extent they don’t demand data or utilise the 
data given to them. So because they don’t demand for the data, the 
generation of data is poor as well as the quality. There is a chain reaction- 
no political will at the top; no investment in data, no demand and those who 
supply don’t see the value in doing so, it lacks quality. Nigeria is not used 
to using data to plan. When we budget it’s done on incremental basis, not 
informed on evidence provided by data; it cuts across all sectors... Data 
reveal inefficiencies, for example, how much is put in PHC.” [Emphasis 
mine] 
 
There is a strong sense that the lack of information culture is in fact the outcome of 
purposeful action. Not entirely in the sense that there is intentionality in the creation 
of a poor data culture but that there are strong interests represented in maintaining the 
status quo of unaccountable public servants. A state HMIS officer contends that 
policy makers depend on the weakness of the HMIS to remain unaccountable for 
HMIS resources:  
“I don’t know why policy makers are not interested in HMIS. They just let 
donors do it all. When money is allocated nobody knows but when it comes 
down to accounting for the money they say, “Where is the statistics?”” 
[Emphasis mine] 
 
HMIS at the hierarchical level is more tuned towards performance accountability in a 
way that distances its outcome from accountability to citizens and the improvement of 
healthcare delivery. The developmental undertones resonate more with modernisation 
ideals as opposed to human development. What we focus on is that HMIS conceived 
from a technical rationality constrains the creativity required to work in a 
challenging accountability context like Nigeria. With more prominence placed on 
accountability to citizens, HMIS implementation approaches will necessarily need to 
be more context-specific, improvised and flexible especially at sub national levels.  In 
an interview with the Head of the NHMIS in 2008, there was an overwhelming 
emphasis on technological development and instrumental accountability in his vision 
for HMIS development. In response to the question of what the ideal HMIS in the 
country will look like and be able to achieve, the following was stated:  
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“A situation where health facilities generate quality data, local governments 
capture data electronically and forward it to states and states are able to 
forward it to the federal NHMIS; NHMIS having a database, feeding data 
into the database and periodically publishing as a form of feedback to the 
states; raising up health alerts if there are potentially unpleasant situation 
for the public. Capturing data electronically even at facility level using 
PDAs because paper is costly. Infrastructure has to be in place otherwise 
these will not work and high calibre staff to handle data and making use of 
data to inform planning.” 
 
Over three years after this conversation, a follow up question was put to this senior 
official regarding the progress and challenges of HMIS implementation since 2008. 
The positive developments were enumerated in terms of efforts made towards 
standardisation and hierarchical accountability e.g. harmonised HMIS forms, more 
frequent feedback to states which is engendering competition and motivation for data 
reporting, the DHIS more recognised as the nationally adopted HMIS software. The 
challenges he listed were directly related to problems of an information culture: 
“Funding; data culture very slow to change; demand for data low; political 
commitment is still poor in state and LGA; and value attached to data is 
very low”  
 
We therefore note that efforts to develop a culture of information have direct 
consequences for improving the performance of the HMIS. As we have noted that 
hierarchical information is employed to render agents visible and accountable, what 
we find in our case is that, it is the fact of being constantly unseen that maintains 
undisciplined (unaccountable) public official. Consequently, the non-performance of 
the bureaucracy in implementing HMIS can be related to the mediation of personal 
and corrupt institutional interests that weaken accountability arrangements in the 
delivery of PHC services. There are efforts currently underway to streamline 
organisational structures for PHC delivery. This is tagged, “bringing PHC under one 
roof” (McKenzie, Enyimayew et al. 2010; National Council for Health 2011) in order 
to improve accountability in PHC delivery. This administrative restructuring reflects 
the direction of the National Health Bill so that a PHC board will become responsible 
for the management of services. Information plays an evaluation role in helping 
managers to fine-tune their strategic plans for health delivery. The plan also reiterates 
the needs for all citizens to have access to a basic minimum health package. These are 
plans in the pipeline that are attempting to refocus PHC delivery on people rather than 
just performance. As mentioned earlier, the implementation of these plans are directly 
related to the challenges of the presidential assent for the National Health Bill.     
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Dialogue Culture: people-centred 
Mediation 
We analyse localised interpretations through the experience of civil society and the 
role of political culture in understanding how citizens perceive their agency within 
accountability practices for the delivery of PHC services. We show through these 
analyses, that there is a weak dialogue culture in Jigawa state as efforts are directed 
more at performance and information culture.  
 
Civil society and political culture  
In analysing the health priorities of community members, the findings of this case 
study show that the rural poor of Tsakuwawa village incorporate health within 
broader human developmental needs: economic opportunities for self-sustenance, 
improved health services and infrastructure and better employment prospects through 
skills development and education. In Northern Nigeria, where there are some 
scepticism regarding formal Western education, it was surprising that community 
members not only valued education as a means for escaping the shackles of poverty 
but also noted its intrinsic value to health and how it affects their ability to participate 
in decisions that affect the delivery of health care services. The Village Head surmises 
that:         
“Poverty and ignorance are the main problems of health in this community. 
To increase the level of awareness in the community is critical for 
improving health. So that those who are not involved in the system can now 
be involved.”  
 
In a bid to address these priorities, Tsakuwawa Development Association (TsADA), 
was formed informally in 1986 to support community projects, improve access to 
education and provide social welfare.  The Village Head explained its achievements 
and objectives:  
“This association applied for a Junior Secondary school, which was granted 
and created in 1990. Subsequently they applied to the government to have it 
upgraded to include a Senior Secondary school and this was done as well. 
TsADA sponsors children whose parents cannot afford sending them to 
school. Some of the other primary focus of TsADA is community projects, 
environmental sanitation, supervising and assessing teachers’ performance. 
Our achievements over the years also include getting the government to 
bring electricity. TsADA contributes a small amount towards covering 
healthcare costs for community members who need it most.” 
 
An important point to note is that PHC accountability mechanisms must be broad 
enough to respond to defined priorities of poor citizens. For HMIS to be effective and 
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sustained, it must also be reconceptualised beyond the formal system (Mutemwa 2006) 
to incorporate citizens’ health developmental needs. There is a critical view that 
poverty and ignorance are calculations helping to sustain the status quo of 
unaccountable public officials. This theme was clearly articulated by the Village Head 
who expressed intentionality and calculated political power play: 
“Our people are suffering – poverty and ignorance help to sustain the status 
quo of unaccountable public officials. Education is a vital catalyst for voice.  
The situation is desperate. It is a battle for survival on a daily basis. People 
in power are happy with this state of affairs because it is easy to buy their 
votes when the time comes.”  
  
 In this respect, education is perceived as constitutive of and instrumental to 
development; instrumental in terms of providing jobs and better income and 
constitutive as far as it is a gateway to reducing the influence of corrupt political 
practices that diminish the accountability to citizens. With a political society that must 
be seen to be pro poor, the government offers free education to girls in Northern 
Nigeria. While this is a step in the right direction, the non-coordinated approach to this 
initiative means that its developmental impact is minimal. For instance, some 
community members are not aware of the free education provision, others argue that 
school fees are only a part of the expense as other costs such as school lunches, 
uniforms and books are beyond their means; more still contend that children are often 
needed on farms to secure enough income and food for the family. The point being 
made is that poor people in the community articulated their health needs in a holistic 
way. For example: 
“The main cause of health problem is ignorance and low income. To 
address this, parents have to make sure that their children get to school. 
Sometimes children abscond; parents don’t ask and don’t visit. The parents 
can’t monitor their children because they go to the farm.”  
 
“[The major causes of health problems are] ignorance and poverty; for 
instance, this man is sick but he has no money for treatment so he just 
sleeps at home. If people get business, money and education, this will bring 
improvement. If we are independent we can help our families and 
ourselves.”  
 
In a conversation with a research director studying health seeking behaviour, he 
expressed surprise that the preliminary findings of his study showed that women were 
not happy about having to wait for their husband’s permission before they could go to 
the health facility or delivery ward. This was corroborated directly with a respondent 
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who expanded on this with the underlying economic reasons that sustain this status 
quo: 
“The main problem with health is lack of money. If I have money then it 
does not matter what my husband says, I can go to the health facility. But 
when we both don’t have, then the situation gets worse. Ignorance is also a 
main problem. This is because instead of sending the boy to school the 
father will send him to the farm so they can eat.”  
 
An information culture primarily addresses the accountability needs of a formalised 
HMIS. These community views are strong indications that the development of an 
information culture cannot fully capture information regarding the developmental 
needs of poor communities. This is precisely because these require context sensitivity 
and less abstraction. There are no predefined formats or templates but a need to 
mediate and represent a community’s priorities at a given time and place. One of the 
women volunteers in Tsakuwawa touched on this point as an important means for 
improving accountability to the community: 
“The only way we as a community can make effective demands of the 
government is if all the community development committees in the 
community present their case as one voice.” 
 
 It is important to seriously consider one of the roles of HMIS as strengthening 
accountability to citizens and bringing about developmental transformation through 
the creation of a platform for communities’ “one voice”. This role is critical because 
civil societies in poor communities are often weak and fragmented. For instance, civil 
society in Tsakuwawa developed as a consequence of the state’s inability to make 
adequate provisions for the developmental needs of the people. In the community, 
their impact translates to either limited influence of the group and/or membership of 
the group motivated by self-interest and therefore accountability skewed towards 
objectives defined by patrons. For instance, because TsADA assumed a civil society 
role out of necessity and compulsion in response to inherent weaknesses in the state, 
its influence is limited (this is as suggested by Hyden et al. 2004). Therefore, while 
the association has been able to secure tangible benefits for the community either 
directly or through petitioning the state, this is chronically limited. For TsADA, this 
has been limited to only a handful of public goods in over two decades of its 
existence. As a result the association is not significantly visible within the community 
itself. A community member stated: 
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“I don’t know about … TSADA but I have been seeing development 
around the community. I have been living here for around 45 years. I just 
felt it was politicians doing the work.” 
 
In terms of the formally constituted Ward Development Committee, this has been able 
to achieve the employment of a female staff to the health facility by petitioning the 
Gunduma Board. In spite of this, some community volunteers perceive this committee 
to be dormant because “it did not have clear direction” due to irregular funding for 
meetings from the Gunduma. Ideologically, these committees were conceived as a 
participatory approach to health. This platform has been co-opted by global health 
agenda for selective PHC. This is clearly visible as a community doctor explains that 
“… the WHO and NPHCDA narrowed the remit of the WDC to focus on 
immunisation”. The content of the WDC meetings illustrate this: 
 
“The WDC met last month to discuss medicine stock, the upcoming routine 
immunisation exercise and the positive indication that patient attendance is 
improving. The WDC has a good relationship with the community because 
all the dignified people are involved for instance the Chief Imam, the Chief 
barber, the Chief drummer, the Chief butcher and the Village Head. The 
LGA gives the committee N2k to N3k [10-15 GBP] after every 
immunisation programme to share among all the members, which comes 
down to about N150- N200 per person. This isn’t even done consistently. 
There is no fund for conducting meetings.”  
 
WDC members are accountable to the LGA who are provided with donor funds to 
improve polio immunisation coverage. With the presence of a powerful patron, the 
committee’s accountability to the community is transposed into self-interest. A 
community engagement senior programme officer explained that:  
“Now that they [WDC] get paid for IPD, this is all the M&E officers and 
OiCs look for. It affects routine immunisation because all the DSNOs and 
OiCs are conscripted for this exercise. The LGA is paid about NGN 50k 
(GBP 200) for social mobilisation but they don’t do it. They only share the 
money because they don’t want polio to go.”  
 
What we emphasise here is that in the absence of an accountability structure that 
addresses health as a holistic developmental need, local institutional arrangements 
required to mediate the priorities of poor people are driven by the self-interest of 
intermediaries accountable to external patrons. We see this particularly in the case of 
the LCVs. The involvement of a donor setting up a health partners’ forum that 
constituted these volunteers influenced the perception of the benefits of membership. 
There are subtexts of misaligned expectations on the part of some LCVs as described 
in the accounts below:    
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“Some people describe the Nigerian man as someone who wants you to go 
straight to the point. Nigerians are not looking for volunteering. If you call 
someone, they are hoping that there would be something for them. Our 
people are suffering. For example, if you call me to pass on information, I 
can agree because I am standing before you. However this would be 
difficult in practice because people need to make ends meet… If you 
however give me N500 -N1000, you will find that I will work very hard 
because they can work for 1 week without making this kind of money.”  
 
“The LCVs are somewhat helpful. But not all are active. Most of them 
signed up as volunteers not knowing what it meant. Expectation was 
probably that LGA would pay them. But with nothing forthcoming they are 
gradually withdrawing.”  
 
It is important to note that the expectations of the LCVs are not purely monetary but 
generally developmental. One of the volunteers made an appeal suggesting that  
 
“If members of LCV can get support they will do more; I mean support in 
the way of skill acquisition. Most of the members are unemployed and this 
will help them to earn a living. The support should come from LGAs and 
donors.” 
  
We observe this in the case of LCVs who volunteered to provide an interface between 
the community and service provider. In a discussion with the consultant who 
facilitates some of the community engagement activities, we touched on the subject of 
the sustainability of the scheme. The following was in July 2010 and the conversation 
went thus: 
 
Researcher: “There is an issue of sustainability though, for as long as the 
donor implements this initiative it is unlikely to be sustainable after 
external support ends.”  
 
Local Engagement Consultant: “The donor also realise that it is 
important to let Gundumas provide facilitators and take ownership since 
they’ve already been taught how to budget for such vital activities.”   
   
In a follow up telephone conversation in March 2012 about the activities of the LCVs, 
he stated that the “LCVs need rapid awareness training because they are losing 
motivation”. However this was not only because they were not receiving any 
remuneration for their activities but also because the demand created was not 
adequately met by the supply of antigens in the health facility.  
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Within the framework of a weak civil society, a significant element of instrumentality 
is involved in the self-interest of intermediaries who seek to fulfil their developmental 
needs through the opportunity afforded by affiliation to a powerful patron. That is, 
intermediaries externally supported or constituted through a donor programme become 
accountable to delivering on the benefactor’s predetermined health priorities, thereby 
hoping to address their own immediate socio-economic needs. We also found that as 
donors funded most of the community engagement and participation activities, this 
seems to mutate the distortion of hierarchical distance into compliant dependence.  We 
interpret this as a sort of self-interest mediation that “goes through the motion” in 
return for (expected or promised) benefits from the patron. For instance, a donor-
sponsored review, which was based on wide participation from community 
representatives, discussed the performance of health facilities across a range of 
criteria. Scanning through the posters, a significant amount of entries related to the 
weakness of data use although some had data reporting as their strengths. 
Subsequently spending time in Tsakuwawa community revealed a sense that data was 
far removed from their priorities. Fig. 6.5 below shows the Village Head from 
Tsakuwawa village as a representative in this forum and a typical list of health facility 
performance assessment. Presence at a forum such as this is highly desirable both 
symbolically and financially. Therefore, we find that there are variations and nuances 
to what might conventionally be classified as dialogue and a forum where 
accountability reflects community needs but in fact serves an instrumental purpose. As 
a proxy for strengthening community participation, the donor measures how many 
community engagement reviews have been conducted and the scope of participants 
involved.  
 
It is fruitful to examine how civil society is also a product of historical political culture 
(Hyden et al 2004). We employ our concept of political culture, to analyse 
responsiveness to community. This is primarily through the perspectives of citizens 
and how they perceive their agency in engaging political society.   
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Fig.6.5: Dialogue forum: HMIS emphasis on information culture 
 
 
Political culture analyses the disposition of citizens to engagement in political society 
for their developmental priorities and is therefore a useful way of understanding the 
nature of accountability to communities. This construct suggests that 
representativeness of the political society is perceived as limited to the interest of a 
few rich and/educated elites. This is mainly because the democratic process is seen as 
corrupt through bribes, which effectively diminishes the voting power of citizens 
established to make local politicians accountable. An encounter during an interview 
illuminates this challenge by bringing to the fore the perception of communities’ 
agency within political society. Below is an extract detailing the dialogue with a group 
of community elders: 
[Community elders express that their voice can 
only be heard through external actors like the 
researcher] 
[Interpreter suggests that the community needs to 
approach the Ward Councillor to voice their 
health priorities].  
Researcher: If government doesn’t respond, you 
should not vote for them next time.  
Group of Elders: [spontaneous laughter]. 
Research notes: [The practice of democracy 
seems to be perceived as an institutional tragic 
comedy] 
Table 6.3: Democratic ideals as institutional tragic comedy 
 
As an aside, it is striking that during the fieldwork another memorable occasion where 
a question was met with spontaneous laughter was in a prior interview in March 2009 
with the DPRS in Katsina state. The researcher asked a question about the use of data 
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for planning and was met with an almost uncontrollable laughter. The response 
eventually was, “Only when the federal want data everyone runs around looking for 
data.” 
  
Our theoretical framework notes that historical contexts have implications for the 
evolution of particular political cultures such as the one above that experience 
accountability to citizens as a joke, albeit with real and often tragic consequences. Two 
local engagement consultants working in different LGAs independently referred to 
historical socio-political contexts to differentiate between a community like 
Tsakuwawa with relatively weak civil society and the other communities they work 
with. For instance, the local engagement facilitator for the LCVs states:  
 
“In Ringim where I come from, there is a stark difference [to Tsakuwawa]. 
70% of the men are educated that is why it is one of the 5 Emirates in 
Jigawa state. The community has produced eminent professors, doctors and 
engineers. The women are very industrious looking for opportunities to 
make financial contributions to the home.”  
 
Probing further about why he thought Ringim has a more active community voice he 
mentioned a history of political activism, establishment of primary schools in the 
1950s and a generally more educated population. He further mentions that proximity 
to urban Kano was also a factor that stood the communities in good stead in terms of 
both economic and social exchange. Another local engagement consultant gave an 
account to illustrate how Ringim is politically more enlightened:  
  
“A particular constituency did not respond to a political campaign. The 
campaign sent emissaries to meet the elders of the village who told them 
that the problem is that in the last tenure there were no public services 
rendered.” 
 
These accounts contrasts to Tsakuwawa where less than a fifth of the men are 
educated with the Village Head stating that, “we have been deceived about the 
necessity of Western education.” These are themes that are also explored in the ICTD 
literature. Walsham (2010) state that there is an overlap between broad development 
categories. For instance, better lives for the poor in terms of health requires the poor 
to avail themselves of economic opportunities (i.e. “enhanced economic activity”), 
social opportunities such as education (i.e. leading to “improved civil society”) and 
effective and efficient healthcare service delivery (i.e. “improved government 
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services”). These overlaps are seen in the accounts above. For instance, the 
community in Ringim seem to enjoy a better life as a result of having a more literate 
population, who are also close to urban Kano and therefore have better avenues for 
trade. Their education also provides them with a strong civil society. Hyden et al 
(2004) conclude that practically, the state and civil society are from within the same 
societal pool. The implication being that “the state reflects the quality of its societal 
base” (pg. 74).  This implies that if civil society is educated then the bureaucracy will 
have a pool of competent individuals to draw from. This will in turn have a positive 
outcome on the delivery of government services.  
Political culture goes some way in helping to explain the historical context in 
Tsakuwawa that marginalises their interests in political society, leaving their 
developmental priorities un(der)-represented. With accountability to citizens’ weak, 
this influences the role of intermediaries, volunteers and development committees (i.e. 
TsADA, LCVs and WDC) who rely on external patrons for achieving their individual 
developmental aspirations. Within this accountability framework, the formal HMIS is 
interpreted as self-interest where health workers report data for monetised incentives 
and government officials benefit from donor HMIS programmes through financial 
and non-financial remunerations (e.g. capacity development trainings).  
Responsiveness is a mediating term that is imbued with the uncertainty and 
unintended outcomes of interactions and interests. The instrumentality in 
performance-based accountability is therefore mediated through varying degrees and 
levels of self-interests: be it of well-placed senior bureaucrats and political actors or 
locally situated agents who seek to do well for themselves through donor 
programmes. Accountability outcomes are constructed through the various 
combinations of institutional accountability arrangements, efforts to strengthen 
community voice and the day-to-day mediations of individuals’ interests to address 
their developmental priorities. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
Summary of thesis chapters so far 
Chapter One introduces the background and motivation for the study, what 
approaches had been used in prior work, the general problem we intend to address, 
the ways in which the approach we chose is similar and also distinct from the body of 
work in this field and how we expected to contribute to current knowledge and 
practice.  
The rationale for choosing to study HMIS was set against the background of dire 
health status, failing PHC delivery and the weak impact of HMIS in addressing these 
problems in LDCs. We noted that there have been different approaches to 
conceptualising and understanding these problems. Some studies frame the problems 
in terms of a failure to optimise opportunities afforded by modern technological 
advances, especially the Internet (Edejer 2000). Others highlight economic argument 
for implementing HMIS (Stansfield 2005). Both approaches are usually based on 
assumptions that do not consider the social and institutional influences that are 
implicated in the implementation of HMIS. Another stream of studies conceive of the 
problem domain in terms of various contextual contingencies that provide a better 
appreciation of the complexity of HMIS in LDCs.  It addresses HMIS as a socio-
technical system and conceptualise its appropriateness within the target context.  
Particularly, this study identifies with the context-specific approach and intends to 
build on its findings. The weakness that we identify generally is that there is limited 
understanding of the role of HMIS in contributing to the improvement in the lives of 
the poor. We propose that we could gain a better grasp of this problem by studying 
HMIS through an accountability perspective. We propose that problematising 
accountability will lead to better understanding of the potential and challenges of 
HMIS implementation in supporting poor people to attain better lives as defined by 
them.    
Chapter two critically reviews pertinent literature in the HMIS field. The aim is to 
understand what was already known and the nature of this knowledge so that we 
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could place our study within its broader scholastic context. In particular, we are 
interested in the areas that are not satisfactorily addressed in this field. We review 
four main components of our problem domain. First, we consider how different 
notions regarding health care delivery are underpinned by different development 
ideologies. One view conceives of health from a social welfare perspective and from 
this view primary health care delivery resonates with the principles of participatory 
development. A biomedical view of health on the other hand advocates a selective 
primary health care approach through technical and economically viable interventions 
that prioritise tackling major diseases. We note that this reflects the ethos of 
development as modernisation and economic growth.  
The next body of literature we review is how the link between information, decision-
making and health policy has been understood. We present an instrumental view that 
proposes a perspective of information as a tool that serves to support managers and 
policy makers in rational decision processes that improve PHC delivery. A critique of 
this view is presented through studies that have shown that empirical evidence 
suggests a tenuous link between information and decision-making. Instead, 
perspectives that argue for information and HMIS being socially embedded provide 
analytical means to understand the divergence between the expectations of a rational 
design and actual practice.  
Next, we examine socially embedded studies of HMIS implementation in LDCs. 
These studies discuss the complexity of HMIS supporting local use within a 
decentralised organisational structure and a context where donors wield significant 
influence. The main theme in these studies therefore addresses the sustainability of 
HMIS when donors withdraw financial and technical support. Sustainability was 
framed in terms of target LDCs developing an information culture, the HMIS being 
adaptable and scalable, and the requirement for the HMIS to be institutionalised, 
integrated and strengthened through local participation. The last body of literature 
turns to the greater emphasis placed on accountability as a result of increased donor 
investments in HMIS activities. We note that accountability from this perspective has 
been predominantly related to performance management and the express need for aid 
recipients to account for finances provided for PHC services. Few studies - with 
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exceptions such as Madon and Krishna  (2010) - address how HMIS might improve 
accountability to citizens.  
From the literature reviewed, we propose that there are two interrelated areas that 
have not been given sufficient attention: the first is providing a developmental 
dimension to HMIS studies and the second elucidating on HMIS and accountability 
arrangements from a developmental perspective. The gaps identified help to formulate 
our primary research question: “To what extent can HMIS improve accountability 
arrangements that underpin the delivery of PHC in LDCs?”  
Chapter Three develops a conceptual framework for addressing this question. We 
note that it is important to construct an accountability framework that would be robust 
enough to capture the developmental, instrumental and socialising dimensions of PHC 
delivery. To this end we present governance ideas that are implied in instrumental and 
socialising forms of accountability. We commit to the notion that a robust analytical 
framework requires a synthesis of both forms of accountability. The concepts 
discussed are synthesised into a framework that proposes a more nuanced 
understanding of the duality of accountability. This duality revolves around the three 
concepts of representation, visibility and responsiveness, which we suggest have dual 
meanings: representation as the objective of accountability is presented as both mirror 
and mediation; visibility as the mechanism of accountability employs discipline and 
direction; and responsiveness evaluates developmental outcomes of accountability as 
tuned towards performance management and community priorities.  
In Chapter Four, we present our methodological approach starting with the 
philosophical leanings underlying this study as realist constructionism. The main 
implications of this choice are that this is an interpretive research which is reflexive 
on the researcher’s possible bias, the interpretation and analysis of data is based on 
sense-making and the purpose of the research methods is to improve understanding of 
the role of HMIS in strengthening accountability arrangements. The research design 
adopted is an embedded single-case study. Research methods for data collection are 
interviews, observations, and document analysis. We present the fieldwork as based 
in Northern Nigeria with the unit of analysis being multi-level although loosely 
corresponding to the HISP project to strengthen HMIS in Northern Nigeria. Data 
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analysis is conducted through iterative cycles informed by the theoretical framework 
and empirical data.  
The Case Study chapter (Chapter Five) is structured according to the multilevel unit 
of analysis proposed in Chapter Four.  We structure the case from a hierarchical view 
at the federal level, to three states in the Northern region (Katsina, Yobe and 
Zamfara), to our primary location in Jigawa State and Tsakuwawa village specifically. 
Chapter Six analyses the case study data using our theoretical constructs of 
representation, visibility and responsiveness developed in Chapter Three. These 
theoretical constructs address three interrelated sub-questions of the primary research 
question. Through representation we try to unpack how HMIS are implicated in the 
accountability arrangements underpinning PHC delivery in LDCs; the question 
tackled through visibility focuses on how we can better understand the challenges of 
HMIS implementation in LDCs through the complexities of accountability 
mechanisms; and for responsiveness, we ask “what kind of developmental 
transformation is implied in the implementation of HMIS from an accountability 
perspective?”  
From our representation analysis, we found that at the hierarchical level, 
accountability objectives for PHC delivery are objectified in the formal HMIS 
through the definition of a national MDS. Accountability objectives are embedded in 
the requirement for the HMIS to mirror PHC delivery. With the various actors 
involved in the process of defining an MDS, we also highlight the mediation of 
interests represented in the outcome of the MDS as well as the resulting fragmentation 
of accountability arrangements. Reflecting that these accountability objectives are 
determined at a distant hierarchical level, we then consider how it is localised and 
interpreted within a decentralised structure. Through an analysis of the local 
interpretation of accountability objectives, we find that mirroring is modulated 
through local interests and made sense of in view of the characteristics and 
motivations of health workers and other local agents. In addition to the weak 
accountability arrangements of hierarchical information demands, we find that local 
agents are able to exercise their discretion and mediate their interests through donor 
programmes thereby constructing parallel accountability objectives. In this dynamic 
between donors, service providers and hierarchical demands, accountability to 
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citizens is usually on the periphery. Nevertheless, we note that one of the subtle ways 
poor communities engage to demand better services and accountability is through 
non-participation. Non-participation however feeds back as distortion of HMIS mirror 
representation. Deriving from the ways in which we find that HMIS are implicated in 
PHC accountability arrangement, the mechanisms to achieve objectives of 
representation are analysed through our visibility construct.  
The main findings are that in Nigeria the use of discipline is limited in supporting 
hierarchical information demands because of an inadequate legislative framework. 
We are able to tease out how rituals of accountability reflect diverse social 
constructions of accountability practices that range from the visibility tools at the 
disposal of the federal agents, incentives provided through donors’ sanctions and 
rewards and accountability mechanisms that are evoked on the basis of 
communitarian affiliations of political society. The complexity of HMIS supporting 
accountability mechanisms is reflected in the challenges of balancing overarching 
hierarchical accountability arrangements and the need to support the communitarian 
form of situated local accountability structures.  
Taking this forward, we introduce our last theoretical construct of responsive 
performance to evaluate the developmental implications of hierarchical performance 
management through an information culture and community responsiveness through 
dialogue. The building of an information culture in the context of this study, found 
visions articulated in policy documents about the instrumental value of information 
and health, the necessity of fully exploiting advances in ICTs and the link to 
economic productivity and growth. We find this reflecting the sedimentation of a 
modernisation ethos of development. Interestingly (but probably unsurprising) is that 
there is a skew towards an information culture. More significantly, this bias seems 
pervasive even in dialogue forums where one would expect local expressions of 
health priorities that could be potentially insightful for reconceptualising HMIS. 
Dialogue in this research is therefore predominantly understood from community 
level conversations where individuals are able to speak freely (to some extent) about 
their view regarding health and human developmental priorities.  In the next section, 
we discuss the implications of these finding to HMIS studies, especially in a 
development context (ICTD) and IS research generally.   
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Research Contributions 
 
Walsham (2006) provides useful concepts which can be used to contextualise the 
framing of a contribution e.g. proposed audiences, target literature, proposition claims 
and intended use. Walsham (1995 in Barrett and Walsham 2004) further argues that 
“qualitative generalizations” can be used as content of contr ibutions. Generalisation in 
qualitative research is a contentious notion (Lee and Baskerville 2003) but Walsham 
(1995) identifies four types of generalisations: “development of concepts, 
generalisation of theory, drawing specific implications in particular domains of 
action, and contribution of rich insights” (p. 299). For our theoretical contribution to 
HMIS, we draw on accountability concepts we developed (representation, visibility 
and responsiveness) within the context of LDCs consider. HMIS in LDCs is our 
primary target literature with ICTD as a secondary target literature. We also 
contribute to general IS literature given HMIS is a form of IS.  
 
Theoretical Contributions to HMIS research in LDCs 
In discussing the theoretical contributions, we present the implication of the 
accountability constructs developed in this thesis and make three claims regarding 
HMIS and its role in strengthening accountability mechanisms in LDCs. First, we 
maintain that it is indeed critical to understand the objectives of HMIS-based 
accountability as both mirror and mediating representation. Second, we consider the 
ways in which we can better understand the complexity of HMIS supporting visibility 
and last, we evaluate the impact of representation and visibility on responsiveness.   
Criticality of representation 
Representation as the objective of accountability requires a structural framework as 
well as the flexibility of context sensitivity. We have noted this in various literature 
such as Hyden et al’s (2004) governance concept of structural contingency, Robert’s 
(1991) notion of the required interdependencies between hierarchical and socialising 
forms of accountability and Madon and Krishna’s (2010) conceptualisation of 
democratic and “de facto” accountability. From our analysis we find that HMIS are 
implicated not just in structurally contingent accountability arrangements but also in 
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the contingent structure of accountability arrangements. In the first instance, this is 
about localised navigation of accountability structure within an overarching 
hierarchical demand. The literature highlights how information is routinely 
manipulated for the purpose of self-interest (Feldman and March 1981; Feldman 
1988; Dean and Sharfman 1993; Mutemwa 2006). This is evident in our analysis with 
DSNOs, LIOs and SIO. Also, the symbolic rather than objective function of 
information for decision-making (Mutemwa 2006) is noted in planning and budgeting 
processes. Data is submitted, charts and health information are displayed in facilities 
but beneath the surface we find that these are rituals that do not reflect the intrinsic 
value of information but token representations that fulfil purposes other than better 
accountability to citizens. What we however find from a hierarchical view is that in 
addition to agents being subject to structural constraints, the structures themselves are 
contingent i.e. accountability objectives are dynamic. This is at least in two ways. 
First, this is as a result of high-level negotiations of interest among the HDPU. These 
are formalised through policy as we have in Nigeria that the HMIS MDS should be 
reviewed every two years. Secondly, within a decentralised organisational structure 
parallel accountability objectives are constructed as a result of particular donor 
programmes. It is through this perceived contingent structure that we better appreciate 
the developmental implications of HMIS supporting PHC accountability 
arrangements. What we mean is that an overarching accountability arrangement either 
reflects a commitment to health as human development through the definition of a 
national MDS that reflects local health priorities or externally driven indicators that 
overburden the MDS with extensive disease focused performance targets of vertical 
programmes. The level of health abstraction at the national level by necessity must 
make the MDS minimal and concentrate more on locally defined indicators that 
reflect particular health needs in individual states. 
Although Shaw (2005) notes that an MDS must be defined through a top-down 
approach, from our accountability perspective we suggest that in contexts where there 
is widespread institutional corruption, self-interest of senior bureaucrats and 
politicians will usually compromise this process. The MDS as a representation tool is 
of value in supporting accountability to the degree that it produces quality data. Were 
the MDS to truly reflect the local health priorities of the nation, its representation of 
poor health status then unveils a legacy of neglect and lack of accountability to 
citizens’ basic health needs. It is therefore understandable that the fragmentation of 
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(un) accountable practices is required to maintain the status quo. As long as donors 
focus on selective mirror representations that are invariably a form of distortion, 
accountability becomes selective within the limited frame of donors’ project interests 
while unaccountable practices may flourish in the rest of the country. What we 
therefore revert to is the continued marginalisation of the majority of poor individuals 
in matters relating to their health care services. 
One of the ways we may think of improving HMIS mirror representation from a 
developmental perspective, is through a significant institutional overhaul in light of 
good governance prescriptions. We might indeed opt for a more pragmatic approach 
of “good enough governance” (Grindle 2004; Grindle 2007). Nevertheless, the main 
point is that institutional change is often a complex and long-term process. On the 
other hand we may consider strengthening HMIS mediation representation. This is 
along the lines of Brinkerhoff’s (2007) suggestion that there are two routes to 
accountability: the short route where citizens hold service providers to account 
through monitoring of services (as we have in community monitoring); and the long 
route where citizens participate in the democratic space where politicians are held 
accountable for responding to health priorities by providing adequate resources and a 
bureaucracy (i.e. MOH) capable of formulating and implementing appropriate 
policies. We note from a socialising perspective of accountability that there is often 
an understanding that citizens appreciate the constraints of service providers who 
have not been supplied with the required resources to carry out their duties 
effectively. We see this particularly where community engagement activities lead to 
increase demand for formal health services but met with inadequate supply of crucial 
drugs thereby frustrating the whole process. Citizens understand that the stock outs 
are not the fault of the health workers but a state quantification failure.  This therefore 
leaves the long route where citizens avail themselves of the democratic process to 
mediate their health needs. With weak democratic institutions we find that this long 
route also demands a complex social process with considerable time implications. 
This was a primary conceptual and empirical challenge we faced very early on in the 
research field when we tried to understand the contribution HMIS could make to PHC 
delivery from a developmental perspective. Appreciating that HMIS are implicated in 
these forms of accountability arrangements was a significant factor in pursuing its 
reconceptualisation and how we understand HMIS. Hence an understanding proposed 
here of HMIS mirror and mediating representation (in a later section, we will further 
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explore how HMIS representation may impact on responsiveness). However, at this 
point we note that the conceptualisation of HMIS as mirror and mediating 
representation implies that in LDCs, a robust analysis of HMIS cannot be divorced 
from the socio-political context from which it evolves.  
 
Supporting visibility  
Our understanding of HMIS supporting visibility goes beyond the requirements of 
transparency (AbouZahr and Boerma 2005; Stansfield 2005) to include Corbridge et 
al.’s (2005) and Cornwall et al.’s (2011) idea about how citizens see the state (or not) 
because the state has chosen to see them (or not). In this governance dynamic, we 
note that HMIS for discipline and direction are weak in LDCs because of a state that 
does not see its citizens and the widespread experience of citizenship as deficit 
(Cornwall et al. 2011). The complexity of visibility for discipline requires 
accountability mechanisms defined through appropriate regulatory frameworks. 
Without this framework, formal hierarchical accountability through the HMIS is 
significantly weakened. We therefore gain an appreciation for the extensive lobbying 
to put into place a National Health Bill. We can also understand why there will be 
fierce opposition and resistance to this Bill as the current status quo protects the 
interests of public officials who have hitherto remained unaccountable. What is 
equally interesting to note is that the incorporation of informal, contextual 
information into the formal HMIS (Madon and Krishna 2010) depends to some 
degree on how actively engaged communities are in dialogue. With a strong dialogue 
culture, it is possible to easily formalise the information generated and provide 
visibility into how the citizens see the state. An example will be the cataloguing of 
communities’ developmental priorities and scoring the local state on its ability to 
deliver. Just as health indicators and graphs are displayed in health facilities, these 
could be made clearly visible by displaying them in public places like the health 
facilities. A major challenge to this notion of making PHC services visible according 
to the views of poor communities is the “militarisation” and subjugation of most poor 
communities. There is apathy towards political society after years of military rule and 
a democratic regime that is unrepresentative because of flawed electoral processes. 
This is in light of Corbirdge et al (2005) arguing that an authoritarian imposition over 
a subjugated civil society is not only limited to military rule but also extend to 
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democratic regimes that merely pay lip service to the electoral process. Given a 
subdued civil society, the disconnection between information as a mechanism for 
visibility and accountability is even more pronounced. We can further examine the 
idea of HMIS supporting visibility through information dialogue. This is especially as 
health information is central to health delivery at community levels. We present 
community outreach as an example of the interactions that aim to improve visibility in 
terms of understanding and mutual accountability.       
  
Informational interaction with the community through outreach services can be better 
understood from the ICTD literature on capability. Specifically, the proposition that 
the agency of information users is critical in transforming information from a means 
to an end which will lead to improvements in the quality of their lives and enable 
them to accomplish their personal goals (Zheng 2006: 76). The ability of people to act 
profitably on information is determined by their “conversion factors – personal, social 
and environmental characteristics” (Zheng 2009: 70). Zheng writes that, “conversion 
factors are conditions that enable people to do what they want with their lives, with or 
without the facility of ICT” (pg. 79). However Zheng notes that using capability 
theories in ICTD allow for spaces to contest value systems. One of the critical points 
in this interaction is that it relies on a “local indigenous approach” (Walsham 2010), 
operating within the bounds of established cultural etiquette.  
 
Impact on responsiveness 
Donor efforts to strengthen the formalised HMIS are often concentrated at the 
national and state levels and occasionally at local levels. This is understandable 
because of the increasing resource implications and logistical complexities the lower 
one goes. Attention is focussed on developing skill sets and data appreciation i.e. 
building an information culture. No doubt this is crucial; however, these efforts 
mainly address the concerns of mirror representation and are often divorced from the 
necessity of responsiveness to citizens’ interest. In so doing, there is a seeming 
reflection of sectorial development that occurred in ICT industries such as global 
software outsourcing (Heeks and Nicholson 2002; Carmel 2003; Heavin, Fitzgerald et 
al. 2003) but failed to lead to widespread development. In the case of HMIS 
strengthening activities, groups of individuals with extensive exposure to donor 
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capacity development programmes have been afforded opportunities to make better 
lives for themselves either through remunerations provided directly or better paid 
employment for a donor. An illustration from the fieldwork shows that this is 
happening to some degree and may be quite extensive especially in regions where 
there is an acute shortage of human resource capacity required by donors (as in the 
case of Northern Nigeria). As a case in point, between February and March 2008 the 
researcher was involved in conducting an HMIS situation analysis in three Northern 
states in Nigeria. In two of the states visited there were two HMIS officers in the 
SMOH who stood out in comparison to the rest of the individuals met. In fact one was 
credited with long-standing service in the public sector. However, before the end of 
the assignment, separate donor programmes had recruited both of these individuals. 
This seems to be quite commonplace. While we are not able to make claims that there 
is a sizeable industry of this sort, the principle once again is that the desperately poor 
are further marginalised when developmental programmes are designed to target the 
not so poor (Yunus 2003).  
 
We however do not offer prescriptions or specific strategies to address the problem of 
HMIS and developmental transformation through accountability arrangements. While 
referring to the challenges of development two decades ago, we find that the primary 
observations of put forward by Thomas (2000) are still relevant: 
 
“… throughout the 1990s there has been a growing consensus on the need 
to look more closely at the potential for local groups and individuals to be 
involved as their own development agents, if only because of the manifest 
failure of the main theoretical perspectives on development to delivery 
major improvements in living conditions to the world’s poorest individuals 
and communities” (Pg. 48) 
 
This is in the spirit of Easterly’s (2006) proposition that the idea of a solution to the 
problem of poverty is by necessity based on an impoverished understanding of the 
complex historical, social and cultural realities that are implicated in achieving any 
significant or sustainable change. We however would like to extend some of 
Easterly’s suggestions to how we can pursue the developmental potential of HMIS as 
mediation representation. We particularly agree that this field is in dire need of 
“searchers” rather than “planners”. From a development perspective, searchers 
represent homegrown, contextual, improvised and responsive approaches while on the 
other hand, planners epitomise the current status quo of externally driven 
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interventions, universal aid-dominated strategies and primarily a disjuncture between 
programme initiatives and the needs of the poor. It is understandable that the basis of 
Easterly’s distinction between searchers and planners have been criticised as gross 
oversimplification even though they are generally useful (Sen 2006). These provide 
us with some useful pointers for thinking about approaches that can be adopted in 
strengthening HMIS as representation. The first is the idea that grand schemes - 
overtly optimistic and overly ambitious - originating from outside the context of need 
is often unresponsiveness to actual problems of the poor. This is because they do not 
have adequate capacity to address the intricacies of social institutions and appropriate 
incentive schemes. This brings with it, an imperative for “ground-level” investigation 
of the problems with a view to constantly searching for creative, useful and 
productive solutions (Sen 2006). According to Easterly, the defining mechanisms that 
foster searchers are feedback from and accountability to the poor or the absence of 
these in the case of planners. This could therefore be conceived as analogous to 
Mehrotra’s (2006) idea of political decentralisation where the poor have a voice in 
shaping intervention programmes according to their needs.  
 
Theoretical contribution to information systems 
Information systems as a field of study is noted to rely on an eclectic mix of reference 
disciplines and thereby lacks a distinctive theory or method (Avgerou 2000). As a 
case in point, we have drawn theories from accountability and governance literature 
analyse the empirical content of this study. For example, through these reference 
disciplines, we have shown that the developmental role of HMIS in improving 
accountability structures implies a complex informational network, which goes 
beyond technological concerns but involves social norms and cultural values. 
Through an exposition of how these norms and values are implicated in HMIS 
implementation, we contribute to IS study debates that advocate the need for context-
sensitive analysis (e.g. Avgerou, and Cornford 1998; Avgerou and Madon 2002 argue 
for the importance of framing the context of IS studies). There is a strong empirical 
and analytical argument that context in particularly important when studying ICT 
innovations such as HMIS in LDCs.  Another dimension of this debate is interested in 
how micro-macro interactions produce organisational and/or institutional change and 
stability over time (Orlikowski 1996; 2000; Hasselbladh and Kallinikos 2000; 
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Orlikowski and Barley 2001). Similar to arguments made by Hasselbladh and 
Kallinikos (2000) we also conclude that it is important to consider that while at the 
micro-level we speak of emergent and situated practices within particular institutional 
structures, we must at the same time turn our attention to the processes that render 
these structure contingent. Micro-macro interactions are therefore not only mutually 
influencing but also relatively fluid.     
 
 
Policy/practical contribution 
Our accountability construct provides tools to conduct a robust analysis of HMIS 
implementation challenges in terms of data quality, reliability and use. By framing 
instrumental and socialising accountability as co-constitutive we are able to unpack 
how contextual understandings can contribute to formalised HMIS and vice versa. 
These also have policy implications for the role of multiple principals in HMIS PHC 
delivery, especially highlighting the involvement of international partners and the 
wider donor community. These policy implications provide guidance on 
strengthening institutional structures and intermediaries that advocate local 
developmental priorities with a view to balancing the bias of global health 
expediencies on formal hierarchical systems. 
 
We propose that the relationship between instrumental and socialising forms of 
accountability can be conceived through the dual expediencies of efficiency and 
relevance. Mirror representation as the objective of instrumental accountability is 
defined in terms of an efficiency domain and socialising accountability along a 
relevance continuum (See fig 7.1 below). Efficient HMIS is able to provide data, 
which mirrors a vertical component of PHC delivery accurately. Inefficient HMIS on 
the other hand is riddled with inaccuracies and is generally unreliable. Relevant HMIS 
is contextual data determined through local input regarding PHC priorities while 
irrelevant HMIS lacks context-sensitivity and usefulness either intrinsically or 
perceptually. We develop representation pathways for navigating these accountability 
domains. The weakest HMIS quadrant is conceived as distorted representation, which 
is characterised by both unreliable and irrelevant (or unused) data. This is usually the 
state where most national HMIS systems are located. It is indicative of the neglect of 
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rural community health, disconnect between the state and its poor citizens and the 
superficial commitment to PHC delivery. Active interventions to strengthen HMIS 
implementation implicitly follow a path either of improving efficiency or relevance. 
In the case of the former, the goal of HMIS representation is as a mirror. HMIS is 
introduced through a disciplinary regime supporting hierarchical accountability with 
priority given to the requirements of vertical programmes. These form the basis of 
performance management of health care providers e.g. in terms of reporting rates. 
This is usually the preference of most donor projects and vertical health programmes. 
It often depends on a reductive approach where specific data elements are chosen and 
usually only in limited geographical areas. With this bounded remit, visibility is high 
and the meting out of sanctions and rewards, depending on performance, are efficient. 
Therefore, while data quality may improve and indicators reported become more 
representative of this highly selective “reality”, the developmental impact is 
invariably narrow and is usually of minimal relevance locally. In the absence of donor 
visibility, there is the likelihood that the output of the HMIS will be typically 
ritualistic with data generated having minimal relevance for the users and the quality 
mostly unreliable. This is because if the data elements and indicators are determined 
at a distance, it is unlikely that anyone uses the data locally in which case there is no 
incentive to make sure quality data is reported only that data is reported. 
 
Fig. 7.1: Conceptualising PHC HMIS, Instrumental and Socialising Accountability  
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Where the relevance path is chosen, HMIS representation is conceived as mediation. 
In this case, there is an active effort to build local capacity to respond to their defined 
health priorities. Minimum datasets and disease surveillance data are however 
important for epidemiological and health planning purposes. While locally situated 
HMIS caters for the specificities of communities it must be sufficiently integrated as 
required for epidemiological surveillance and response (Smith et al. 2008). There is 
also the risk of fragmentation based on geopolitical alliances as discussed under 
communitarian citizenship. Some communities may have well-resourced PHC 
delivery services due to tribal alliances while other are marginalised.  
 
The ideal HMIS quadrant satisfies dual representation through mirroring and 
mediation. In this scenario, communities are given an opportunity to engage with 
health providers in articulating health priority needs while fulfilling the demands of 
the MDS. This interaction also implies that communities through active civil societies 
can hold public officials accountable for the adequate resourcing on their health 
facilities. HMIS under these circumstances should be broad with formal data 
requirements appropriately reported and routine dialogue (e.g. community 
monitoring) between relevant stakeholders making sure that their veracity is 
confirmed. The dialogue also produces informal channels of information where the 
HMIS becomes a repository of community information needs with relevant channels 
available to address these needs. While the primary health care system accentuates 
community engagement, it also requires an overarching coordination framework at 
different levels e.g. regional or national. Therefore while a contextually relevant 
HMIS might be effective in responding to health needs of a particular community, the 
geographical spread of diseases are not limited by geopolitical boundaries therefore 
efficient interventions designs have to take into account the need for regional or 
national strategies. Consequently, the interdependent relationship between HMIS 
efficiency and relevance is an important one for instrumental and socialising 
accountability (see Table 7.1 below for illustration from the field).  
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1) Efficient but not effective (Ritual)  2) Effective and Efficient 
(Broadly Developmental) 
- Most donor HMIS-strengthening activities; 
preoccupation with data reporting e.g. IDSR, 
HMIS, parallel data forms 
- Bottom-up contextual 
information augments top-down 
essential dataset. 
 
-Micro-level capacity building  
4) Inefficient and ineffective (Neglect and 
Disconnect) 
3) Effective but not efficient 
(Narrowly Developmental)  
Most government run systems show local PHC 
system neglect; this is where most donor 
activity baseline start from  
Community –driven health 
development ward systems 
Table: 7.1: Conceptualising PHC HMIS, Instrumental and Socialising Accountability  
Limitations and further research 
Studying the role of HMIS in improving PHC delivery in LDCs is an ambitious 
agenda albeit relevant and important. Nevertheless, within the constraint of a study 
such as this, it is necessary to contain this research domain pragmatically. In this 
sense, one of the limitations of this study is the methodological design of an 
embedded single case study. Another possible limitation is the use of multiple 
theoretical constructs for analysing the case study.      
The primary limitation of this research project is that its central focus was on one state 
(Jigawa) and one community (Tsakuwawa) in Nigeria, limiting our ability to provide 
statistical generalisations of our finding although as noted we are able to provide 
analytical generalisation.  This is especially so in this case where we have developed 
accountability concepts and drawn implications (Walsham 1995) for HMIS 
implementation in Northern Nigeria and LDCs generally. Our methodology section in 
Chapter Four also indicated that the aim of this study is to provide a way of making 
sense of the developmental challenges of implementing HMIS. Therefore, the aim we 
set out to achieve was more of a rich understanding than it was for generalisable 
conclusions. According to this logic, the researcher decided to immerse himself in the 
field in order to gain deep insight into HMIS implementation efforts, perceptions of 
accountability and expressions of developmental priorities. Another methodological 
concern is the use of multilevel unit of analysis. However, this is legitimised in 
similar HMIS studies (Such as, Kimaro 2006) as well as studies considering the 
impact of central level policies on PHC outcomes (Atkinson, Cohn et al. 2005). 
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In terms of the multiple theoretical constructs used, this has been justified as far as 
they are not contradictory (Klecun-Dabrowska 2002). In addition, the source 
disciplines where these constructs have been developed contend that it is imperative 
for analytical constructs in this domain to embrace analytical frameworks that provide 
the researcher with an opportunity to explore the contradictions, nuances and 
complexity of the empirical field in a creative way (Kooiman 2003). Lastly, we noted 
from our critical realist stance that it is precisely the opposite that produces 
unimaginative and misleading analysis (Sayer 2000).       
 
It would be fruitful to conduct further research at community level (such as multiple 
case studies in Northern and Southern Nigeria) especially in light of the socialising 
forms of accountability constructs presented here.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Initial research Agenda 
 
Primary Health Care 
Service Delivery 
HMIS 
Responsive to 
Reflected in 
Captured in 
Informs and improves 
Conceptual Framework 
Decision Space/Decentralisation 
 
Highlighting the capacity of local 
agents i.e. PHC workers and other 
stakeholders, to make decisions which 
will influence PHC service delivery.  
 
Investigating the perception and actual 
use of ICTs in the provision of PHC 
services.  
Developmental Views  
 
Understanding barriers to seeking 
formal health services 
 
Analysing pathway to using 
particular health facilities 
including alternatives to formal 
health facilities 
 
 
  
Community Engagement 
How do communities 
participate in the delivery of 
their health care? 
Fieldwork Design 
Research Map 
RQ: Understanding this space 
Decentralisation/HMIS 
To interview 
1) PHC stakeholders from National PHC 
Development Agency 
3) CHEW  
4) Village Health Workers 
5) HISP and NHMIS 
6) Community Health Committees  
7) Health information officers 
Community Health  
 
To interview 
1) Community Health Committees 
(community and ward level) 
 
2) Community Health doctors 
 
3) Community members 
 
Community Health 
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Appendix 2: Cross referencing respondents in Analysis chapter 
Designation Location of Interview Date of Interview 
FMOH Official Abuja/London 24.11.08/01.03. 12 
NPHCDA Official Abuja 24.10.08 
 
WHO Official Abuja 02.12.08 
Katsina State HMIS 
Officer  
Katsina State 19.02.09/24.02.09 
LGA M&E Officer Jigawa State July 2009 
Community Health Doctor Abuja - Gwagalada 28.10.08 
Katsina State DPRS Katsina State 27.02.09 
Zamfara STM Zamfara State 2.03.09 
Yobe HIS Officer Yobe State 9.03.09 
M&E Officer Fika Yobe 01.03.09 
OIC – Gashaka Yobe 01.03.09 
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Appendix 3: List of Respondents by level and interview period/date  
S/N Date/Period Source/Respondent Type of Data 
collection 
1 24/10/08 NPHCDA: Planning Research and 
Statistics  
Interview 
2 02/12/08 WHO: Health Promotions Officer Interview 
3 28/10/2008 ABUTH: Resident Dr. Community 
Medicine 
Interview 
4 24/11/08 FMOH: Head NHMIS Branch Interview 
5  Health Consultant World Bank Project Interview 
6  FMOH: Epidemiology Interview 
7  NNPC: Medical Doctor Conversation 
8    
9 2009   
10 18/02/2009 PRRINN-MNCH: Communications 
Strategy Technical Adviser 
Conversation 
11 19/02/2009 PRRINN-MNCH: Katsina STM Conversation 
12 19/02/2009 PRRINN-MNCH: SPO Conversation 
13 19/02/2009 Katsina SMOH: State HMIS Office Conversation & 
Interview 
14 24/02/2009 Six officers from Katsina SMOH and 
SPHCDA 
 
Assistant Director Admin and Supply SMOH Katsina 
Training, 
interview and 
conversation 
15 24/02/2009 Katsina SMOH: State HMIS Officer Conversation & 
Interview 
16 24/02/2009 Katsina LGA M&E Officer Interview 
17 24/02/2009 PRRINN-MNCH: LEC Interview 
18 27/02/2009 Katsina SPHCDA: State M&E Officer Interview 
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S/N Date/Period Source/Respondent Type of Data 
collection 
19 27/02/2009 Katsina SMOH: DPRS Interview 
20 2/03/2009 PRRINN-MNCH: Zamfara STM Conversation 
21 2/03/2009 HISP-Nigeria: HMIS Consultant Conversation 
22 2/03/2009 Zamfara SMOH: State HMIS Officer Conversation 
23 2/03/2009 Zamfara SMOH: DPRS Interview 
24 2/03/2009 Zamfara SMOH: PS Interview 
25 09/03/2009 Yobe SMOH: State Logistician Conversation 
26 09/03/2009 Yobe SMOH: State HMIS Officer Conversation 
27 11/03/2009 Yobe Fika LGA: M&E Officer Conversation 
28 11/03/2009 Yobe Gashaka PHC: OIC  Conversation & 
Interview 
29 12/03/2009 Yobe PRRINN-MNCH: SPO Demand 
Side 
Conversation 
30 12/03/2009 Yobe Damaturu LGA: M&E Officer Conversation & 
Interview 
31 12/03/2009 Yobe Damaturu Dispensary: OIC Conversation & 
Interview 
32 12/03/2009 Yobe SMOH: State HMIS Official Interview 
33 12/03/2009 Yobe SMOH: State HMIS Official Interview 
34 12/03/2009 Yobe SMOH: DPRS Interview 
35 12/03/2009 Yobe SMOH: PS Interview 
36    
37 17/07/2009   
38  Jigawa State Kiyawa PHC: MRO Conversation & 
Observation 
39  Jigawa State Dutse GH: MRO Conversation 
and Observation 
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S/N Date/Period Source/Respondent Type of Data 
collection 
40  Jigawa State SMOH: DPRS Briefing & 
Conversation 
41 20/07/2009 Jigawa State Jahun Gunduma: Director  Briefing & 
Conversation 
42  Jigawa State Kafin Hausa Gunduma: 
Director  
Briefing & 
Conversation 
43 21/07/2009 Jigawa State PPRHAA: HF and 
Community Feedback 
Focus group 
observation - 114 
HFs, 9 GH, 9 
GHSC, 1 GHSB  
44 22/07/2009 Jigawa State SMOH: State HMIS Officer Interview and 
observation 
45    
46 28/09 - 
04/10 2009  
Katsina SMOH: DHIS support State HMIS data 
analysis, quality 
audit 
47 05/10 - 7/10 
2009 
Katsina, Yobe, Zamfara & Jigawa HMIS 
officers 
Interstate Data 
Review 
48 14/10 - 
15/10 2009 
Jigawa State SMOH: State HMIS Office State HMIS data 
analysis, quality 
audit 
49 10/11/2009 Jigawa State: Health Data Consultative 
Committee members 
HDCC Meeting 
Observer 
50 11/11/ - 
12/11/2009 
Jigawa State: HMIS officers, LGA M&E 
officers, PRRINN LEC and PATHS 2 
Consultant 
Intrastate data 
review facilitator 
51    
52 7/12/2009 Katsina State: HDCC Chairman, HMIS 
Unit, PRRINN MNCH STM and SPO 
Meetings and 
conversations 
53 8/12/2009 Katsina SMOH: DHIS support State HMIS data 
analysis, quality 
audit 
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S/N Date/Period Source/Respondent Type of Data 
collection 
54 9/12 - 
10/12/2009 
Katsina State: HMIS officers, LGA M&E 
officers, PRRINN LEC and PATHS 2 
Consultant 
Intrastate data 
review facilitator 
  JIGAWA STATE   
55 5/07/2010 PRRINN-MNCH: HMIS LEC  Interview and 
Conversation 
56 6/07/2010 Tsakuwawa Health Post: Assistant OIC Interview 
57  Tsakuwawa Health Post: OIC Interview 
58  Tsakuwawa Community: LCV Secretary Interview 
59 07/07/2010 Tsakuwawa Health Post: OIC Interview and 
Conversation 
60  Tsakuwawa Village Head Interview 
61  PRRINN-MNCH: Community 
Engagement LEC 
Interview 
62  Tsakuwawa Community: LCV (Farmer & 
Head of Lasininayi Settlement) 
Interview 
62  Tsakuwawa Community: LCV (Farmer) Interview 
64  Tsakuwawa Community: LCV (TBA) Interview 
65  Tsakuwawa Community: LCV 
(Unemployed - male) 
Interview 
66  Tsakuwawa Health Post: Assistant OIC Interview and 
Conversation 
67 8/07/2010 Tsakuwawa Health Post: OIC Conversation, 
observation, data 
analysis 
68  PRRINN-MNCH: Community 
Engagement LEC 
Conversation 
69  Tsakuwawa Community: LCV (Town 
Crier) 
Interview 
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S/N Date/Period Source/Respondent Type of Data 
collection 
70  Tsakuwawa Community: LCV (Farmer in 
Kofar Gabas) 
Interview 
71  Tsakuwawa Community: 
TBA/Potter/bean cake seller 
Interview 
72  Tsakuwawa Community: LCV 
(TBA/trader) 
Interview 
73  Tsakuwawa Community: LCV 
(Unemployed-female) 
Interview 
74  Tsakuwawa Community: LCV (Tailor) Interview 
75  Tsakuwawa Community: LCV (bean 
cake seller) 
Interview 
76  PRRINN-MNCH: SPO Community 
Engagement 
Conversation 
77 9/07/2010 Tsakuwawa Community: Head Sweeper Interview 
78  Tsakuwawa Community: 
Fisherman/Sweeper 
Interview 
79  Tsakuwawa Community: 
Fisherman/Sweeper (Kofar Ariwa 
Settlement) 
Interview 
80  Tsakuwawa Community: 
Fisherman/Sanitation Officer 
Interview 
81  Tsakuwawa Community: 
Fisherman/Sanitation Officer (Kofar 
Ariwa Settlement) 
Interview 
 10/07/2010 Slept in the village Observation, 
reflection 
82 11/07/2010  Tsakuwawa Community resident - 
Health Promotions Officer Jahun 
Gunduma 
Interview 
83  Tsakuwawa Community resident - 
CHEW 
Interview 
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S/N Date/Period Source/Respondent Type of Data 
collection 
84  Tsakuwawa Village Head Conversation 
85 12/07/2010 Jahun Gunduma Research Council Interview 
86   Tsakuwawa Community resident - 
Health Promotions Officer Jahun 
Gunduma 
Interview 
87  Tsakuwawa Health Post: OIC Conversation 
88  SMOH DPRS Conversation 
89  Tsakuwawa Traditional Chiefs Interview 
 13/07/2010 Tsakuwawa Community: Women 
Attending ANC 
 
90  From Hantsu Settlement Interview 
91  From Kofar Kudu Interview 
92  Health Facility Security Guard Interview 
93 14/07/2010 Tsakuwawa Health Post: OIC Conversation 
94  Village Headʼs Wives  
95  Wife 1 Interview 
96  Wife 2 Interview 
97  Wife 3 Interview 
98  Wife 4 Interview 
99  21 Tsakuwawa Youths Interview 
100  10 Tsakuwawa Elders Interview 
101  Former State Health Commissioner  Phone 
Conversation 
 15/07/2010   
102  NGO Secretary (RIMCOF) Interview 
103  PRRINN-MNCH: Jigawa STM Conversation 
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S/N Date/Period Source/Respondent Type of Data 
collection 
104 16/07/2010 NGO Secretary (KAMALA) Interview 
 17/07 - 
21/07/2010 
  
105  DHIS Manual Developers: PATHS 2 
HMIS National Adviser, Health NHMIS 
Branch, Jigawa State HMIS Officer  
Training Manuals 
and 
Conversations 
 28/07 - 
30/07 
  
106  Jigawa, Yobe, Katsina, Zamfara state 
HMIS representatives, FMOH NHMIS 
officers, PRRINN M&E Programme 
Officers 
Training & 
Observation 
 09/12 - 
15/12/2010 
  
107  Location Kano - HISP-Nigeria: 4 HMIS 
Consultants, Jigawa, Yobe, Katsina, 
Zamfara state HMIS representatives, 
FMOH NHMIS officers, PRRINN M&E 
Programme Officers 
Interstate Data 
Review, 
Conversations, 
Observations 
 11/01 - 
18/01/2011 
  
108  HISP-Nigeria: 3 HMIS Consultants,  Conversation 
 19/03 - 
24/03/2011 
  
109  Location Katsina - HISP-Nigeria: 4 HMIS 
Consultants, Jigawa, Yobe, Katsina, 
Zamfara state HMIS representatives 
Interstate Data 
Review, 
Conversations, 
Observations 
    
110 01/03/2012 FMOH - Head NHMIS Branch  Interview -Phone 
111  HMIS Consultant Phone 
Conversation 
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S/N Date/Period Source/Respondent Type of Data 
collection 
 30/03/2012   
112  PRRINN-MNCH: Jigawa HMIS LEC Interview -Phone 
    
 
Type of Data Collection Quantity Note 
Interview 64 
Conversations 40 
Not unique respondents, 
includes conversations and 
observations with elements 
of an interview and repeat 
interviews/conversations 
etc 
 
Others- e.g. observations, 
meetings, workshops, 
trainings etc 
13 Unique count of type but 
not sources 
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Appendix 4: Sample Questions: Hierarchical Level 
Head of National Health Management Information System  
AIM: to understand the role, difficulties and opportunities for HMIS in Nigerian 
PHCs  
1. Personal Information 
 
Name………………………………………………………………………….. 
What is your official title and role?  
 
What are the typical activities that come with your role i.e. your common 
everyday tasks? 
2. Decentralisation 
a) Identifying principal/agent interactions 
i. What role do ICTs play in the decentralised PHC structure? 
ii. Can you give examples of how ICTs are used? 
iii. Who are the key stakeholders at this level? 
iv. Are ICTs used for monitoring performance targets or other 
managerial data? E.g. no. of hours worked, visits made, 
vaccines given etc.  
b) Health Information Systems 
i. What do you think are the main challenges in developing an 
effective NHMIS in Nigeria? 
ii. With specific reference to the PHC level, what are the 
difficulties you encounter or perceive in the collection and use 
of health information? 
iii. Is there a feedback structure to help health workers at the PHC 
level understand how their health data is being used?  
iv. Is there a functional system for the monitoring and evaluation 
of diseases? What role does the NHMIS play in this? 
v. Do you feel technology can be used for anything more helpful 
in the long run?  
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